Brown Green And Blue Water Fleets

From riverine operations in the American Civil War and China in the 1860s to the major fleet engagements of the World Wars, plus more recent naval actions in the Falklands/Malvenas War and Gulf War, Lindberg and Todd methodically show how geography has shaped the strategy, tactics, and tools of naval warfare. Alfred T. Mahan was perhaps the first naval professional to recognize and acknowledge fully the influence of geography on navies and naval warfare. Many of his principles of seapower were inherently geographical and influenced both what kind of naval force a state would possess and how it would be utilized. In the time that has passed since Mahan made his observations, naval warfare and navies have experienced major technological changes, yet geographical factors continue to exert their influence on how navies fight, how they are structured, and the design of the ships that they deploy. After providing a comprehensive review of geostrategic theory and its application to naval warfare, the book is organized by major operational environments in which such warfare occurs--the high seas, littoral regions, and inland waterways. Lindberg and Todd illustrate how such geographical factors as distance, location, surface, and subsurface conditions influence naval operations, including fleet-to-fleet engagements, amphibious assault, coastal defense, logistical support, and riverine actions. A separate chapter takes an in-depth look at the ways in which geography influences navies themselves with issues such as primary mission type, force structure development, and ship design. Through the use of historical case studies, this volume applies long held geographical concepts to fundamental naval theories and practices to illustrate just how pervasive geography's influence has been during the past 140 years.

This book focuses on the theory and practice of maritime strategy and operations by the weaker powers at sea. Illustrated by examples from naval and military history, the book explains and analyzes the strategies of the weaker side at sea in both peacetime and wartime; in defense versus offense; the main prerequisites for disputing control of the sea; and the conceptual framework of disputing control of the sea. It also explains and analyzes in some detail the main methods of disputing sea control – avoiding/seeking decisive encounters, weakening enemy naval forces over time, counter-containment of enemy naval forces, destroying the enemy’s military-economic potential at sea, attacks on the enemy coast, defense of the coast, defense/capturing important positions/basing areas, and defense/capturing of a choke point. A majority of the world’s navies are currently of small or medium-size. In the case of a war with a much stronger opponent, they would be strategically on the defensive, and their main objective then would be to dispute control of the sea by a stronger side at sea. This book provides a practical guide to such a strategy. This book would be of much interest to students of naval power, maritime security, strategic studies and military/naval history.

This is the fourth, revised and updated, edition of Geoffrey Till's Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-first Century. The rise of the Chinese and other Asian navies, worsening quarrels over maritime jurisdiction and the United States’ maritime pivot towards the Asia-Pacific region reminds us that the sea has always been central to human development as a source of resources, and as a means of transportation, information-exchange and strategic dominion. It has provided the basis for mankind's prosperity and security, and this is even more true in the early twenty-first century, with the emergence of an increasingly globalised world trading system. Navies have always provided a way of policing, and sometimes exploiting, the system. In contemporary conditions, navies, and other forms of maritime power, are having to adapt, in order to exert the maximum power ashore in the company of others and to expand the range of their interests, activities and responsibilities. While these new tasks are developing fast, traditional ones still predominate. Deterrence remains the first duty of today’s navies, backed up by the need to ‘fight and win’ if necessary. How navies and their states balance these two imperatives will tell us a great deal about our future in this increasingly maritime century. This book investigates the consequences of all this for the developing nature, composition and functions of all the world's significant navies, and provides a guide for anyone interested in the changing and crucial role of seapower in the twenty-first century. Seapower is essential reading for all students of naval power, maritime security and naval history, and highly recommended for students of strategic studies, international security and international relations.

In this book, contributors from both sides of the Atlantic examine several key themes in the increasingly important subject of counter-insurgency. It assesses the lessons that contemporary policy makers and military practitioners can draw from historical and more recent experience.

This is a fascinating insight into China’s strategic abilities and ambitions, probing the real depths of its plans for the twenty-first century. China's Rising Sea Power explores similarities between China’s strategic outlook today and that of earlier continental powers whose submarine fleets challenged dominant maritime powers for regional hegemony: Germany in two World Wars and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Using insights from classical naval strategic theory, Peter Howarth examines Beijing’s strategic logic in making tactical submarines the keystone of China’s naval force structure. He also investigates the influence of Soviet naval strategy and ancient Chinese military thought on the PLA Navy’s strategic culture, contending that China’s increasingly capable submarine fleet could play a key role in Beijing’s use of force to resolve the Taiwan issue. This book will be of great interest to all students and scholars of security and strategic studies, Asian politics, geopolitics and military (naval) strategy.

This edited volume focuses on aspects of the understudied theme of African sea-power, including African navies and the engagement of non-African navies with the continent. Africa possesses 48,000 kilometers of coastline, comprising 38 out of 54 of the continent’s states and several strategic choke points for international shipping, such as the Suez Canal, the Gulf of Aden and the Cape of Good Hope. Nevertheless, post-colonial Africa’s small navies and their relations with the navies of external powers have not received much scholarly attention. Focusing on Sub-Saharan Africa, this collection attempts to address this neglect and stimulate further research by offering original chapters related to historical and contemporary themes around Africa’s navies. The historical chapters cover the origin of the Tanzanian, Ethiopian, Nigerian and Ghana navies during the era of decolonization and the Cold War, the asymmetrical naval campaign fought during the Nigerian Civil War (1967-70), and the activities of the Soviet Navy in supporting African states and movements fighting lingering colonialism and white supremacy during the 1970s and 1980s. Focusing on the contemporary situation, other chapters discuss the engagement of the Indian Navy with Africa, the potential role of the Angolan and Mozambican navies in the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the transformation and development of the post-apartheid South African Navy, and the challenges and capabilities of African navies in the early twenty-first century. The book concludes by discussing the question of whether African coastal countries need navies. This book will be of much interest to students of naval power, strategic studies, African politics and International Relations. Chapters 1, 2, 6 and 8 of this book are available for free in Open Access at www.taylorfrancis.com. It has been made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 license.

A detailed account of Germany’s groundbreaking Operation Weserübung, the first three dimensional—land, sea, air—strategic invasion in history. The German invasion of Denmark and Norway in April 1940 brought a sudden and shocking end to the “Phoney War” in the West. In a single day, multiple seaborne and airborne landings established German forces ashore in Norway, overwhelming the unprepared Norwegian forces and catching the Allied Powers completely by surprise. Their belated response was ill-thought-out and badly organized, and by June 9 all resistance had formally ended. The strategic importance of Scandinavian iron ore, shipped through the port of Narvik to Germany, was the main cause of the campaign. The authors show how Allied attempts to interdict these supplies provoked German plans to secure them, and also how political developments in the inter-war years resulted in both Denmark and Norway being unable to deter threats to their neutrality despite having done so successfully in the First World War. The German attack was their first “joint” air, sea, and land operation, making large-scale use of air-landing and parachute forces, and the Luftwaffe’s control of the air throughout the campaign would prove decisive. Although costly, particularly for the Kriegsmarine, it was a triumph of good planning, improvisation and aggressive, determined action by the troops on the ground. Making full use of Norwegian, Danish, and German sources, this book is a full and fascinating account of this highly significant campaign and its aftermath both for the course of the Second World War and the post-war history of the two countries conquered with such unprecedented speed.

This book examines British naval diplomacy from the end of the Crimean War to the American Civil War, showing how the mid-Victorian Royal Navy suffered serious challenges during the period. Many recent works have attempted to depict the mid-Victorian Royal Navy as all-powerful, innovative, and even self-assured. In contrast, this work argues that it suffered serious challenges in the form of expanding imperial commitments, national security concerns, precarious diplomatic relations with European Powers and the United States, and technological advancements associated with the armoured warship at the height of the so-called 'Pax Britannica'. Utilising a wealth of international archival sources, this volume explores the introduction of the monitor form of ironclad during the American Civil War, which deliberately forfeited long-range power-projection for local, coastal command of the sea. It looks at the ways in which the Royal Navy responded to this new technology and uses a wealth of international primary and secondary sources to ascertain how decision-making at Whitehall affected that at Westminster. The result is a better-balanced understanding of Palmerstonian diplomacy from the end of the Crimean War to the American Civil War, the early evolution of the modern capital ship (including the catastrophic loss of the experimental sail-and-turret ironclad H.M.S. Captain), naval power-projection, and the nature of 'empire', 'technology', and 'seapower'. This book will be of great interest to all students of the Royal Navy, and of maritime and strategic studies in general.