America First Us Asia Policy Under President Trump

The Trump administration looks to be adopting a more muscular and self-interested security policy in the Asia-Pacific. Confrontational on China: Trump and his advisers have outlined a hard line towards China on most bilateral issues, and view Beijing as an aggressive strategic competitor that needs to be deterred with US strength. Supportive but transactional on allies: the administration will uphold Asian security guarantees at the same time as more strictly scrutinising the US interests at stake. The United States will seek greater burden-sharing and “wins” from allies, including initiatives to create new US jobs. A military-first rebalance: the administration will advance the security elements of President Obama’s “pivot to Asia” while attaching little importance to engagement with Southeast Asia or the rebalance’s original liberal internationalist goals. Changes in US Asia policy will likely produce more volatile relations with competitors, and potentially between Washington and its allies and partners. Instability in US-China relations: Trump’s abrasive policies, particularly on Taiwan, are likely to deepen friction with China and increase the risk of mixed signals and communication breakdowns. Disunity and fragility in the US alliance network: Trump’s “America first” approach to Asia is at odds with the policy preferences and public opinions of most regional allies, creating potential constraints on coordination between Washington and its Asian alliance network. Divergence between Australia and Japan: Japan’s anxiety about being abandoned by the United States may see it rush to embrace Trump’s Asia policy, while Australia’s concern about being entrapped in potential US military endeavours could see it keep some distance from Washington. This may produce opposing dynamics that could weaken bilateral ties and trilateral cooperation. Australia needs to adopt a more active regional security policy to weather these destabilising shifts. It should: Assist the United States in articulating policy priorities on China. Actively work to reduce possible misperceptions between the United States and China. Work multilaterally with Asian allies and partners to communicate shared interests, opportunities, and redlines to President Trump’s cabinet. Coordinate US alliance management strategies with Japan. Build greater resilience into the US Asian alliance network by establishing new trilateral partnerships with Southeast Asia, starting with an Australia-Indonesia-Japan grouping. Assume a more active leadership role in Southeast Asia by independently contributing to a stable and liberal regional order.

The book assesses U.S. foreign relations in the Indo-Pacific during the Trump Administration, with a particular focus on the regional powers’ response to Trump's “America First” policy. The chapter authors draw on the theoretical insights from dominant International Relations theories – (Neo)Realism, Liberal Institutionalism, and Constructivism – to explain both continuities and discontinuities found in the regional powers’ security and foreign economic policies before and during the Trump Administration. The book will be of interest to new and advanced students of International Relations, Asian Studies, and U.S. foreign policy. The multi-national perspectives of the regional experts offer penetrating analyses of the likely legacy (or lack thereof) of the range of political, security, and trade policy initiatives launched by the Trump Administration and its implications for the balance of power, regional institutions, and national identity-informed approaches to international relations in the Indo-Pacific.

This book offers an extensive account of Donald Trump’s foreign policy record in the Indo-Pacific region. Set against the backdrop of Trump’s policy of sustained US confrontation with China, it recounts his administration’s efforts to shore up America’s position with the Indo-Pacific strategy. It also reviews Trump’s record with allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific and the South Asian subregion in context of the ‘great power competition’ between China and the United States. Amidst the ongoing conversations on the declining currency of American internationalism, the volume showcases the seeming insularity of the Indo-Pacific region from forces that are informing an America in retreat. In noting Trump’s record to have been a consequential one, the authors also offer insights into the prospects for US policy continuity under Joe Biden. This timely book will be of great interest to scholars, teachers, and students of politics and international relations, Asia studies, US-China studies, area studies, foreign policy, maritime studies, and world politics. It is a recommended read for all watchers of US foreign policy and the evolving US-China rivalry.

As America’s first president never to have served in government or the military, Donald Trump entered the White House with an unformed foreign policy position. Yet he was confronted by a wide range of developing issues; the rise of China, Russian-United States relations, the resurgence of nationalism in Europe, U.S. Foreign Policy in Latin America, environmental challenges, terrorism, security challenges of failing states, cyber security threats, and challenges in international political economy. This volume focuses on these sensitive foreign policy issues that determine the prospects for American decline or continued hegemony. Contributions are divided into ‘regional’ and ‘functional’ issues, exploring the nature and significance of the challenge, the previous response, and President Trump’s policies and their consequences. Topics have been selected to address political, military, economic, and social factors in global politics and the book will appeal to undergraduates and scholars of U.S. foreign policy at all levels.

The centre of gravity in today’s global economy arguably now resides in Asia. As a result of this, the maintenance of geopolitical and economic security in Asia has become pivotal to global stability. This indispensable Handbook examines the crucial and multifaceted role of the United States as a force in the region that has been, and continues to be, necessary for the continuation of Asian prosperity.

On August 21, 2017, United States' President Donald Trump provided the roadmap to America's next South Asia strategy, mainly centered on America‟s Afghanistan Policy. Given the United States, longtime involvement in the region, America‟s Afghanistan policy plays a keyrole in United States overall foreign policy. Given the primacy attached, Trump‟s speech reflected two very significant factors: First, there was a clear identification and condemnation of Pakistan as a significant actor contributing to terrorism. Secondly, there was greater confidence expressed in India‟s role in the region at large and Afghanistan in particular. Keeping this context, the present series attempts to articulate three key questions: 1. What does Trump's new South Asia policy hold for U.S., India, and China? 2. Is there a continuity/change in America's policy and what can be further expected? 3. What will be the larger implications of Trump's new South Asia policy, if any? To address the queries, the series is divided into three perspectives- American, Indian and Chinese. Reflecting on America's foreign policy under the Trump administration, Dr. Monish Tourangbam argues that the new U.S. strategy on Afghanistan is designed to avoid losing, rather than winning in Afghanistan. While arguing from an Indian perspective, Tridivesh Singh Maini suggests that while it is tough to predict how U.S. policy will pan out towards Afghanistan, one major shift in Trump's approach is that unlike previous U.S. administration's, he has not really drawn any red lines for India‟s role in Afghanistan. Drawing on the Chinese perspective, Dr. Sriparna Pathak argues that as China shares an "all-weather friendship" with Pakistan, public shaming of Pakistan for shielding terrorists is clearly not something that is acceptable to China. However, with respect to terrorism, China has its own woes emanating primarily from its Xinjiang province. Therefore, the American policy in South Asia, which in all probability will see greater American involvement in the region, will have to be carefully considered by the foreign policy mandarins in Beijing. Amrita Jash, Editor-in-Chief, IndraStra Global

American Indo-Pacific policy will be driven by its China policy, regardless of whether there is a second-term Donald Trump administration or a first-term Joe Biden administration. The Republicans will continue to frame the major challenge as “balancing” against Chinese power and “countering” the worst aspects of Beijing’s policies. Establishment or moderate Democrats under Biden will choose the softer language of seeking a favourable “competitive coexistence” in the military, economic, political and global governance realms, and the reassertion of American leadership and moral standing. In advancing the FOIP, the current administration argues that disruptiveness and unpredictability are necessary to reverse what they see as the “normalization” of Chinese assertiveness, coercion and revisionism. They also point to the closeness of US cooperation with Japan, Australia and India and bourgeoning strategic relationships with Vietnam. A second-term Trump administration will continue to seek out “fit-for-purpose” existing institutions and relationships, or prioritize new ones. Establishment Democrats believe that the “America First” unilateralist approach is unsettling for allies and partners. In advancing a favourable “competitive coexistence” with China, Democrats will seek to expand the tools of statecraft and achieve a better balance between military/economic/political/governance approaches. Prima facie, a Biden administration might position America as a more consultative guarantor of a preferred order. However, there will be greater pressure on Southeast Asians to accept more collective responsibility to advance common objectives. This means hedging in a manner more suitable to American rather than Chinese preferences. Failing that, more emphasis might be placed on greater institutionalization of the Quad and ad hoc groupings. A Bernie Sanders administration, now an unlikely prospect, would be a disaster for US standing and power in the region, and therefore for Southeast Asia.

"This book offers an extensive account of Donald Trump's foreign policy record in the Indo-Pacific region. Set against the backdrop of Trump's policy of sustained US confrontation with China, it recounts his administration's efforts to shore up America's position with the Indo-Pacific strategy. It also reviews Trump's record with allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific and the South Asian subregion in context of the 'great power competition' between China and the United States. Amidst the ongoing conversations on the declining currency of American internationalism, the volume showcases the seeming insularity of the Indo-Pacific region from forces that are informing an America in retreat. In noting Trump's record to have been a consequential one, the authors also offer insights into the prospects for US policy continuity under Joe Biden. This timely book will be of great interest to scholars, teachers and students of politics and international relations, Asia studies, US-China studies, area studies, foreign policy, maritime studies, and world politics. It is a recommended read for all watchers of US foreign policy and the evolving US-China rivalry"--