What If Anything Are Species

This book is an extended argument for abandoning the species rank. Instead, the author proposes that the rank of "species" be replaced by a pluralistic and multi-level view. In such a view, all clades including the smallest identifiable one would be named and studied within a phylogenetic context. What are currently called "species" represent different sorts of things depending on the sort of organisms and processes being considered. This is already the case, but is not formally recognized by those scientists using the species rank in their work. Adopting a rankless taxonomy at all levels would enhance academic studies of evolution and ecology and yield practical benefits in areas of public concern such as conservation. The Open Access version of this book, available at http://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/e/9781498714549, has been made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial license. KEY FEATURES • Proposes the replacement of restrictive species concepts with a pluralistic view • Suggests abandoning the formal taxonomic rank of "species" • Considers zoological, botanical, and microbiological aspects of the species level • Deals with practical issues such as conservation, inventories, and field guides

The general notion of species is one of the most fundamental in biology. But an idea of species is also one of the most persistent unresolved obsessions of biologists, philosophers and theoreticians. This new book investigates the multifaceted problem species as a "conceptual envelope" of that notion. Contemporary conceptualists and evolutionary epistemology allow for a fresh look by analyzing the framework of history viewed as changes ordered by changing philosophical-scientific contexts. In this analysis, the species problem is characterized in a pluralistic non-trivial manner, in contrast to a more monistic "accepted view." Key Features Provides new insights into the persistent species "problem." Focuses on conceptual history and identifies pivotal landmarks in the history of the concept of species. Argues for a scientific consistency of species pluralism. Discusses the "evolving species-hood" in the context of new essentialism. Related Titles * Wilkins, J. S, et al., eds. Species Problems and Beyond: Contemporary Issues in Philosophy and Practice (ISBN 978-1-0322-2147-2) * Mishler, B. D. What, if anything, are species? (ISBN 978-1-4987-1454-9) * Wilkins, J. S. Species: The Evolution of the Idea, Second Edition (ISBN 978-1-1380-5574-2) * Sigwart, J. D. What Species Mean: A User's Guide to the Units of Biodiversity (ISBN 978-1-4987-9937-9)

Species Problems and Beyond offers a collection of up-to-date essays discussing from an interdisciplinary perspective the many ramifications of the ‘Species Problem.’ The authors represent experts in the philosophy of biology, in species-level evolutionary investigations, and in biodiversity studies and conservation. Some of the topics addressed concern the context sensitivity of the term ‘species’; species as individuals, processes, natural kinds, or as ‘operative concepts’; species delimitation in the age of Big (genomic) Data; and taxonomic inflation and its consequences for conservation strategies. The carefully edited volume will be an invaluable resource for philosophers of biology and evolutionary biologists alike. – Olivier Rieppel, Rowe Family Curator of Evolutionary Biology, Negaunee Integrative Research Center, Field Museum, USA Species, or ‘the Species Problem’, is a topic in science, in the philosophy of science, and in general philosophy. In fact, it encompasses many aspects of the same problem, and these are dealt with in this volume. Species are often thought of as fundamental units of biological matter to be used in ecology, conservation, classification, and biodiversity. The chapters in this book present opposing views on the current philosophical and conceptual issues of the Species Problem in biology. Divided into four sections, Concepts and Theories, Practice and Methods, Ranks and Trees and Names, and Metaphysics and Epistemologies, the book is authored by biologists, philosophers, and historians, many leaders in their fields. Topics include ontology of species, definitions of both species category and units, species rank, speciation issues, nomenclature, ecology, and species conservation. Species Problems and Beyond aims to clarify the contemporary issues of the Species Problem. It is ideal for use in upper-level seminars and courses in Evolutionary Biology, Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Biology, Systematics and Taxonomy, and Phylogenetics/Cladistics, and for any scholar in these fields.

This sweeping discussion of the philosophy of evolutionary biology is based on the author's revolutionary idea that species are not kinds of organisms but wholes composed of organisms—individuals in the broadest ontological sense. Although the book's primary focus is on species and speciation, it deals with a wide variety of other fundamental units and basic processes and provides a reexamination of the role of classification in biology and other sciences. In explaining his individuality thesis, Michael T. Ghiselin provides extended discussions of such philosophical topics as definition, the reality of various kinds of groups, and how we classify traits and processes. He develops and applies the implications for general biology and other sciences and makes the case that a better understanding of species and of classification in general puts biologists and paleontologists in a much better position to understand nature in general, and such processes as extinction in particular.

This book was listed as a CHOICE Outstanding Academic Title in 2011. Defining Species: A Sourcebook from Antiquity to Today provides excerpts and commentary on the definition of «species» from source material ranging from the Greeks, through the middle ages, to the modern era. It demonstrates that the logical meaning of species is in direct contrast to the use of kind terms and concepts in natural history and biology, and that the myth that biologists or natural historians were ever essentialists about kinds is mistaken.

A world of categones devmd of spirit waits for life to return. Saul Bellow, Humboldt's Gift The stock-in-trade of communicating hypotheses about the historical path of evolution is a graphical representation called a phylogenetic tree. In most such graphics, pairs of branches diverge from other branches, successively marching across abstract time toward the present. To each branch is tied a tag with a name, a binominal symbol that functions as does the name given to an individual human being. On phylogenetic trees the names symbolize species. What exactly do these names signify? What kind of information is communicated when we claim to have knowledge of the following types? "Tetonius mathewzi was ancestral to Pseudotetonius ambiguus. " "The sample of fossils attributed to Homo habzlis is too variable to contain only one species. " "Interbreeding populations of savanna baboons all belong to Papio anubis. " "Hylobates lar and H. pileatus interbreed in zones of geographic overlap. " While there is nearly universal agreement that the notion of the speczes is fundamental to our understanding of how evolution works, there is a very wide range of opinion on the conceptual content and meaning of such particular statements regarding species. This is because, oddly enough, evolutionary biolo gists are quite far from agreement on what a species is, how it attains this status, and what role it plays in evolution over the long term.

Although the species is one of the fundamental units of biological classification, there is remarkably little consensus among biologists about what defines a species, even within distinct sub-disciplines. The literature of paleobiology, in particular, is littered with qualifiers and cautions about applying the term to the fossil record or equating such species with those recognized among living organisms. In Species and Speciation in the Fossil Record, experts in the field examine how they conceive of species of fossil animals and consider the implications these different approaches have for thinking about species in the context of macroevolution. After outlining views of the Modern Synthesis of evolutionary disciplines and detailing the development within paleobiology of quantitative methods for documenting and analyzing variation within fossil assemblages, contributors explore the challenges of recognizing and defining species from fossil specimens—and offer potential solutions. Addressing both the tempo and mode of speciation over time, they show how with careful interpretation and a clear species concept, fossil species may be sufficiently robust for meaningful paleobiological analyses. Indeed, they demonstrate that the species concept, if more refined, could unearth a wealth of information about the interplay between species origins and extinctions, between local and global climate change, and greatly deepen our understanding of the evolution of life.

Christine M. Korsgaard presents a compelling new view of humans' moral relationships to the other animals. She defends the claim that we are obligated to treat all sentient beings as what Kant called "ends-in-themselves". Drawing on a theory of the good derived from Aristotle, she offers an explanation of why animals are the sorts of beings for whom things can be good or bad. She then turns to Kant's argument for the value of humanity to show that rationality commits us to claiming the standing of ends-in-ourselves, in two senses. Kant argued that as autonomous beings, we claim to be ends-in-ourselves when we claim the standing to make laws for ourselves and each other. Korsgaard argues that as beings who have a good, we also claim to be ends-in-ourselves when we take the things that are good for us to be good absolutely and so worthy of pursuit. The first claim commits us to joining with other autonomous beings in relations of moral reciprocity. The second claim commits us to treating the good of every sentient creature as something of absolute importance. Korsgaard argues that human beings are not more important than the other animals, that our moral nature does not make us superior to the other animals, and that our unique capacities do not make us better off than the other animals. She criticizes the "marginal cases" argument and advances a new view of moral standing as attaching to the atemporal subjects of lives. She criticizes Kant's own view that our duties to animals are indirect, and offers a non-utilitarian account of the relation between pleasure and the good. She also addresses a number of directly practical questions: whether we have the right to eat animals, experiment on them, make them work for us and fight in our wars, and keep them as pets; and how to understand the wrong that we do when we cause a species to go extinct.