Boards Of Appeal Of Eu Agencies

While the EU agencies that have been granted the power to adopt binding decisions are a diverse group, they at least share one feature: in all of them an organisationally separate administrative review body, i.e. a board of appeal, has been established. The review procedures before these boards must be exhausted before private parties can seize the EU courts and the boards therefore all fulfil a similar function: filtering cases before they end up before the courts and providing parties by expert-driven review. Sharing this common function as well as some common features, the boards of appeal of the different agencies remain heterogenous in their set up and functioning. This raises a host of questions from both a theoretic and practical perspective which this volume analyses in depth: how do the boards function, which kind of review do they offer, and how should they be conceptualized in the EU's overall system of legal protection against administrative action? To answer these questions, the volume's first part presents a series of case studies, covering all the EU boards of appeal currently in existence, while a second part looks into the horizontal issues raised by the phenomenon of the boards of appeal.

Providing a comprehensive overview of the development of agencification in the EU, this book explores the question: What are the political and legal limits to EU agencification?

Do independent boards of appeal set up in some EU agencies and the European Ombudsman compensate for the shortcomings of EU Courts? This book examines the operation of EU judicial and extra-judicial review mechanisms. It confronts the formal legal rules with evolving practices, relying on rich statistical data and internal documents. It covers detailed institutional arrangements, the standard of review, the types of cases and litigants, and the activity of the parties in the process. It makes visible the diverse but complementary ways in which the mechanisms enhance the authority of EU legal acts and processes. It also reveals that scarce resources and imprecise rules restrict the scope of review and hinder independent empirical investigations. Finally, it casts light on how a differentiated system of judicial and extra-judicial review can accommodate various kinds of technical and political discretion exercised by EU institutions and bodies.

Controlling EU Agencies launches the debate on how to build a comprehensive system of controls in light of the ongoing trends of agencification and Europeanisation of the executive in the EU.

Which administrative procedures are followed by EU agencies? Which are the implications flowing from the principles of good administration, access and participation, for those agencies? Do their procedures strengthen their legitimacy without impairing the timeliness of administrative regulation and hence its effectiveness? This book offers an in-depth analysis of the extension of procedural constraints imposed on EU agencies and addresses the vital question of the role of procedural instruments in contributing to agencies’ input and output legitimacy. The volume focuses in particular on some of the newest EU agencies, which are entrusted with binding (or quasi-binding) powers. The chosen fields of investigation are those of electronic communications, energy, aviation safety, banking and financial regulation. Moreover, two cross cutting issues have been selected: the use of soft law by agencies and their internal remedies, through appeals and other instruments.

While the EU agencies that have been granted the power to adopt binding decisions are a diverse group, they at least share one feature: in all of them an organisationally separate administrative review body, i.e. a board of appeal, has been established. The review procedures before these boards must be exhausted before private parties can seize the EU courts and the boards therefore all fulfil a similar function: filtering cases before they end up before the courts and providing parties by expert-driven review. Sharing this common function as well as some common features, the boards of appeal of the different agencies remain heterogenous in their set up and functioning. This raises a host of questions from both a theoretic and practical perspective which this volume analyses in depth: how do the boards function, which kind of review do they offer, and how should they be conceptualized in the EU's overall system of legal protection against administrative action? To answer these questions, the volume's first part presents a series of case studies, covering all the EU boards of appeal currently in existence, while a second part looks into the horizontal issues raised by the phenomenon of the boards of appeal.

The increasing number of executive tasks assigned to EU institutions and agencies has resulted in a greater demand for justice that can no longer be satisfied by the courts alone. This has led to the development of a wide range of administrative remedies that have become a central part of the EU administrative justice system. This book examines the important theoretical and practical issues raised by this phenomenon. The work focuses on five administrative remedies: internal review; administrative appeals to the Commission against decisions of executive and decentralised agencies; independent administrative review of decisions of decentralised agencies; complaints to the EU Ombudsman; and complaints to the EU Data Protection Supervisor. The research rests on the idea that there is a complex, and at times ambivalent, relationship between administrative remedies and the varying degrees of autonomy of EU institutions and bodies, offices and agencies. The work draws on legislation, internal rules of executive bodies, administrative practices and specific case law, data and statistics. This empirical approach helps to unveil the true dynamics present within these procedures and demonstrates that whilst administrative remedies may improve the relationship between individuals and the EU administration, their interplay with administrative autonomy might lead to a risk of fragmentation and incoherence in the EU administrative justice system.

The proper functioning of the EU financial market is protected by public actors - both national and supranational - responsible for rulemaking and supervision of investment firms and other private actors. At the same time the effectiveness of the EU legal system requires vigilance from private actors such as investment firms but also their clients, invoking their rights before national authorities and courts. This means that investment firms have a dual role within the system, turning them into subjects of control and enforcement but also agents in the maintenance of the rule of law. Legal Accountability in EU Markets for Financial Instruments brings together a group of scholars with expertise from different legal disciplines but a shared interest for the EU internal market and the way it develops. It integrates a modern study of the form and function of EU rulemaking in the internal market after the financial crisis. The book includes an evaluation of core aspects of rulemaking in the financial market and that way provides a cross-cutting treatment of EU law. The focus of the book is set on the regulatory framework in MiFIDII and MiFIR and thematic questions around legal mechanisms for accountability and the role of investment firms in the operation of those mechanisms. It further discusses the implications for EU law and the EU legal system and gives readers a thorough understanding of the concept of accountability through its own findings.