Wittgenstein And Theology

Does Wittgenstein's philosophy lead to atheism? Is it clearly religious? Perplexingly, both of these questions have been answered in the affirmative. Despite the increasing awareness and use of Wittgenstein's philosophy within theological circles the puzzle persists: 'Does his philosophy really fit with theology?' It is helpful to show that Wittgenstein has no agenda towards atheism or religious belief in order to move ahead and properly discuss his philosophy as it stands. A study of Wittgenstein's key concepts of logic and language in his major works from the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus to the Philosophical Investigations and On Certainty reveals how he came to see in his later work that meaning is not simply intuitive or a consequence of solitary empirical investigation; rather, meaning is shown in how words are woven into the community of concrete life practices. A discussion of Christology and Luther's distinction between the theologian of glory and the theologian of the cross provide clear theological analogies for Wittgenstein's later philosophy. It also provides important evidence to show-through examples of scripture, liturgy, and practice-that Wittgenstein's philosophy is a useful tool that can fit with theology.

Does Wittgenstein's philosophy lead to atheism? Is it clearly religious? Perplexingly, both of these questions have been answered in the affirmative. Despite the increasing awareness and use of Wittgenstein's philosophy within theological circles the puzzle persists: 'Does his philosophy really fit with theology?' It is helpful to show that Wittgenstein has no agenda towards atheism or religious belief in order to move ahead and properly discuss his philosophy as it stands. A study of Wittgenstein's key concepts of logic and language in his major works from the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus to the Philosophical Investigations and On Certainty reveals how he came to see in his later work that meaning is not simply intuitive or a consequence of solitary empirical investigation; rather, meaning is shown in how words are woven into the community of concrete life practices. A discussion of Christology and Luther's distinction between the theologian of glory and the theologian of the cross provide clear theological analogies for Wittgenstein's later philosophy. It also provides important evidence to show-through examples of scripture, liturgy, and practice-that Wittgenstein's philosophy is a useful tool that can fit with theology.

Can we talk meaningfully about God? The theological movement known as Grammatical Thomism affirms that religious language is nonsensical, because the reality of God is beyond our capacity for expression. Stephen Mulhall critically evaluates the claims of this movement (as exemplified in the work of Herbert McCabe and David Burrell) to be a legitimate inheritor of Wittgenstein's philosophical methods as well as Aquinas's theological project. The major obstacle to this claim is that Grammatical Thomism makes the nonsensicality of religious language when applied to God a touchstone of Thomist insight, whereas 'nonsense' is standardly taken to be solely a term of criticism in Wittgenstein's work. Mulhall argues that, if Wittgenstein is read in the terms provided by the work of Cora Diamond and Stanley Cavell, then a place can be found in both his early work and his later writings for a more positive role to be assigned to nonsensical utterances—one which depends on exploiting an analogy between religious language and riddles. And once this alignment between Wittgenstein and Aquinas is established, it also allows us to see various ways in which his later work has a perfectionist dimension—in that it overlaps with the concerns of moral perfectionism, and in that it attributes great philosophical significance to what theology and philosophy have traditionally called 'perfections' and 'transcendentals', particularly concepts such as Being, Truth, and Unity or Oneness. This results in a radical reconception of the role of analogous usage in language, and so in the relation between philosophy and theology.

"Intended primarily to introduce Wittgenstein to students of theology, but aimed also at philosophers interested in religion, the book focuses on those of Wittgenstein's writings (primarily in the Philosophical investigations) that relate to theological issues such as the inner life, the immortality of the soul and the relationship of the believer to church and tradtion. By taking up the main points raised by reviewers of the first edition, the author responds in his new material to a wide range of recent literature and other interpretations of Wittengenstein's -- often seemingly ambiguous -- religious positions, and in so doing paints an absorbing picture, for a fresh set of readers, of how theology might look 'after Wittgenstein'."--Last page of cover.

Gordon Graham presents a bold new account of Wittgenstein's philosophy, which argues for its relevance to the study of religion and aims to revitalize the philosophy of 'true religion'. He uses Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy to argue in favour of the idea that 'true religion' is to be understood as human participation in divine life.

This volume argues that Wittgenstein’s philosophy of religion and his thought in general continue to be highly relevant for present and future research on interreligious relations.

Wittgenstein was one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century. In this collection, distinguished Wittgenstein scholars examine his legacy for the philosophy of religion by examining key areas of his work: Wittgenstein's Tractatus; Frazer's 'Golden Bough'; and the implications of his later philosophy for the understanding of religion. Assessments are also provided of the philosophical and theological reception of his work. The collection provides an invaluable resource for graduate and undergraduate teaching of Wittgenstein in relation to religion.