Agency Perception And Moral Values Related To Autonomous Weapons

The deployment of Autonomous Weapons gives rise to ongoing debate in society and at the United Nations, in the context of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. Yet little empirical research has been done on this topic. This volume fills that gap by offering an empirical study based on military personnel and civilians working at the Dutch Ministry of Defence. It yields insight into how Autonomous Weapons are perceived by the military and general public; and which moral values are considered important in relation to their deployment. The research approach used is the Value-Sensitive Design (VSD) method that allows for the consideration of human values throughout the design process of technology. The outcome indicates that military personnel and civilians attribute more agency (the capacity to think and plan) to an Autonomous Weapon than to a Human Operated Drone. In addition, it is clear that common ground exists between military and societal groups in their perception of the values of human dignity and anxiety. These two values arise often in the discourse, and addressing them is essential when considering the ethics of the deployment of Autonomous Weapons. The text of this volume is also offered in parallel French and German translation.

Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) are important to human, national, and even international security. IT research, artifacts, and knowledge that can be applied in military and civilian contexts, used as part of weapon systems, or cause significant harm are referred to as dual-use. Advances in artificial intelligence (AI), robotics, cybersecurity, and open source intelligence (OSINT) raise questions about their dual-use risks. But how can dual-use of such disparate technologies be assessed? Case studies are still lacking on how to assess dual-use ICT and how to enable sensitive and responsible dual-use design. To address the research gap, this cumulative dissertation uses Technology Assessment (TA) as an epistemological framework to bring together approaches of Critical Security Studies (CSS) as well as Value Sensitive Design (VSD) from the field of Human-Computer Interaction (HCI). As a result, the dissertation systematizes the dual-use risks and scenarios of the selected ICTs and derives organizational and design implications.

What does responsibility mean in International Relations (IR)? This handbook brings together cutting-edge research on the critical debates about responsibility that are currently being undertaken in IR theory. This handbook both reflects upon an emerging field based on an engagement in the most crucial theoretical debates and serves as a foundational text by showing how deeply a discussion of responsibility is embedded in broader questions of IR theory and practice. Contributions cover the way in which responsibility is theorized across different approaches in IR and relevant neighboring disciplines and demonstrate how responsibility matters in different policy fields of global governance. Chapters with an empirical focus zoom in on particular actor constellations of (emerging) states, international organizations, political movements, or corporations, or address how responsibility matters in structuring the politics of global commons, such as oceans, resources, or the Internet. Providing a comprehensive overview of IR scholarship on responsibility, this accessible and interdisciplinary text will be a valuable resource for scholars and students in many fields including IR, international law, political theory, global ethics, science and technology, area studies, development studies, business ethics, and environmental and security governance.

"Because of the increasing use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs, also commonly known as drones) in various military and para-military (i.e., CIA) settings, there has been increasing debate in the international community as to whether it is morally and ethically permissible to allow robots (flying or otherwise) the ability to decide when and where to take human life. In addition, there has been intense debate as to the legal aspects, particularly from a humanitarian law framework. In response to this growing international debate, the United States government released the Department of Defense (DoD) 3000.09 Directive (2011), which sets a policy for if and when autonomous weapons would be used in US military and para-military engagements. This US policy asserts that only "human-supervised autonomous weapon systems may be used to select and engage targets, with the exception of selecting humans as targets, for local defense ...". This statement implies that outside of defensive applications, autonomous weapons will not be allowed to independently select and then fire upon targets without explicit approval from a human supervising the autonomous weapon system. Such a control architecture is known as human supervisory control, where a human remotely supervises an automated system (Sheridan 1992). The defense caveat in this policy is needed because the United States currently uses highly automated systems for defensive purposes, e.g., Counter Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar (C-RAM) systems and Patriot anti-missile missiles. Due to the time-critical nature of such environments (e.g., soldiers sleeping in barracks within easy reach of insurgent shoulder-launched missiles), these automated defensive systems cannot rely upon a human supervisor for permission because of the short engagement times and the inherent human neuromuscular lag which means that even if a person is paying attention, there is approximately a half-second delay in hitting a firing button, which can mean the difference for life and death for the soldiers in the barracks. So as of now, no US UAV (or any robot) will be able to launch any kind of weapon in an offensive environment without human direction and approval. However, the 3000.09 Directive does contain a clause that allows for this possibility in the future. This caveat states that the development of a weapon system that independently decides to launch a weapon is possible but first must be approved by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)); the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)); and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Not all stakeholders are happy with this policy that leaves the door open for what used to be considered science fiction. Many opponents of such uses of technologies call for either an outright ban on autonomous weaponized systems, or in some cases, autonomous systems in general (Human Rights Watch 2013, Future of Life Institute 2015, Chairperson of the Informal Meeting of Experts 2016). Such groups take the position that weapons systems should always be under "meaningful human control," but do not give a precise definition of what this means. One issue in this debate that often is overlooked is that autonomy is not a discrete state, rather it is a continuum, and various weapons with different levels of autonomy have been in the US inventory for some time. Because of these ambiguities, it is often hard to draw the line between automated and autonomous systems. Present-day UAVs use the very same guidance, navigation and control technology flown on commercial aircraft. Tomahawk missiles, which have been in the US inventory for more than 30 years, are highly automated weapons with accuracies of less than a meter. These offensive missiles can navigate by themselves with no GPS, thus exhibiting some autonomy by today's definitions. Global Hawk UAVs can find their way home and land on their own without any human intervention in the case of a communication failure. The growth of the civilian UAV market is also a critical consideration in the debate as to whether these technologies should be banned outright. There is a $144.38B industry emerging for the commercial use of drones in agricultural settings, cargo delivery, first response, commercial photography, and the entertainment industry (Adroit Market Research 2019) More than $100 billion has been spent on driverless car development (Eisenstein 2018) in the past 10 years and the autonomy used in driverless cars mirrors that inside autonomous weapons. So, it is an important distinction that UAVs are simply the platform for weapon delivery (autonomous or conventional), and that autonomous systems have many peaceful and commercial uses independent of military applications"--

2021 CHOICE Outstanding Academic Title Moral Responsibility in Twenty-First-Century Warfare explores the complex relationship between just war theory and the ethics of autonomous weapons systems (AWS). One of the challenges facing ethicists of war, particularly just war theorists, is that AWS is an applicative concept that seems, in many ways, to lie beyond the human(ist) scope of the just war theory tradition. The book examines the various ethical gaps between just war theory and the legal and moral status of AWS, addresses the limits of both traditional and revisionist just war theory, and proposes ways of bridging some of these gaps. It adopts a dualistic notion of moral responsibility—or differing, related notions of moral responsibility and legitimate authority—to study the conflicts and contradictions of legitimizing the autonomous weapons that are designed to secure peace and neutralize the effects of violence. Focusing on the changing conditions and dynamics of accountability, responsibility, autonomy, and rights in twenty-first-century warfare, the volume sheds light on the effects of violence and the future ethics of modern warfare.

"This book addresses the relationship between lethal autonomous weapon systems, human dignity, and international law. Its central thesis is that the delegation of human responsibility for moral judgments to lethal autonomous weapon systems erodes human dignity and, consequently, international law"--

How does the use of military drones affect the legal, political, and moral responsibility of different actors involved in their deployment and design? This volume offers a fresh contribution to the ethics of drone warfare by providing, for the first time, a systematic interdisciplinary discussion of different responsibility issues raised by military drones. The book discusses four main sets of questions: First, from a legal point of view, we analyse the ways in which the use of drones makes the attribution of criminal responsibility to individuals for war crimes more complicated and what adjustments may be required in international criminal law and in military practices to avoid ’responsibility gaps’ in warfare. From a moral and political perspective, the volume looks at the conditions under which the use of military drones by states is impermissible, permissible, or even obligatory and what the responsibilities of a state in the use of drones towards both its citizens and potential targets are. From a socio-technical perspective, what kind of new human machine interaction might (and should) drones bring and which new kinds of shared agency and responsibility? Finally, we ask how the use of drones changes our conception of agency and responsibility. The book will be of interest to scholars and students in (military) ethics and to those in law, politics and the military involved in the design, deployment and evaluation of military drones.

This examination of the implications and regulation of autonomous weapons systems combines contributions from law, robotics and philosophy.