Wittgenstein S Lectures On The Foundations Of Mathematics Cambridge 1939

For several terms at Cambridge in 1939, Ludwig Wittgenstein lectured on the philosophical foundations of mathematics. A lecture class taught by Wittgenstein, however, hardly resembled a lecture. He sat on a chair in the middle of the room, with some of the class sitting in chairs, some on the floor. He never used notes. He paused frequently, sometimes for several minutes, while he puzzled out a problem. He often asked his listeners questions and reacted to their replies. Many meetings were largely conversation. These lectures were attended by, among others, D. A. T. Gasking, J. N. Findlay, Stephen Toulmin, Alan Turing, G. H. von Wright, R. G. Bosanquet, Norman Malcolm, Rush Rhees, and Yorick Smythies. Notes taken by these last four are the basis for the thirty-one lectures in this book. The lectures covered such topics as the nature of mathematics, the distinctions between mathematical and everyday languages, the truth of mathematical propositions, consistency and contradiction in formal systems, the logicism of Frege and Russell, Platonism, identity, negation, and necessary truth. The mathematical examples used are nearly always elementary.

The book is a first detailed discussion of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Remarks on Colour, a compilation of writings on the subject from the last fifteen months of his life. The origin and significance of the remarks are explained along with a remark-by-remark guide to what Wittgenstein says. In addition to serving as an account of the thought recorded in the text, the book provides an interpretation of Wittgenstein’s treatment of colour concepts and an account of his distinctive philosophical style. Remarks on Colour is shown to be a good way into the philosophy, to reveal a great deal about how Wittgenstein approaches philosophy, and to bring out features of his thought elided, if not missed, by more general studies, especially those that focus on more finished work.

In Wittgenstein and the Social Sciences, Robert Vinten takes a fresh look at the relationship between Wittgenstein’s philosophy and the social sciences. He argues that although social sciences are quite different to the natural sciences, they are nonetheless properly called ‘sciences’. The book looks in detail at whether Wittgenstein can be claimed by conservatives, liberals, or socialists as their own. Wittgenstein’s philosophical remarks and remarks about politics and culture are taken into account in deciding where to locate Wittgenstein in relation to various ideologies. In the final part of the book, Vinten considers how Wittgenstein’s philosophy can be of use in resolving or dissolving problems in the social sciences. Along the way, he critically assesses work from Perry Anderson, Terry Eagleton, Richard Rorty, and Chantal Mouffe in the light of Wittgenstein’s philosophical oeuvre. The book makes a compelling examination of how Wittgenstein’s work remains as relevant as ever to thinking about our cultural and political situation.

The application of standard measurement is a cornerstone of modern science. In this collection of essays, standardization of procedure, units of measurement and the epistemology of standardization are addressed by specialists from sociology, history and the philosophy of science.

'Monk's energetic enterprise is remarkable for the interweaving of the philosophical and the emotional aspects of Wittgenstein's life' Sunday Times 'Ray Monk's reconnection of Wittgenstein's philosophy with his life triumphantly carries out the Wittgensteinian task of "changing the aspect" of Wittgenstein's work, getting us to see it in a new way' Sunday Telegraph 'This biography transforms Wittgenstein into a human being' Independent on Sunday 'It is much to be recommended' Observer 'Monk's biography is deeply intelligent, generous to the ordinary reader... It is a beautiful portrait of a beautiful life' Guardian

Offers a comprehensive and accessible exploration of the scope and importance of Gottlob Frege's work.