Welfare Economics And Antitrust Policy Vol Ii

This book is Volume II of a two-volume set on antitrust policy, analyzing the economic efficiency and moral desirability of various kinds of antitrust-policy-coverable conduct and various possible government responses to such conduct, including US and EU antitrust law. The overall study consists of three parts. Part I (Chapters 1-8) introduces readers to the economic, moral, and legal concepts that play important roles in antitrust-policy analysis. Part II (Chapters 9-16) analyzes the impacts of eight types of conduct covered by antitrust policy and various possible government responses to such conduct in terms of their economic efficiency, their impact on liberal moral rights, and their instantiation of various utilitarian and other egalitarian conceptions of the moral good. Part III (Chapters 17-18) provides detailed information on US antitrust law and EU competition law and compares the extent to which—when correctly interpreted and applied—these two bodies of law could increase economic efficiency, protect liberal moral rights, and instantiate various morally defensible conceptions of the moral good. This second volume contains the last 6 chapters of Part II, which focus respectively on horizontal (M&A)s, conglomerate (M&A)s, surrogates for vertical integration, vertical (M&A)s, joint ventures, and internal growth and Part III, which focuses on US antitrust law and EU competition law. The book will appeal to undergraduate and graduate students of economics and law who are interested in welfare economics, antitrust policy, and The General Theory of Second Best.

This book is Volume II of a two-volume set on antitrust policy, analyzing the economic efficiency and moral desirability of various kinds of antitrust-policy-coverable conduct and various possible government responses to such conduct, including US and EU antitrust law. The overall study consists of three parts. Part I (Chapters 1-8) introduces readers to the economic, moral, and legal concepts that play important roles in antitrust-policy analysis. Part II (Chapters 9-16) analyzes the impacts of eight types of conduct covered by antitrust policy and various possible government responses to such conduct in terms of their economic efficiency, their impact on liberal moral rights, and their instantiation of various utilitarian and other egalitarian conceptions of the moral good. Part III (Chapters 17-18) provides detailed information on US antitrust law and EU competition law and compares the extent to which-when correctly interpreted and applied-these two bodies of law could increase economic efficiency, protect liberal moral rights, and instantiate various morally defensible conceptions of the moral good. This second volume contains the last 6 chapters of Part II, which focus respectively on horizontal (M&A)s, conglomerate (M&A)s, surrogates for vertical integration, vertical (M&A)s, joint ventures, and internal growth and Part III, which focuses on US antitrust law and EU competition law. The book will appeal to undergraduate and graduate students of economics and law who are interested in welfare economics, antitrust policy, and The General Theory of Second Best.

This book is Volume I of a two-volume set on antitrust policy, analyzing the economic efficiency and moral desirability of various tests for antitrust legality, including those promulgated by US and EU antitrust law. The overall study consists of three parts. Part I (Chapters 1-8) introduces readers to the economic, moral, and legal concepts that play important roles in antitrust-policy analysis. Part II (Chapters 9-16) analyzes the impacts of eight types of conduct covered by antitrust policy and various possible government responses to such conduct in terms of economic efficiency, the securing of liberal moral rights, and the instantiation of various utilitarian, non-utilitarian-egalitarian, and mixed conceptions of the moral good. Part III (Chapters 17-18) provides detailed information on US antitrust law and EU competition law, and compares the extent to which—when correctly interpreted and applied—these two bodies of law could ensure economic efficiency, protect liberal moral rights, and instantiate various morally defensible conceptions of the moral good. This first volume contains Part I and the first two chapters of Part II of the overall study—the two chapters that focus on oligopolistic and predatory conduct of all kinds, respectively. The book will appeal to undergraduate and graduate students of economics and law who are interested in welfare economics, antitrust legality and the General Theory of the Second Best.

As the economists and lawyers contributing to this volume demonstrate, an important element of the Reagan Revolution has been a fundamental shift in antitrust policy and enforcement away from the focus on market structure during the 1960s and early 1970s toward a greater emphasis on the effects of business conduct on economic efficiency and consumer welfare. This shift, caused both by a marked change in the political climate and changes in the thinking and research output of economists, has had an enormous impact on the volume and substance of antitrust activity during the 1980s. The articles collected here--each written especially for this volume--assess these changes in antitrust activity in key policy areas: mergers, vertical restraints, monopoly, and strategic behavior. The authors examine particularly the impact of the change in antitrust enforcement and policy on social welfare. They point out where changes have been beneficial, evaluate whether further changes in policy or law are desirable, and probe unresolved issues, such as whether current policy pays too little attention to the possible strategic or anticompetitive aspects of some forms of business conduct. Taken together, these essays offer a multifaceted explanation of the ways in which economics has contributed to changes in antitrust policy and law. By providing a more thorough understanding of developments in industrial economics during the last 30 years, the authors also provide lawyers, economists, business executives, and students of business administration with new insights into possible future trends in antitrust policy and law--and their impact on the structure of American businesses and markets.

This volume (1) defines the specific-anticompetitive-intent, lessening-competition, distorting-competition, and exploitative-abuse tests of illegality promulgated by U.S. and/or E.U. antitrust law, (2) compares the efficiency defenses promulgated by U.S. and E.U. antitrust law, (3) compares the conduct-coverage of the various U.S. and E.U. antitrust laws, (4) defines price competition and quality-or-variety-increasing-investment (QV-investment) competition and explains why they should be analyzed separately, (5) defines the components of individualized-pricing and across-the-board-pricing sellers’ price minus marginal cost gaps and analyses each’s determinants, (6) defines the determinants of the intensity of QV-investment competition and explains how they determine that intensity, (7) demonstrates that definitions of both classical and antitrust markets are inevitably arbitrary, not just at their periphery but comprehensively, (8) criticizes the various protocols for market definition recommended/used by scholars, the U.S. antitrust agencies, the European Commission, and U.S. and E.U. courts, (9) explains that a firm’s economic (market) power or dominance depends on its power over both price and QV investment and demonstrates that, even if markets could be defined non-arbitrarily, a firm’s economic power could not be predicted from its market share, (10) articulates a definition of “oligopolistic conduct” that some economists have implicitly used–conduct whose perpetrator-perceived ex ante profitability depended critically on the perpetrator’s belief that its rivals’ responses would be affected by their belief that it could react to their responses, distinguishes two types of such conduct–contrived and natural–by whether it entails anticompetitive threats and/or offers, explains why this distinction is critical under U.S. but not E.U. antitrust law, analyzes the profitability of each kind of oligopolistic conduct, examines these analyses’ implications for each’s antitrust legality, and criticizes related U.S. and E.U. case-law and doctrine and scholarly positions (e.g., on the evidence that establishes the illegal oligopolistic character of pricing), and (11) executes parallel analyses of predatory conduct--e.g., criticizes various arguments for the inevitable unprofitability of predatory pricing, the various tests that economists/U.S. courts advocate using/use to determine whether pricing is predatory, and two analyses by economists of the conditions under which QV investment and systems rivalry are predatory and examines the conditions under which production-process research, plant-modernization, and long-term full-requirements contracts are predatory.

More than any other area of regulation, antitrust economics shapes law and policy in the United States, the Americas, Europe, and Asia. In a number of different areas of antitrust, advances in theory and empirical work have caused a fundamental reevaluation and shift of some of the assumptions behind antitrust policy. This reevaluation has profound implications for the future of the field. The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics has collected chapters from many of the leading figures in antitrust. In doing so, this two volume Handbook provides an important reference guide for scholars, teachers, and practitioners. However, it is more than a merely reference guide. Rather, it has a number of different goals. First, it takes stock of the current state of scholarship across a number of different antitrust topics. In doing so, it relies primarily upon the economics scholarship. In some situations, though, there is also coverage of legal scholarship, case law developments, and legal policies. The second goal of the Handbook is to provide some ideas about future directions of antitrust scholarship and policy. Antitrust economics has evolved over the last 60 years. It has both shaped policy and been shaped by policy. The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics will serve as a policy and research guide of next steps to consider when shaping the future of the field of antitrust.

Michal Gal's thorough analysis shows the effects of market size on competition policy, ranging from rules of thumb to more general policy prescriptions, such as goals and remedial tools. Competition policy in small economies is becoming increasingly important, since the number of small jurisdictions adopting such policy is rapidly growing. Gal's focus extends beyond domestic competition policy to the evaluation of the current trend toward the worldwide harmonization of policies.

These recognized leaders in competition and antitrust law offer an in-depth comparison of Canadian and U.S. competition laws, from their origins in the nineteenth century to the most recent cases involving mergers, pricing practices, cartels, advertising and abuse of dominance, with a special chapter on antitrust economics, which makes economics accessible to lawyers."--Pub. desc.