Weak States In The International System

This work defines weak states and their strengths and weaknesses. It examines why they are weak and their position in different international systems as well as their economic positions.

This book seeks to explain why weak states exist within the international system. Using the cases of Armenia, St. Kitts and Nevis, Lebanon, and Cambodia, the author argues that, if a state is weak and vulnerable, then it can practice an unexpected degree of relative autonomy unfettered by great powers.

Grand strategies can be thought of as overall survival strategies of all states. Great powers seek survival against other great powers seeking to undermine their power and position, determining prestige-seeking behavior as psychotic and destructive. Weak states suffer from systemic vulnerabilities and trade whatever political power they have to a great power for economic assistance. If enough weak states support a particular great power, then that great power will become more powerful relative to competitors. This forms an international system fashioned by these transactions.

This book studies systemic vulnerabilities and their impact on states and individual survival. The author theorizes that the structure of the international system is a product of the distribution of capabilities and vulnerabilities across states. States function or behave in terms of these systemic threats. The author examines a number of specific case-studies focusing on military, economic, environmental, political and cyber vulnerabilities, and how different states are impacted by them. Arguing that current attempts to securitize these vulnerabilities through defensive foreign policies are largely failing, the books makes the case for prioritizing economic development and human security.

Smaller nations have a special place in the international system, with a capacity to defy the expectations of most observers and many prominent theories of international relations. This text addresses an imbalance in the international relations literature by focusing attention on the role of small states.

The threat of terror, which flares in Africa and Indonesia, has given the problem of failed states an unprecedented immediacy and importance. In the past, failure had a primarily humanitarian dimension, with fewer implications for peace and security. Now nation-states that fail, or may do so, pose dangers to themselves, to their neighbors, and to people around the globe: preventing their failure, and reviving those that do fail, has become a strategic as well as a moral imperative. State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror develops an innovative theory of state failure that classifies and categorizes states along a continuum from weak to failed to collapsed. By understanding the mechanisms and identifying the tell-tale indicators of state failure, it is possible to develop strategies to arrest the fatal slide from weakness to collapse. This state failure paradigm is illustrated through detailed case studies of states that have failed and collapsed (the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone, the Sudan, Somalia), states that are dangerously weak (Colombia, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan), and states that are weak but safe (Fiji, Haiti, Lebanon).

Why do many Asian, African, and Latin American states have such difficulty in directing the behavior of their populations--in spite of the resources at their disposal? And why do a small number of other states succeed in such control? What effect do failing laws and social policies have on the state itself? In answering these questions, Joel Migdal takes a new look at the role of the state in the third world. Strong Societies and Weak States offers a fresh approach to the study of state-society relations and to the possibilities for economic and political reforms in the third world. In Asia, Africa, and Latin America, state institutions have established a permanent presence among the populations of even the most remote villages. A close look at the performance of these agencies, however, reveals that often they operate on principles radically different from those conceived by their founders and creators in the capital city. Migdal proposes an answer to this paradox: a model of state-society relations that highlights the state's struggle with other social organizations and a theory that explains the differing abilities of states to predominate in those struggles.