Britain And The Channel Tunnel

Commissioned by the Cabinet Office and using hitherto untapped British Government records, this book presents an in-depth analysis of the successful project of 1986-94. This is a vivid portrayal of the complexities of quadripartite decision-making (two countries, plus the public and private sectors), revealing new insights into the role of the British and French Governments in the process. This important book, written by Britain’s leading transport historian, will be essential reading for all those interested in PPPs, British and European economic history and international relations. The building of the Channel Tunnel has been one of Europe’s major projects and a testimony to British-French and public-private sector collaboration. However, Eurotunnel’s current financial crisis provides a sobering backcloth for an examination of the British Government’s long-term flirtation with the project, and, in particular, the earlier Tunnel project in the 1960s and early 1970s, which was abandoned by the British Government in 1975.

A history of the building of the Channel Tunnel, which connects England and France, with emphasis on the difficulties of digging a tunnel where some engineers said it could not be done.

Commissioned by the Cabinet Office and using hitherto untapped British Government records, this book presents an in-depth analysis of the successful project of 1986-94. This is a vivid portrayal of the complexities of quadripartite decision-making (two countries, plus the public and private sectors), revealing new insights into the role of the British and French Governments in the process. This important book, written by Britain's leading transport historian, will be essential reading for all those interested in PPPs, British and European economic history and international relations. The building of the Channel Tunnel has been one of Europe's major projects and a testimony to British-French and public-private sector collaboration. However, Eurotunnel's current financial crisis provides a sobering backcloth for an examination of the British Government's long-term flirtation with the project, and, in particular, the earlier Tunnel project in the 1960s and early 1970s, which was abandoned by the British Government in 1975.

The Channel Tunnel is a huge construction project, employing over 14,000 people at peak, and costing over 15611 billion of private money. It has succeeded in spite of great financial, political and techncial difficulties, and a fundamentally flawed contract. This book tells the story of the project, based on the coverage in Construction News and with commentary taken from recent interviews with key project sources.

In a "business narrative of high risk and high finance, of culture clashes and reckless blunders," the author explains the tunnel from an engineering standpoint and also from the viewpoint of the financiers who had planned to make money on the project.