Assessment Of Technologies Deployed To Improve Aviation Security

This report assesses the operational performance of explosives-detection equipment and hardened unit-loading devices (HULDs) in airports and compares their operational performance to their laboratory performance, with a focus on improving aviation security.

This report assesses the operational performance of explosives-detection equipment and hardened unit-loading devices (HULDs) in airports and compares their operational performance to their laboratory performance, with a focus on improving aviation security.

Protection of the traveling public from terrorist threats involving explosives is a major goal of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). For 20 years, the TSA (and the Federal Aviation Administration before it) have been investing in technologies to meet that goal. To support that activity, the TSA has asked the NRC to assess a variety of technological opportunities for offering such protection. The NRC is approaching this assignment by issuing a series of reports on chosen technology applications. This is the first of that series and presents an assessment of mass spectrometry for enhanced trace detection (ETD) of chemicals contained in explosives. The report describes limitations of trace detection in general and the current technologies in particular. It then presents a discussion of the potential for mass spectrometry to improve EDT including challenges faced by such a system, recommendations for starting a program to take advantage of mass spectrometry, and recommendations for a phased implementation plan.

The security of the U.S. commercial aviation system has been a growing concern since the 1970's when the hijacking of aircraft became a serious problem. Over that period, federal aviation officials have been searching for more effective ways for non-invasive screening of passengers, luggage, and cargo to detect concealed explosives and weapons. To assist in this effort, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) asked the NRC for a study of emerging screening technologies. This book - the fourth of four - focuses on data fusion as a means to significantly improve the ability of the existing suite of airport detection systems and access control systems to detect and prevent attacks. The book presents a discussion of the data fusion, an analysis of current data fusion efforts, and an assessment of data fusion opportunities for various airport security activities.

Following the terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001, there has been a plethora of legislation and acts resulting in security screening of airline passengers and their baggage to the deployment of newer and more updated security technologies, aimed at closing this alarming gap in security. This new book examines additional proposals and actions not only from Congress, but the FAA as well. Contents: Preface; Aviation Security Technologies and Procedures: Screening Passengers and Baggage; Selected Aviation Security Legislation in the Aftermath of the September 11 Attack; Vulnerabilities in, and Alternatives for, Pre-board Screening Security Operations; Terrorist Acts Demonstrate Urgent need to Improve Security at the Nations' Airports Operations; Weaknesses in Airport Security and Options for Assigning Screening Responsibilities; Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for the Air Cargo System; Transportation Security Administration Faces Immediate and Long-Term Challenges; Registered Traveller Program Policy and Implementation Issues; Index.

On November 19, 2001 the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) was created as a separate entity within the U.S. Department of Transportation through the Aviation and Transportation Security Act. The act also mandated that all checked baggage on U.S. flights be scanned by explosive detection systems (EDSs) for the presence of threats. These systems needed to be deployed quickly and universally, but could not be made available everywhere. As a result the TSA emphasized the procurement and installation of certified systems where EDSs were not yet available. Computer tomography (CT)-based systems became the certified method or place-holder for EDSs. CT systems cannot detect explosives but instead create images of potential threats that can be compared to criteria to determine if they are real threats. The TSA has placed a great emphasis on high level detections in order to slow false negatives or missed detections. As a result there is abundance in false positives or false alarms. In order to get a better handle on these false positives the National Research Council (NRC) was asked to examine the technology of current aviation-security EDSs and false positives produced by this equipment. The ad hoc committee assigned to this task examined and evaluated the cases of false positives in the EDSs, assessed the impact of false positive resolution on personnel and resource allocation, and made recommendations on investigating false positives without increase false negatives. To complete their task the committee held four meetings in which they observed security measures at the San Francisco International Airport, heard from employees of DHS and the TSA. Engineering Aviation Security Environments-Reduction of False Alarms in Computed Tomography-Based Screening of Checked Baggage is the result of the committee's investigation. The report includes key conclusions and findings, an overview of EDSs, and recommendations made by the committee.