Choosing China S Leaders

Political elites are a key topic in contemporary China studies, and have been investigated in relation to factional politics, generation politics, technocracy, and crucially, institutionalization. The institutionalization of elite replacement began in China in the 1980s and quickly accelerated after the early 1990s, as mechanisms emerged to regulate political elites’ entry and exit, including age limits, term limits, and step-by-step promotion. By examining the various processes of elite selection, this book explores the role played by institutionalization in elite recruitment, promotion and turnover in China. While existing studies have developed our understanding of Chinese elite politics, two key puzzles regarding institutionalisation remain. Although institutionalisation is recognised as an important trend in Chinese politics, there is as yet no theoretical framework to explain the forces that have brought about and sustained this. Further, it is unclear how the process of institutionalisation has impacted on factional politics, and how factions would continue to operate within the parameters of formal politics. Drawing on a wide range of studies, this book looks at Politburo members, senior People’s Liberation Army officers, provincial leaders, heads of major central state-owned enterprises, and Youth League affiliates, to provide a comprehensive understanding of elite recruitment and mobility in contemporary China. This book will be of great interests to students and scholars of Chinese politics and government, Chinese studies and Asian politics more broadly.

Cadres have played a significant role throughout Chinese history. This group has been pivotal in enabling the CPC to bring about social and economic development. This book provides a fascinating insight into how they're chosen and a systematic understanding of how China's leaders are selected and appointed.

Challenges the conventional view that the party-state structure creates a monolithic political elite in PR China, allowing readers to think about Chinese politics in a different perspective using an institutional approach Unlike existing research on Chinese elites this book relies upon advance statistical data Statistics are based on 1588 top Chinese leaders making this book the most extensive and up-to-date biographical data set in elite studies

A fascinating look at China now and in the years to come, through the eyes of those at the helm As China continues its rapid ascent, attention is turning to its leaders, who they are, and how they view the country's incredible transformation over the last thirty years. In How China's Leaders Think: The Inside Story of China's Past, Current and Future Leaders, Revised, bestselling author Lawrence Kuhn goes directly to the source, talking with members of China's ruling party and examining recently declassified Party material to provide readers with an intimate look at China's leaders and leadership structure, visionary principles, and convulsive past, and tracing the nation's reform efforts. Focusing on President Hu Jintao's philosophies and policies, the book looks to the next generation of China's leaders to ask the questions on everyone's lips. Who are China's future leaders? How do they view China's place in the world? Confronting China's leaders head on, Kuhn asks about the county's many problem, from economic imbalances to unsustainable development, to find out if there's a road map for change. Presenting the thoughts of key Chinese leaders on everything from media, military, banking, and healthcare to film, the Internet, science and technology, and much more, the book paints an intimate, candid portrayal of how China's leaders really think. Presents a fascinating insight into how China's leaders think about their country and where it's headed Asks the tough questions about China's need for reform Pulls together information from over 100 personal interviews as well as recently declassified Party documents Taking readers closer to Party officials than ever before, How China's Leaders Think documents China's thirty-year struggle toward economic and social reform, and what's to come.

Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China over 70 years ago, five paramount leaders have shaped the fates and fortunes of the nation and the ruling Chinese Communist Party: Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping. Under their leaderships, China has undergone an extraordinary transformation from an undeveloped and insular country to a comprehensive world power. In this definitive study, renowned Sinologist David Shambaugh offers a refreshing account of China’s dramatic post-revolutionary history through the prism of those who ruled it. Exploring the persona, formative socialization, psychology, and professional experiences of each leader, Shambaugh shows how their differing leadership styles and tactics of rule shaped China domestically and internationally: Mao was a populist tyrant, Deng a pragmatic Leninist, Jiang a bureaucratic politician, Hu a technocratic apparatchik, and Xi a modern emperor. Covering the full scope of these leaders’ personalities and power, this is an illuminating guide to China’s modern history and understanding how China has become the superpower of today.

Who will govern China after Jiang Zemin? What path will its new leaders chart in the early years of the twenty-first century? Drawing upon a wealth of both quantitative and qualitative data on the so-called fourth generation of leaders_those who were young during the Cultural Revolution_Cheng Li shows that this group is more diversified than previous generations in formative experiences, political solidarity, ideological conviction, and occupational background. The author explores the contradictions between these emerging leaders and their non-elite peers who were barred from education during the Mao era and now often are unemployed and disenchanted. The book concludes with the intriguing notion that this generation of leaders may have a better understanding of its peersO concerns and therefore may make the regime more accountable to its people, thus contributing to, rather than opposing, democratic development.

Political elites are a key topic in contemporary China studies, and have been investigated in relation to factional politics, generation politics, technocracy, and crucially, institutionalization. The institutionalization of elite replacement began in China in the 1980s and quickly accelerated after the early 1990s, as mechanisms emerged to regulate political elites’ entry and exit, including age limits, term limits, and step-by-step promotion. By examining the various processes of elite selection, this book explores the role played by institutionalization in elite recruitment, promotion and turnover in China. While existing studies have developed our understanding of Chinese elite politics, two key puzzles regarding institutionalisation remain. Although institutionalisation is recognised as an important trend in Chinese politics, there is as yet no theoretical framework to explain the forces that have brought about and sustained this. Further, it is unclear how the process of institutionalisation has impacted on factional politics, and how factions would continue to operate within the parameters of formal politics. Drawing on a wide range of studies, this book looks at Politburo members, senior People’s Liberation Army officers, provincial leaders, heads of major central state-owned enterprises, and Youth League affiliates, to provide a comprehensive understanding of elite recruitment and mobility in contemporary China. This book will be of great interests to students and scholars of Chinese politics and government, Chinese studies and Asian politics more broadly.

Executive Summary:Foreign policy makers in the United States should not be misled by prevailing media and scholarly assessments that exaggerate China?s influence in Asia relative to that of the United States. In particular, it would be a mistake for the Bush administration to give in to recent congressional, media, and interest group pressures that employ overstated assessments of China?s increasing power in order to push for tough U.S. government policies to confront and compete with China. This study shows that overt U.S. competition with China for influence is unwelcome in Asia, counterproductive for U.S. interests in the region, and unwarranted given the limited challenge posed by China?s rise. Prevailing assessments and commentaries about China?s rise in Asia are unbalanced, emphasizing China?s strengths and the United States? weaknesses. With few exceptions, they give inadequate attention to Chinese weaknesses and U.S. strengths. This study demonstrates that China?s recent success in Asia rests heavily on a fairly narrow foundation?that is, generally adroit Chinese diplomacy and intra-Asian trade that is less significant than the reported figures of annual trade between China and its neighbors would suggest. China?s willingness and ability to lead in Asia is undermined notably by many domestic preoccupations, nationalistic ambitions at odds with Asian neighbors, and economic complications posed by China?s rise as many countries in Asia are left further behind.Moreover, Chinese leaders and officials continue to follow policies that do not require either China or its neighboring countries to make significant changes, sacrifices, or commitments for one another that they would not ordinarily make. Thus, China?s Asian approach focuses on ?easy? things?the ?low-hanging fruit??and avoids costly commitments or major risk. By contrast, U.S. leadership in Asia, though challenged by unpopular policies in Southwest Asia and Korea, along with insufficient attention in dealing with Asian governments, remains strong in undertaking responsibilities and providing needed security and economic benefits to Asian states. The United States continues to show influence in Asia in concrete ways, notably by influencing Asian governments to do things they would not be inclined to do.Predictions of an emerging order in Asia led by a rising China that will marginalize the United States illustrate how far many of the predominate, unbalanced media and scholarly assessments have gone. They reflect a poor understanding of the ambitions of Asian governments, the resilience of U.S. power and leadership, and the actual status of China?s influence relative to that of the United States in Asian states around China?s periphery. To some extent, a rising China that generally accommodates its neighbors benefits from the fluid post-Cold War Asian order, as various Asian governments seek to broaden international options with various powers in a continuing round of hedging and maneuvering for advantage. But as China rises in influence in Asia, this study shows that these same neighboring governments hedge and maneuver against possible Chinese dominance. In this process, they quietly seek closer ties with one another and particularly with the region?s dominant power, the United States. America?s advantages in this situation are strong. The United States has a proven record of being able and willing to commit significant resources and prestige to protect allies and friends. The United States is very powerful?a superpower?but it is far away from Asia and has none of the territorial and few of the other ambitions that characterize Asian powers. Thus it is less distrusted by Asian governments in comparison with how these governments view one another, including China. As a result, most Asian governments?including China and all the major powers in Asia?give higher priority to relations with the United States than to relations with any power in Asia.In addition to being Asia?s economic partner of choice and acknowledged security guarantor, the United States has a leadership position in Asia that rests on a determined U.S. administration prepared to confront adversaries and opponents. This position gives pause to Asian governments seeking to challenge or displace the United States. The analysis in this monograph demonstrates that even hard-line Chinese critics of U.S. ?hegemony? in Asian and world affairs have been compelled in recent years to adopt alow posture in dealings with the United States, choosing to wait as China builds comprehensive national power over the coming decades.Chinese leaders are often frustrated by U.S. policies and power, and desirous over the long term to see their periphery free of constricting U.S. great power involvement. However, they show little sign of deviating from efforts to expand influence in selected ways that tend to avoid directly challenging the United States. Thus, for the most part, China?s rise in Asia does not come at the expense of U.S. interests and is not a part of a zerosum game resulting in the automatic decline of U.S. influence.To enhance its position in Asia, Washington should focus on repairing negative features of recent U.S. policy in Asia related to the fallout of its actions in Iraq, the Middle East, and Korea; U.S. unilateralism in international politics; and inattentiveness to the concerns of Asian governments over economic development, nation building, and multilateral cooperation. This recommendation requires adjustments, not a wholesale revamping of U.S. policies. Backed by continued, careful management of U.S. security commitments and economic relations with regional governments, they will enhance the leading role of the United States in Asian affairs. The prevailing tendency of Asian governments to hedge in the post- Cold War environment seems likely to continue to pose challenges for U.S. management of alliance and other relations with Asian governments seeking more independence and freedom of action, inclining some to seek closer ties with China, among others. Policymakers in the United States should not overreact to such maneuvers, recognizing that such hedging continues to provide a prominent role for the United States as the region?s well-recognized security stabilizer and economic partner of choice. In particular, Chinese government leaders found that their overt efforts in the late 1990s to compel Asian governments to choose between a rising China and the United States failed in the face of Asian governments? long unwillingness to do so. The government should learn from this experience in seeking to advance its leadership in Asia without the overt competition with China that would try to force Asian governments to make such a choice, probably with negative implications for U.S. leadership in Asia.