Wto Dispute Settlement Cases Involving The Agreement On Agriculture 1995 2019

A landmark achievement of the Uruguay Round, and notably, the Agreement on Agriculture, was the full inclusion of agriculture in multilateral rules and disciplines. Since the birth of World Trade Organization (WTO), a significant number of member countries have used the dispute settlement mechanism (DSM) for resolving the disputes in agriculture. The DSM has played an important role not only for those parties involved in the disputes, but also by helping member countries to better understand the WTO rules, and therefore help guide them in developing domestic policies and trade policies that are consistent with WTO requirements. This paper examines trade disputes involving the Agreement on Agriculture since the WTO was formed in 1995 through December 2019. It analyzes who brought the disputes and against whom disputes were brought, and provides details on the natures of the disputes, the duration of disputes, and, the outcome of those disputes.

These are the WTO's authorized and paginated reports in English. They are an essential addition to the library of all practising trade lawyers and a useful tool for students and academics worldwide working in the field of international economic or trade law. DSR 2019: Volume VI contains the panel report on 'China - Domestic Support for Agricultural Producers' (WT/DS511).

As a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements, the United States has committed to abide by WTO rules and disciplines, including those that govern domestic farm policy as spelled out in the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA). Since establishment of the WTO on January 1, 1995, the United States has complied with its WTO spending limits on marketdistorting types of farm program outlays (referred to as amber box spending). However, the addition of large, new trade assistance payments to producers in 2018 and 2019, on top of existing farm program support, has raised concerns by some U.S. trading partners, as well as market watchers and policymakers, that U.S. domestic farm subsidy outlays might exceed the annual spending limit of $19.1 billion agreed to as part of U.S. commitments to WTO member countries. CRS analysis indicates that the United States probably did not violate its WTO spending limit in 2018 but could potentially exceed it in 2019. A farm support program can violate WTO commitments in two principal ways: first, by exceeding spending limits on certain market-distorting programs, and second, by generating distortions that spill over into the international marketplace and cause significant adverse effects. Program outlays are cumulative, and compliance with WTO commitments is based on annual aggregate spending levels. Under the WTO's AoA, total U.S. amber box outlays (that is, those outlays deemed market distorting) are limited to $19.1 billion annually, subject to de minimis exemptions. De minimis exemptions are spending that is sufficiently small (less than 5% of the value of production)-relative to either the value of a specific product or total production-to be deemed benign. Since 1995, the United States has apparently stayed within its amber box limits. However, U.S. compliance has hinged on judicious use of the de minimis exemptions in a number of years to exclude certain amber box spending from counting against the amber box limit. These exemptions have never been challenged by another WTO member. According to CRS analysis, projected U.S. amber box spending for 2018 (inclusive of $8.7 billion in product-specific outlays under the 2018 trade assistance package) could exceed $14 billion. This would be the largest U.S. amber box notification since 2001. However, despite its magnitude, it still would fit within the U.S. spending limit of $19.1 billion. A more ambiguous result is projected for 2019. The expansion of direct payments under a second trade assistance package to $14.5 billion in 2019 and their shift to a non-product-specific WTO classification-when combined with currently projected spending under other non-product-specific programs such as the Price Loss Coverage (PLC) and Agricultural Risk Coverage (ARC) programs-could push U.S. amber box outlays above $24 billion. This would be in excess of the U.S. amber box spending limit of $19.1 billion. However, this projection hinges on several as-yet-unknown factors, including market prices, output values, and program outlays under traditional countercyclical ARC and PLC programs. If the final price and revenue values are higher than currently projected, then program payments under ARC and PLC could be smaller than those used in this analysis. This could decrease both aggregate non-product-specific outlays and the possibility of exceeding the amber box spending limit. If cumulative payments in any year were to exceed the agreed-upon spending limit, then the United States would be in violation of its commitments and could be vulnerable to a challenge under the WTO's dispute settlement mechanism. Furthermore, to the extent that such program outlays might induce surplus production and depress market prices, they could also result in potential challenges under the WTO.

The 3rd Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization (WTO) at Seattle was not able to launch a new and comprehensive round of multilateral trade negotiations, but it is expected that in the coming years the WTO will be the forum of these negotiations, commonly referred to as the Millenium Round. Developing countries are currently greatly involved in the WTO process and seek active participation in this round. In relation to least developed countries in Africa, and with Ethiopia as country for a case study, the present paper argues that the Agreement on Agriculture, part of the Uruguay Round, has put a system of basic mechanisms into place but not led to significant agricultural trade liberalization. At the same time, a new host of issues have emerged that relate directly or indirectly to food and agriculture. The report highlights the various interactions between these subjects from the perspective of Ethiopia.

South-South Cooperation (SSC) is increasingly recognized as an effective instrument for catalyzing economic development by fostering the exchange of innovation and good practices, and expanding market opportunities across countries with a similar level of development and shared development objectives, such as those reflected in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Key to this economic cooperation are trade and investment relationships among South countries. The importance of South countries in global agrifood markets and trade has been increasing over the last two decades, with growth in their participation, as both exporters and importers, having outpaced that of North countries. Agricultural productivity growth has fueled expansion in the production of some products, while population growth and urbanization, rapid economic growth and increasing per capita incomes have contributed to growing demand for diverse food products.

China’s rapid rise as a leading global exporter of manufacturing goods since its accession to the WTO in 2001 has been the focus of both admiration and, increasingly, concern, but China is also a large importer of goods, particularly agricultural products. Since China's accession to the WTO, China agricultural exports have increased by 8 percent annually while imports have risen by almost twice that rate. China has become the world's largest importer of agricultural products and the first or second largest destination for many of the world's top agricultural exporters such as the US, Brazil, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and Argentina. This paper examines the evolution of China's agricultural trade since accession and discusses how agricultural trade policy and domestic support policies have evolved, with particularly emphasis on China's experience as complainant and respondent in WTO trade disputes.

This book provides an original systematic assessment of China's twenty years in the WTO. Combining insights from law, economics, political science, and international relations, it offers rich, multifaceted analyses of the opportunities and challenges China presents to the world trading system and the responses from other WTO Members. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.