What S In A Name That Which We Call Capital Controls

This paper investigates why controls on capital inflows have a bad name, and evoke such visceral opposition, by tracing how capital controls have been used and perceived, since the late nineteenth century. While advanced countries often employed capital controls to tame speculative inflows during the last century, we conjecture that several factors undermined their subsequent use as prudential tools. First, it appears that inflow controls became inextricably linked with outflow controls. The latter have typically been more pervasive, more stringent, and more linked to autocratic regimes, failed macroeconomic policies, and financial crisis—inflow controls are thus damned by this “guilt by association.” Second, capital account restrictions often tend to be associated with current account restrictions. As countries aspired to achieve greater trade integration, capital controls came to be viewed as incompatible with free trade. Third, as policy activism of the 1970s gave way to the free market ideology of the 1980s and 1990s, the use of capital controls, even on inflows and for prudential purposes, fell into disrepute.

This paper investigates why controls on capital inflows have a bad name, and evoke such visceral opposition, by tracing how capital controls have been used and perceived, since the late nineteenth century. While advanced countries often employed capital controls to tame speculative inflows during the last century, we conjecture that several factors undermined their subsequent use as prudential tools. First, it appears that inflow controls became inextricably linked with outflow controls. The latter have typically been more pervasive, more stringent, and more linked to autocratic regimes, failed macroeconomic policies, and financial crisis--inflow controls are thus damned by this "guilt by association." Second, capital account restrictions often tend to be associated with current account restrictions. As countries aspired to achieve greater trade integration, capital controls came to be viewed as incompatible with free trade. Third, as policy activism of the 1970s gave way to the free market ideology of the 1980s and 1990s, the use of capital controls, even on inflows and for prudential purposes, fell into disrepute.--Abstract.

This paper investigates why controls on capital inflows have a bad name, and evoke such visceral opposition, by tracing how capital controls have been used and perceived, since the late nineteenth century. While advanced countries often employed capital controls to tame speculative inflows during the last century, we conjecture that several factors undermined their subsequent use as prudential tools. First, it appears that inflow controls became inextricably linked with outflow controls. The latter have typically been more pervasive, more stringent, and more linked to autocratic regimes, failed macroeconomic policies, and financial crisis—inflow controls are thus damned by this “guilt by association.” Second, capital account restrictions often tend to be associated with current account restrictions. As countries aspired to achieve greater trade integration, capital controls came to be viewed as incompatible with free trade. Third, as policy activism of the 1970s gave way to the free market ideology of the 1980s and 1990s, the use of capital controls, even on inflows and for prudential purposes, fell into disrepute.

Free capital movements played an important part in the economic integration and globalisation of the nineteenth century. This work analyses historical experience with capital controls, in Britain and elsewhere, and reviews the theory. It concludes that such controls are damaging and that there is no case for reviving them.

This paper provides an analysis of the use and effects of capital controls in 27 AEs and EMDEs which experienced at least one financial crisis between 1995 and 2017. Countries often turn to using capital controls in crisis: some ease inflow controls while others tighten controls on outflows. A key finding is that countries with pervasive controls before the start of the crisis are shielded compared to countries with more open capital accounts, which see a significant decline in capital flows during crises. In contrast, the effectiveness of capital controls introduced during crises appears to be weak and difficult to identify. There is also some evidence that the introduction of outflow controls during crises is negatively associated with sovereign debt ratings, but that investors may actually forgive with time.

A comprehensive examination of policy measures intended to help emerging markets contend with large and volatile capital flows. While always episodic in nature, capital flows to emerging market economies have been especially volatile since the global financial crisis. After peaking at $680 billion in 2007, flows to emerging markets turned negative at the onset of crisis in 2008, then rebounded only to recede again during the U.S. sovereign debt downgrade in 2011. Since then, flows have continued to swing wildly, leaving emerging market policy makers wondering whether they can put in place policies during the inflow phase that will soften the blow when flows subsequently recede. This book offers the first comprehensive treatment of policy measures intended to help emerging markets contend with large and volatile capital flows. The authors, all IMF experts, explain that, in the spirit of liberalization and deregulation in the 1980s and 1990s, many emerging market governments eliminated capital inflow controls along with outflow controls. By 2012, however, capital inflow controls were again acknowledged as legitimate policy tools. Focusing on the macroeconomic and financial-stability risks associated with capital flows, the authors combine theoretical and empirical analysis to consider the interaction between monetary, exchange rate, macroprudential, and capital control policies to mitigate these risks. They examine the effectiveness of various policy tools, discuss the practical considerations and multilateral implications of their use, and provide concrete policy advice for dealing with capital inflows.

This book is the thirteenth volume in the International Papers in Political Economy (IPPE) series which explores the latest developments in political economy. A collection of eight papers, the book concentrates on the deregulation of domestic financial markets and discusses financial liberalisation in terms of its past performance, current progress and future developments. The chapters have been written by expert contributors in the field and focus on topics such as past records of financial liberalisation, future policies of regulation, and current account imbalances. Other papers examine capital account regulations in developing and emerging countries, and capital controls in the Eurozone after the 2007 financial crisis. This collection of papers invites readers to consider the impact of financial liberalisation both during and after the global economic crisis. Scholars and students with an interest in political economy, financialisation, and economic performance will find this collection stimulating and informative.