Waste Into Weapons

During the Second World War, the United Kingdom faced severe shortages of many essential raw materials. To keep its armaments factories running, the British government enlisted millions of people in efforts to recycle a wide range of materials for use in munitions production. Recycling not only supplied British munitions factories with much-needed raw materials - it also played a key role in the efforts of the British government to maintain the morale of its citizens, to secure billions of dollars in Lend-Lease aid from the United States, and even to uncover foreign intelligence. However, Britain's wartime recycling campaign came at a cost: it consumed many items that would never have been destroyed under normal circumstances, including significant parts of the nation's cultural heritage. Based on extensive archival research, Peter Thorsheim examines the relationship between armaments production, civil liberties, cultural preservation, and diplomacy, making Waste into Weapons the first in-depth history of twentieth-century recycling in Britain.

Following the two world wars of the twentieth century, governments decided to dispose of unwanted chemical weapons in the world's oceans. The deleterious consequences of this decision for the earth's precious marine environment are now becoming clear. As the issue of sea-dumped chemical weapons cannot be contained by borders, we will all have to deal with the adverse effects on our fragile planetary ecosystem. While states have made some efforts to address the situation, unresolved international legal issues remain. International Law and Sea-Dumped Chemical Weapons contains a systematic conceptual analysis of the international legal frameworks governing the remediation of sea-dumped chemical weapons. Where deficiencies are found in the law, legal solutions are offered. In addition, practical approaches to the problem are explored. Furthermore, the book argues that solutions to this environmental hazard rely on a holistic awareness-and acceptance-of how humanity's past actions have damaged our ecosystem. Aiming to bring about the necessary will to overcome this challenge, this volume identifies and analyses the problem, offers guidance, and provides hope to the current and succeeding generations so that we can solve the problem of sea-dumped chemical weapons and restore balance to our ecosystem.

Armed conflicts have become more complicated, with the emphasis shifting towards new weapons such as drones, cybercrime and autonomous weapons. In July 2017, the UN General Assembly adopted the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. This treaty prohibits a full range of nuclear-weapon-related activities, such as undertaking to develop, test, produce, manufacture, acquire, possess or stockpile nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the use or threat of use of these weapons. The ongoing conflicts have shown that the consequences of the use of explosive weapons are not limited to death, physical injury and disability, but also include long-term impacts on mental well-being. The use of improvised weapons by States and non-State actors is an area of concern for the environment. Every State must, therefore, ensure that weapons used by their armed forces are explicitly adjudged under International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and Human Rights Law. While reviewing a new weapon, the States must adopt multilateral approaches, drawing upon relevant legal, health, environmental and military expertise. This book describes the environmental effects of eight weapons and explosive remnants of war that have caused extensive environmental harm in the recent past. It also makes specific recommendations addressed to the international community and the States for protecting the natural environment from the impact of weapons of war. This book will contribute towards a better understanding of the environmental harm caused by military weapons.

The Nat. Nuclear Security Admin. (NNSA) is responsible for pit manufacturing (PM), a key component in a nuclear warhead. It lost its ability to PM in 1989 with the closing of the Rocky Flats Plant. In 1996, the Los Alamos Nat. Lab. was directed to reestablish a PM capability, starting with a limited number of pits for the W88 warhead. In recent years, NNSA has considered ways to increase its PM capacity, incl. building a new, large-scale PM facility. It has also proposed producing pits for the Reliable Replacement Warhead. This report determines the: (1) extent to which NNSA achieved its major goals for reestablishing its PM capability; (2) factors that currently constrain its ability to increase its PM capacity; and (3) status of its plans for future PM. Tables.