China Arms Control And Nonproliferation

This is an empirically and conceptually path-breaking book that documents China's participation in international arms control and non-proliferation regimes from 1985 to 2001.

The authors then elaborate a preliminary agenda for exploring with China the requirements of strategic stability in the emerging era and of testing Beijing's intention to continue some form of restraint in the years ahead."--BOOK JACKET.

While the world’s attention is focused on the nuclearization of North Korea and Iran and the nuclear brinkmanship between India and Pakistan, China is believed to have doubled the size of its nuclear arsenal, making it “the forgotten nuclear power,” as described in Foreign Affairs. Susan Turner Haynes analyzes China’s buildup and its diversification of increasingly mobile, precise, and sophisticated nuclear weapons. Haynes provides context and clarity on this complex global issue through an analysis of extensive primary source research and lends insight into questions about why China is the only nuclear weapon state recognized under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty that continues to pursue qualitative and quantitative advancements to its nuclear force. As the gap between China’s nuclear force and the forces of the nuclear superpowers narrows against the expressed interest of many nuclear and nonnuclear states, Chinese Nuclear Proliferation offers policy prescriptions to curtail China’s nuclear growth and to assuage fears that the “American world order” presents a direct threat to China’s national security. Presenting technical concepts with minimal jargon in a straightforward style, this book will be of use to casual China watchers and military experts alike.

An analysis of China's nuclear and space capabilities, deployment strategies, and stance in arms control negotiations, and the implications for U.S. defense strategy. In The Minimum Means of Reprisal, Jeffrey Lewis examines China's nuclear and space capabilities and deployment strategies, as well as the Chinese government's stance in arms control negotiations. Lewis finds that Chinese officials hold a "restrained view" about the role of nuclear weapons in national security and maintain a limited nuclear capacity sufficient to deter attack but not large enough for control of these weapons to be compromised. The future of cooperative security arrangements in space will depend largely on the U.S.-Chinese relationship, and Lewis warns that changes in U.S. defense strategy, including the weaponization of space, could signal to China that its capabilities are not sufficient to deter the United States from the use of force. Such a shift could cause China to reconsider its use of restraint in nuclear strategy, further damaging the already weakened arms control regime and increasing the nuclear threat to the United States and the world.