Arracourt 1944

A photo-packed account of how the tanks of 4th Armored Division defeated two panzer brigades over eleven days of battle at Arracourt: “An enjoyable read.” —AMPS September 1944: With the Allies closing in on the Rhine, Adolf Hitler orders a counterattack on General Patton’s Third Army in France. Near the small French town of Arracourt, elements of the US 4th Armored Division meet the grizzled veterans of the 5th Panzer Army in combat. Atop their M4 Shermans, American tank crews square off against the technologically superior Mark V Panther tanks of the Wehrmacht. Yet through a combination of superior tactics, leadership, teamwork, and small-unit initiative, the outnumbered American forces win a decisive victory against the 5th Panzer Army. Indeed, of the 262 tanks and mobile assault guns fielded by German forces at Arracourt, 200 were damaged or destroyed by enemy fire. The Americans, by contrast, lost only 48 tanks. Following the collapse of the German counterattack, Patton’s Third Army found itself within striking distance of the Third Reich’s borderlands. The battle of Arracourt was the US Army’s largest tank battle until the Ardennes Offensive in December 1944. It helped pave the way for the final Allied assault into Germany, and showed how tactical ingenuity and adaptive leadership can overcome an enemy’s superior size or technological strength. This extensively illustrated book recounts the dramatic story. “An interesting study of small-unit leadership that emphasizes the importance of tank-crew training, the value of a reliable logistics system and effects of weather on battlefield activities.” —ARMOR Magazine “This well-written book explains how U.S. forces won this critical battle.” —WWII History Magazine “Enjoyable . . . includes some nicely done full color profiles of some of the tanks involved.” —ModelingMadness.com

This thesis analyzes the political role of the German General Staff as well as civil military relations in Germany from the late 19th century until 1933. Specifically, it examines the rise and fall of Kurt von Schleicher. Together with Generals Paul von Hindenburg, Erich Ludendorff, and Wilhelm Groener, Schleicher shaped the politics of the Weimar Republic, right up to the end that he—unintentionally—hastened when his intrigues paved the way for Adolf Hitler’s dictatorship. During World War I, the German army completed its control over the civilian administration and bureaucracy. In the Republic of Weimar 1919–1933, the military remained a powerful governmental player—as the self-anointed protector of the nation against external and internal threats, including democracy. Thus, Germany’s political situation in the winter of 1932–1933 and the activities of the key players stemmed from a long-term anti-democratic socialization process amid an entrenched civil-military imbalance. As the present thesis demonstrates, Schleicher’s life—from his military background to his experience as a member of Prussia’s noble Junker class—coincided with Germany’s tumultuous modernization. The fateful lessons that he drew from this experience ultimately spelled the end of Germany’s first democracy and ushered in the calamity of the Third Reich.

This battle study investigates operational and tactical considerations of the battles of Arracourt, which took place in September 1944 as the 4th Armored Division of Patton's Third Army clashed with the Fifth Panzer Army in the French province of Lorraine on the U.S. drive to the German West Wall. By examining detailed German and American unit histories, logs, and summaries, as well as personal papers, this study illuminates differences and similarities in reporting the U.S. penetration from the Nancy Bridgehead to Arracourt, the German offensive at Luneville as a prelude to Arracourt, and the two German offensives at Arracourt, as the Fifth Panzer Army attempted to link up with a German unit cut off at Nancy. Arracourt exemplifies penetration and mobile defense and illustrates the demand for good intelligence and flexible command and control. It shows the inherent risks of piecemeal commitment of reserves, the need for timely orders and good logistical support, as well as the tactical advantages of air superiority. (Author).

A complete examination of Patton's campaign to take the fortified city of Metz. General George Patton's most controversial campaign was the series of battles in autumn 1944 battles along the German frontier which centered on the fortified city of Metz. In part, the problem was logistics. As was the case with the rest of the Allied forces in the European Theatre, supplies were limited until the port of Antwerp could finally be cleared. Also problematic was the weather. The autumn of 1944 was one of the wettest on record, and hardly conducive to the type of mechanized warfare for which Patton was so famous. However at the heart of the problem was the accretion of sophisticated fortifications. Metz had been fortified since ancient times, heavily rebuilt by France in the post-Napoleonic period, modernized by Germany in 1870–1914, and modernized by France during the Maginot effort in 1935–40. The Germans hoped to hold Metz with a thin screen of second-rate troops, counting on the impregnable fortifications. This book covers the entire campaign from beginning to end, offering an unbiased assessment of the success and failures of both the Allied and Axis efforts.

A highly illustrated account of the Panzer offensive in Lorraine. In the wake of the defeat in Normandy in the summer of 1944, Hitler planned to stymie the Allied advance by cutting off Patton's Third Army in the Lorraine with a great Panzer offensive. But Patton's aggressive tactics continued to thwart German plans and led to a series of violent armored battles. The battle-hardened Wehrmacht confronted the better-equipped and better-trained US Army. The Germans managed to re-establish a fragile defensive line but could not stop the US Army from establishing bridgeheads over the Moselle along Germany's western frontier. Campaigns 5, 24, 74 and 75 are also available in a single volume special edition as Into the Reich.

In September 1944 Hitler ordered an attack on Gen. George Patton's Third Army, which was deep inside France making for the Rhine and threatening the German industrial heartland beyond. The ensuing battle near Arracourt--the U.S. Army's largest tank-versus-tank clash until the Bulge--went badly for the Germans, who committed their armor piecemeal and whose offensive was shattered in a series of intense, close-range tank duels with the Americans. Armor expert Steven Zaloga deftly reconstructs the battle and shows how American Sherman tanks bested superior German Panthers.

In September 2010, James G. Pierce, a retired U.S. Army colonel with the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, published a study on Army organizational culture. Pierce postulated that "the ability of a professional organization to develop future leaders in a manner that perpetuates readiness to cope with future environmental and internal uncertainty depends on organizational culture." He found that today's U.S. Army leadership "may be inadequately prepared to lead the profession toward future success." The need to prepare for future success dovetails with the use of the concepts of mission command. This book offers up a set of recommendations, based on those mission command concepts, for adopting a superior command culture through education and training. Donald E. Vandergriff believes by implementing these recommendations across the Army, that other necessary and long-awaited reforms will take place.

Dryden’s Second Hundred Years (Part II) does two exceptional things. First, its tight focus on local participation in World War II paradoxically chronicles the entire war, a conflict which drew its combatants from small rural townships like Dryden NY, assigned and scattered them throughout the world, and then delivered the survivors back home again, creating in every small American community a microcosm of the entire conflict, an eye-witnessing of the whole story. Second, that story is told here largely in local participants’ own words, in letters from camps, troopships, carriers, cruisers, foxholes, and hospitals, their voices a quiet backdrop to the horrific war they had been asked to fight. The resulting narrative suggests that those who don’t know history – while not always doomed to repeat it – are very likely doomed to live their lives without perspective, to mistake inconvenience for hardship, and hardship for catastrophe, and to be blind to the miracle of everyday normal life.