A Theory Of Precedent

This book analyzes the theoretical nuances and practical implications of how judges use precedent.

In this study, the author identifies six types of judicial precedent-ideology and are tests them against judicial experiences in various countries.

Analytical jurisprudence has been mostly silent on the role of precedent in legal adjudication. What is the content of a judge's precedent ideology,or the rule of precedent-recognition, by means of which the ratio of a case is to be distinguished from mere dicta? In this study, the author identifies six types of judicial precedent-ideology, among them judicial legislation, systemic construction of the underlying reasons of law in the Dworkinian sense, and a radical re-evaluation of the merits of a prior case in later adjudication, as envisioned by the American Realists. These competing models are tested against judicial experiences in the UK, US, France, Italy, Germany and Finland. By this means Lon Fuller's famous 'internal morality of law' is shown to function rather poorly in the context of precedents, and the author therefore suggests a redefinition of the rule which makes it work for precedent. This, in turn leads the author to confront fundamental questions about the normative nature of law. Is Kelsen's grundnorm or Hart's ultimate rule of recognition a valid rule, in the image of legal rules proper, or is it merely a social fact, observable only in the practices and behaviour of judges and other officials? The author claims that Hart is caught between Kelsen and J.L. Borges, the late Argentinian fabulist, in so far as the ontology and epistemology of the rule of recognition are concerned. This leads the author to the conclusion that the two predicaments affecting analytical positivism, namely the threat of endless self-referentiality, or infinite regress, can only be accounted for by means of recourse to the philosophy of deconstruction as posited by Jacques Derrida.

It has been said that precedent is the life blood of legal systems. Certainly, an understanding of precedent is vital to an understanding of the workings of law. The principle that decisions should follow those of past similar cases seems simple enough, yet it turns out to be beset with difficulties. What is the justification for following precedents? Do we want absolute, unswerving following of past decisions or a weaker implementation that allows for limited departures? What social and theoretical forces wrought changes in the doctrine? Are judicial pronouncements on precedent rules or just conventions? How do we identify the ratio decidendi of a case? What are the means by which a general "projectable" conclusion may be elicited from a particular judgment? These are some of the problems addressed by contributors to this volume.

Marc Jacob analyses in depth the most important justificatory and decision-making tool of one of the world's most powerful courts.

Neil Duxbury examines how precedents constrain legal decision-makers and how legal decision-makers relax and avoid those constraints. There is no single principle or theory which explains the authority of precedent but rather a number of arguments which raise rebuttable presumptions in favour of precedent-following. This book examines the force and the limitations of these arguments and shows that although the principal requirement of the doctrine of precedent is that courts respect earlier judicial decisions on materially identical facts, the doctrine also requires courts to depart from such decisions when following them would perpetuate legal error or injustice. Not only do judicial precedents not 'bind' judges in the classical-positivist sense, but, were they to do so, they would be ill suited to common-law decision-making. Combining historical inquiry and philosophical analysis, this book will assist anyone seeking to understand how precedent operates as a common-law doctrine.

The Palgrave Macmillan Law Masters series is a long-running and successful list of titles offering clear, concise and authoritative guides to the main subject areas, written by experienced and respected authors. This ninth edition of Legal Method provides a lively introduction to the nature of the English legal system and its sources, and to the techniques which lawyers use when handling those sources. The text assumes no prior knowledge and makes its content accessible by clarity of expression rather than by dilution of content. In addition to more conventional sources, writers as varied as Jonathan Swift, Alexander Pope and T. S. Eliot are cited. This is an ideal course companion for both law undergraduate and GDL/CPE students. Includes end of chapter summaries and self-test exercises.

This fourth edition of Precedent in English Law presents a basic guide to the current doctrine of precedent in England, set in the wider context of the jurisprudential problems which any treatment of this topic involves. Such problems include the nature of _ratio_ _decidendi_ of a precedent and of its binding force, the significance of precedents alongside other sources of law, their role in legal reasoning, and the account which must be taken of them by any general theory of law. Considerable re-writing has been undertaken to update case-law and take account of the possible implications for the doctrine of precedent of the impact of European Community law, making it an indispensable work of reference for readers interested in the past history, present state, and future developments of English rules of precedent.