Utility And Probability

This is an excerpt from the 4-volume dictionary of economics, a reference book which aims to define the subject of economics today. 1300 subject entries in the complete work cover the broad themes of economic theory. This extract concentrates on utility and probability.

Decision theory and the theory of rational choice have recently been the subjects of considerable research by philosophers and economists. However, no adequate anthology exists which can be used to introduce students to the field. This volume is designed to meet that need. The essays included are organized into five parts covering the foundations of decision theory, the conceptualization of probability and utility, pholosophical difficulties with the rules of rationality and with the assessment of probability, and causal decision theory. The editors provide an extensive introduction to the field and introductions to each part.

Introduction to Statistical Decision Theory: Utility Theory and Causal Analysis provides the theoretical background to approach decision theory from a statistical perspective. It covers both traditional approaches, in terms of value theory and expected utility theory, and recent developments, in terms of causal inference. The book is specifically designed to appeal to students and researchers that intend to acquire a knowledge of statistical science based on decision theory. Features Covers approaches for making decisions under certainty, risk, and uncertainty Illustrates expected utility theory and its extensions Describes approaches to elicit the utility function Reviews classical and Bayesian approaches to statistical inference based on decision theory Discusses the role of causal analysis in statistical decision theory

Human decision making involves problems which are being studied with increasing interest and sophistication. They range from controversial political decisions via individual consumer decisions to such simple tasks as signal discriminations. Although it would seem that decisions have to do with choices among available actions of any kind, there is general agreement that decision making research should pertain to choice prob lems which cannot be solved without a predecisional stage of finding choice alternatives, weighing evidence, and judging values. The ultimate objective of scientific research on decision making is two-fold: (a) to develop a theoretically sound technology for the optimal solution of decision problems, and (b) to formulate a descriptive theory of human decision making. The latter may, in tum, protect decision makers from being caught in the traps of their own limitations and biases. Recently, in decision making research the strong emphasis on well defined laboratory tasks is decreasing in favour of more realistic studies in various practical settings. This may well have been caused by a growing awareness of the fact that decision-behaviour is strongly determined by situational factors, which makes it necessary to look into processes of interaction between the decision maker and the relevant task environ ment. Almost inevitably there is a parallel shift of interest towards problems of utility measurement and the evaluation of consequences.

This book offers a unified treatment of my research in the foundations of expected utility theory from around 1965 to 1980. While parts are new, the presentation draws heavily on published articles and a few chapters in my 1970 monograph on utility theory. The diverse notations and styles of the sources have of course been reconciled here, and their topics arranged in a logical sequence. The two parts of the book take their respective cues from the von Neumann-Morgenstern axiomatization of preferences between risky options and from Savage's foundational treatment of decision making under uncertainty. Both parts are studies in the axiomatics of preferences for decision situations and in numerical representations for preferences. Proofs of the representation and uniqueness theorems appear at the ends of the chapters so as not to impede the flow of the discussion. A few warnings on notation are in order. The numbers for theorems cited within a chapter have no prefix if they appear in that chapter, but otherwise carry a chapter prefix (Theorem 3.2 is Theorem 2 in Chapter 3). All lower case Greek letters refer to numbers in the closed interval from o to 1. The same symbol in different chapters has essentially the same meaning with one major exception: x, y, ... mean quite different things in different chapters. I am indebted to many people for their help and encouragement.

Economic theory of subjective probability, utility and profit - probability being regarded as a concept of decision making theory. Application of theory. Annotated bibliography pp. 211 to 233.

Notions of probability and uncertainty have been increasingly prominant in modern economics. This book considers the philosophical and practical difficulties inherent in integrating these concepts into realistic economic situations. It outlines and evaluates the major developments, indicating where further work is needed. This book addresses: * probability, utility and rationality within current economic thought and practice * concepts of ignorance and indeterminancy * experimental economics * econometrics, with particular reference inference and estimation.