What S The Damage Medium Term Output Dynamics After Banking Crises

This paper investigates the medium-term behavior of output following banking crises, and its association with pre- and post-crisis conditions and policies. We find that output tends to be depressed substantially following banking crises, with no rebound to the precrisis trend. However, growth does eventually tend to return to its precrisis rate, with substantial crosscountry variation in outcomes. The depressed path of output typically results from reductions of roughly equal proportions in the employment rate, the capital-to-labor ratio, and total factor productivity. Initial conditions that are strongly associated with medium-run output losses include the short-run change in output, the occurrence of a joint banking-and-currency crisis, and a high precrisis level of investment. Short-run fiscal and monetary stimulus is associated with smaller medium-run deviations of output and growth from the precrisis trend.

One of the most puzzling facts in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) is that output across advanced and emerging economies recovered at a much slower rate than anticipated by most forecasting agencies. This paper delves into the mechanics behind the observed slow recovery and the associated permanent output losses in the aftermath of the crisis, with a particular focus on the role played by financial frictions and investment dynamics. The paper provides two main contributions. First, we empirically document that lower investment during financial crises is the key factor leading to permanent loss of output and total factor productivity (TFP) in the wake of a crisis. Second, we develop a DSGE model with financial frictions and capital-embodied technological change capable of reproducing the empirical facts. We also evaluate the role of financial policies in stabilizing output and TFP in response to disruptions in financial markets.

This paper takes stock of the global economic recovery a decade after the 2008 financial crisis. Output losses after the crisis appear to be persistent, irrespective of whether a country suffered a banking crisis in 2007–08. Sluggish investment was a key channel through which these losses registered, accompanied by long-lasting capital and total factor productivity shortfalls relative to precrisis trends. Policy choices preceding the crisis and in its immediate aftermath influenced postcrisis variation in output. Underscoring the importance of macroprudential policies and effective supervision, countries with greater financial vulnerabilities in the precrisis years suffered larger output losses after the crisis. Countries with stronger precrisis fiscal positions and those with more flexible exchange rate regimes experienced smaller losses. Unprecedented and exceptional policy actions taken after the crisis helped mitigate countries’ postcrisis output losses.

"Claessens, Klingebiel, and Laeven analyze the role of institutions in resolving systemic banking crises for a broad sample of countries. Banking crises are fiscally costly, especially when policies like substantial liquidity support, explicit government guarantees on financial institutions' liabilities, and forbearance from prudential regulations are used. Higher fiscal outlays do not, however, accelerate the recovery from a crisis. Better institutions--less corruption, improved law and order, legal system, and bureaucracy--do. The authors find these results to be relatively robust to estimation techniques, including controlling for the effects of a poor institutional environment on the likelihood of financial crisis and the size of fiscal costs. Their results suggest that countries should use strict policies to resolve a crisis and use the crisis as an opportunity to implement medium-term structural reforms, which will also help avoid future systemic crises. This paper--a product of the Financial Sector Operations and Policy Department--is part of a larger effort in the department to study financial crisis resolution"--World Bank web site.

The lingering effects of the economic crisis are still visible—this shows a clear need to improve our understanding of financial crises. This book surveys a wide range of crises, including banking, balance of payments, and sovereign debt crises. It begins with an overview of the various types of crises and introduces a comprehensive database of crises. Broad lessons on crisis prevention and management, as well as the short-term economic effects of crises, recessions, and recoveries, are discussed.

Italy’s deep-rooted structural problems resulted in an unsatisfactory productivity performance and a dismal growth over the last 15 years. The global financial crisis has exacerbated these long-standing weaknesses, taking a heavy toll on Italy’s economy. With output back to its end-2001 level, Italy’s output losses associated with the crisis have been, thus far, about 132 billion of 2000 euro (around 10 percent of precrisis 1998 - 2004 real GDP). About three quarters of these losses are estimated to be due to a shortfall in potential output. Potential output is not expected to rebound to its precrisis trend over the medium term, even though growth is projected to do so within the next two years. In the short-run, the decline in output is mainly accounted for by a collapse in productivity; in the medium term, employment and capital are also likely to be affected, with implications for the longer-term growth and fiscal outlook.

This edition of the World Economic Outlook explores the prospects for growth in the aftermath of the financial crisis. The fragile nature of the recovery will present many challenges. These include the need for continued strong monetary, fiscal, and financial policies, ongoing efforts to restore the financial sector to health, improvements in private demand, and preparation of exit strategies on the fiscal, monetary, and financial fronts. The first of two analytical chapters included in this edition, "Monetary Policy and Asset Prices: What Do We Learn from Booms and Busts?" explores whether there is a role for monetary policy in preventing asset price busts. The second, "Medium-Run Output Evolutions after Crises: A Historical Perspective," explores the effect of large economic shocks on output and its composition, including variations related to initial conditions, the type of shock, and economic policies.