Us Army Infantry Divisions 1944 45

A complete overview of the evolving organization, tactics, doctrine, weapons and equipment of the US Infantry in the Pacific, Mediterranean and European theatres, from 1944 to the war's end. This follow-up to Battle Orders 17: US Army Infantry Divisions 1942-43, covers the critical period 1944-45 when changes instituted by Lieutenant General Leslie J McNair, the head of the Army Ground Forces and an organizational genius, were imposed on an army reluctant to change. The book includes a table outlining all 66 US Infantry Army divisions that served during World War II, and analyzes the organization of manpower and resources that turned these divisions into a war-winning army.

A complete overview of the evolving organization, tactics, doctrine, weapons and equipment of the US Infantry in the Pacific, Mediterranean and European theatres, from 1944 to the war's end. This follow-up to Battle Orders 17: US Army Infantry Divisions 1942-43, covers the critical period 1944-45 when changes instituted by Lieutenant General Leslie J McNair, the head of the Army Ground Forces and an organizational genius, were imposed on an army reluctant to change. The book includes a table outlining all 66 US Infantry Army divisions that served during World War II, and analyzes the organization of manpower and resources that turned these divisions into a war-winning army.

A complete overview of the evolving organization, tactics, doctrine, weapons, and equipment of the US Infantry in the Pacific, Mediterranean, and European theatres from 1944 to the war's end. This follow-up to Battle Orders 17: US Army Infantry Divisions 1942-43, covers the critical period 1944-45 when changes instituted by Lieutenant General Leslie J. McNair, the head of the Army Ground Forces and an organizational genius, were imposed on an army reluctant to change. McNair wanted the infantry divisions to be as small, simple, and compact as possible so that a sufficient number could be manned and sent overseas. Commanders in theater wanted bigger divisions that had larger numbers of motor vehicles, as well as many organic elements that McNair thought should only be attached for specific operations. McNair's policies were (with a few exceptions) maintained until the end of the war in Europe, despite his accidental death at the hands of the Army Air Corps in August 1944. The book includes a table outlining all 66 US Infantry Army divisions that served during World War II and analyzes the organization of manpower and resources that turned these divisions into a war-winning army. Strategic and battle maps show key infantry engagements whilst the variety of photographs illuminate troops, terrain, weapons, and equipment. Four key battles are also examined, demonstrating the capabilities and limitations of the US Army Infantry divisions of the time.

The US Army infantry division was an intricate system of men and equipment welded together by doctrine and organization into an entity that could fight, maneuver, communicate within itself as well as with outside entities, and regenerate itself through a supply and replacement system. This book examines the organizational development, mobilization, deployment and combat actions of World War II US Army infantry divisions up until the end of 1943. Among the units covered are the separate infantry regiments and battalions of the "standard" type, showing how the Army's new "triangular" infantry division (based on three infantry regiments) evolved from the earlier "square" division (based on four).

This study analyzes the operational performance of the 28th Infantry Division during a period of high intensity combat in the European Theater of Operations. The focus is on the difficulties the division experienced within its subordinate infantry units. Infantrymen, though comprising less than 40 percent of the division's total strength, absorbed almost 90 percent of all casualties. The high casualty rate within infantry units severely curtailed the operational performance of the division. The difficulties the 28th experienced were commonplace in the European theater. Compounding the problem was the inadequate number of divisions in the U.S. Army force structure. This inadequacy forced divisions to remain in combat for excessive durations, greatly increasing battle and non-battle casualties. The army's personnel system further contributed to the problems infantry divisions experienced within their infantry units. It failed to provide sufficient numbers of infantry replacements in a timely manner and there was widespread dissatisfaction with the quality of infantry replacements. This study shows that the U.S. Army failed to realize both the importance of infantry units to the war effort and the severity of combat on the modern battlefield. The result was an infantry force structure poorly designed to accomplish its wartime mission.

The ETO is seen by many as the major theater of World War II, with more infantry regiments serving there than any other. This title follows one soldier ("Joseph") as he is drafted in February 1941, trains with the 22d Infantry in the United States and then ships to England in January 1944. On D-Day he lands on Utah Beach and in the following months fights through France, Belgium, and into Germany. The problems the common soldier faced between June 1944 and May 1945 are dealt with in particular in this authoritative and moving book.