Chinese Military Reforms In The Age Of Xi Jinping

China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) has embarked on its most wide-ranging and ambitious restructuring since 1949, including major changes to most of its key organizations. The restructuring reflects the desire to strengthen PLA joint operation capabilities- on land, sea, in the air, and in the space and cyber domains. The reforms could result in a more adept joint warfighting force, though the PLA will continue to face a number of key hurdles to effective joint operations, Several potential actions would indicate that the PLA is overcoming obstacles to a stronger joint operations capability. The reforms are also intended to increase Chairman Xi Jinping's control over the PLA and to reinvigorate Chinese Communist Party (CCP) organs within the military. Xi Jinping's ability to push through reforms indicates that he has more authority over the PLA than his recent predecessors. The restructuring could create new opportunities for U.S.-China military contacts.

China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) has embarked on its most wide-ranging and ambitious restructuring since 1949, including major changes to most of its key organizations. -The general departments were disbanded, new Central Military Commission (CMC) departments created, and a new ground force headquarters established. -Seven military regions were restructured into five theater commands aligned against regional threats. Commanders will be able to develop joint force packages from army, navy, air force, and conventional missile units within their theaters. -PLA service headquarters are transitioning to an exclusive focus on "organize, train, and equip" missions and will no longer have a primary role in conducting operations. However, the PLA is still figuring out how the new relationships among the CMC, services, and theaters will work in practice. The restructuring will also reduce the size of the PLA by 300,000 soldiers, cutting the ground forces and increasing the size of the navy and air force.

Integral to Xi Jinping's vision of restoring China to greatness--what he defines as the "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation" [zhonghua minzu weida fuxing, 中华民族伟大复兴]--is building a more modern, capable, and disciplined military. China's economic development, territorial integrity, and even the survival of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) itself cannot be guaranteed without an army that can fight and prevail in modern warfare. Articulating the need for a stronger military, Xi and his colleagues have reflected on periods of Chinese weakness, such as the era of imperial decline in the late 19th century and the Japanese occupation in the 1930s and 1940s. In Xi's words, a "nation's backwardness in military affairs has a profound influence on a nation's security. I often peruse the annals of modern Chinese history and feel heartbroken at the tragic scenes of us being beaten because of our ineptitude." Such humiliations, in his view, should never be repeated.Xi's ambition to reshape and modernize the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has been apparent from his early days as CCP general secretary and Central Military Commission (CMC) chairman. At the third plenum of the 18th Party Congress, held in October 2013, Xi and other Party elites declared their intention to overhaul the military's command structure, update its training and logistics systems, adjust the size and composition of the services, unveil new rules and regulations governing military personnel, and strengthen civil-military cooperation in technological development and other areas.2 In early 2014, Xi assumed leadership of a leading group on military reform, symbolizing his central role in the process. At the group's first meeting, Xi declared that "national defense and military reform are an important part and an important symbol of China's overall reform," noting that the overriding goal was to produce a military that can "fight and win battles."

Foreign analysts have only begun to explore the contents, drivers, and possible implications of Xi's campaign to restructure the PLA. Many issues remain shrouded in uncertainty and warrant further examination. These include: what impacts the reforms are having on PLA operations, training, and logistics; the prospects for the ground forces as the reforms' nominal biggest loser, as well as the other services; challenges the PLA is facing in cultivating operational commanders; the structure, roles, and missions of the SSF and JLSF; how the downsizing is being carried out, and what impact it might have on social stability; the implications of reform for Party control over, and Xi's influence within, the PLA; whether and how the reforms will improve coordination between the PLA and the civilian science and technology sector; what the implications might be for the defense acquisition process. This volume explores these and other dimensions of China's military reforms as they were planned and implemented between 2013 and 2018.

This edited volume examines the recalibration of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) roles and missions in China’s domestic and foreign policymaking since Xi Jinping’s ascension to power in late 2012. This book explores how China’s growing military prowess, along with Beijing’s ongoing shift away from "keeping a low profile," owes much to the policies of the China’s Communist Party under Xi Jinping’s leadership. The chapters in the book share a central theme: the recalibration of the PLA roles and missions since Xi Jinping assumed the trifecta of party-state-military power. These contributions seek to explore in depth some of the key issues and scrutinize the enhancements in the PLA’s operational capabilities, both in terms of its hardware as well as its "heartware" – the human elements of its development such as operational culture and doctrine. In all, the chapters document the transformative change the PLA has undergone since the profound realization of its previous limitations vis-à-vis the United States’ advanced military operations of the previous century as well as pointing to continuity amid change. This book will be of much interest to students of strategic studies, Chinese politics, Asian security, defense studies, and international relations, in general.

This is an important report compilation of testimony at a 2018 hearing which provided insight into how China's ongoing military reform efforts and President Xi's vision for achieving the "China Dream" are shaping the People's Liberation Army's long-term defense planning, weapons development, and acquisition programs. The hearing specifically assessed the political and security drivers shaping China's military modernization efforts; the reformed Central Military Commission's role in coordinating modernization priorities with the military services; the development of forces capable of conducting joint operations; and implications for the United States.Panel I: National-Level Military Modernization Priorities and Force Enablers * 1. Cortez Cooper, Senior International/Defense Researcher, RAND Corporation * 2. John Costello, Cybersecurity Policy Fellow, New America Foundation * 3. Kevin McCauley, Independent Analyst * Panel II: Service-Level Military Modernization Priorities * 4. Ben Lowsen, China Advisor, U.S. Air Force * 5. James Holmes, Ph.D., J.C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy, U.S. Naval War College * 6. Brendan Mulvaney, Ph.D., Director, China Aerospace Studies Institute * 7. Michael S. Chase, Ph.D., Senior Political Scientist, RAND Corporation * Panel III: PLA Modernization and Implications for the United States and Beyond * 8. Tate Nurkin, Executive Director, Strategic Assessments, Jane's by IHS Markit * 9. Jacqueline N. Deal, Ph.D., President and CEO, Long Term Strategy Group * 10. Kathleen Hicks, Ph.D. Senior Vice President, Henry A. Kissinger Chair, and Director of the International Security Program, Center for Strategic and International StudiesThe Chinese Communist Party believes that a strong military is essential to maintaining its hold on power in an increasingly competitive geostrategic environment. Since becoming General Secretary of the CCP, Xi Jinping has conveyed his vision for achieving the "China Dream" through the "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation." President Xi as chairman of the Central Military Commission, China's top military decision-making body, has emphasized that a strong military is necessary to reach this goal. At the CCP's recent 19th Party Congress, President Xi revised the milestones set out for the military's development strategy. He announced an interim goal for the PLA to achieve modernization by 2035 and modified the long-term objective to become a world-class military by 2049. China's efforts to reach its military development goals will depend on the PLA's ability to implement its most sweeping reform and reorganization since the 1950s, which began in 2016 and will last through 2020. The reform effort centralizes President Xi's control over the military and seeks to improve the PLA's capability to fight regional conflicts at greater distances from China. Therefore, to better understand the challenges the U.S. and its allies and partners may face in the Indo-Pacific concerning Chinese military modernization, this hearing will examine Beijing's national-level modernization priorities, drivers behind the modernization, force enablers, and how the PLA is coordinating these priorities from the national level down among the military services.At the CCP's recent 19th Party Congress, President Xi revised the milestones set out for the military's development strategy. He announced an interim goal for the PLA to achieve modernization by 2035 and modified the long-term objective to become a world-class military by 2049. China's efforts to reach its military development goals will depend on the PLA's ability to implement its most sweeping reform and reorganization since the 1950s, which began in 2016 and will last through 2020.

This updated volume is of special relevance in light of the profound changes occurring within the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA). China's desire to develop a military commensurate with its diverse interests is both legitimate and understandable. The challenge for U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) is to understand how China will employ this growing military capability in support of its interests. The book addresses the uncertainty surrounding the potential direction of the PLA by examining three distinct focus areas: domestic, external, and technological drivers of PLA modernization; alternative futures for the PLA; and, Implications for the region, world, and U.S.-China relations. The analysis provides an insightful perspective into the factors shaping and propelling the PLA's modernization, its potential future orientation ranging from internally focused to globally focused, and how the PLA's choices may impact China's relations with its neighbors and the world. Audience: Military personnel, policy analysts, lawmakers, and foreign officers in the Asia Pacific region may find many insights in this book pertaining to the development of the Chinese People's Liberation Army under the leadership of Chinese President, Xi Jinping. High school, community college, and undergraduate university students pursuing coursework and research for United States 1945- Present, global studies, and world history classes may find this text helpful for classroom debates about the expansion of the Chinese military role. Graduate students may find this work helpful for International Relations, Chinese Studies, and Global Affairs coursework in the pursuit of a Master's Degree program in these areas. China resources collection can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/international-foreign-affairs/asia/china

Established in 1982, the People’s Armed Police (PAP) is the paramilitary wing of the Chi- nese Communist Party (CCP), with a primary responsibility for maintaining domestic stability and a secondary role in providing rear area support for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) during wartime. e PAP—with a strength of up to a million personnel—also lls a variety of other important roles and missions, such as responding to natural disasters, guarding govern- ment compounds, and participating in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations around the world. For most of its existence, the PAP was under the dual leadership of the Central Military Commission (CMC) and the State Council, with provincial and local o cials granted signi cant latitude over PAP deployments in the event of emergencies. Some e orts to central- ize authority were made during the 1990s and 2000s, but the basic character of the PAP went unchanged for three decades. Under Xi Jinping’s tenure, China has embarked on a series of major reforms to the PAP. is paper explores the key dimensions, drivers, and implications of the PAP reorganization.