Civil War Logistics

During the Civil War, neither the Union nor the Confederate army could have operated without effective transportation systems. Moving men, supplies, and equipment required coordination on a massive scale, and Earl J. Hess’s Civil War Logistics offers the first comprehensive analysis of this vital process. Utilizing an enormous array of reports, dispatches, and personal accounts by quartermasters involved in transporting war materials, Hess reveals how each conveyance system operated as well as the degree to which both armies accomplished their logistical goals. In a society just realizing the benefits of modern travel technology, both sides of the conflict faced challenges in maintaining national and regional lines of transportation. Union and Confederate quartermasters used riverboats, steamers, coastal shipping, railroads, wagon trains, pack trains, cattle herds, and their soldiers in the long and complicated chain that supported the military operations of their forces. Soldiers in blue and gray alike tried to destroy the transportation facilities of their enemy, firing on river boats and dismantling rails to disrupt opposing supply lines while defending their own means of transport. According to Hess, Union logistical efforts proved far more successful than Confederate attempts to move and supply its fighting forces, due mainly to the North’s superior administrative management and willingness to seize transportation resources when needed. As the war went on, the Union’s protean system grew in complexity, size, and efficiency, while that of the Confederates steadily declined in size and effectiveness until it hardly met the needs of its army. Indeed, Hess concludes that in its use of all types of military transportation, the Federal government far surpassed its opponent and thus laid the foundation for Union victory in the Civil War.

Winner of the Eugene Feit Award in Civil War Studies by the New York Military Affairs Symposium During the Civil War, neither the Union nor the Confederate army could have operated without effective transportation systems. Moving men, supplies, and equipment required coordination on a massive scale, and Earl J. Hess’s Civil War Logistics offers the first comprehensive analysis of this vital process. Utilizing an enormous array of reports, dispatches, and personal accounts by quartermasters involved in transporting war materials, Hess reveals how each conveyance system operated as well as the degree to which both armies accomplished their logistical goals. In a society just realizing the benefits of modern travel technology, both sides of the conflict faced challenges in maintaining national and regional lines of transportation. Union and Confederate quartermasters used riverboats, steamers, coastal shipping, railroads, wagon trains, pack trains, cattle herds, and their soldiers in the long and complicated chain that supported the military operations of their forces. Soldiers in blue and gray alike tried to destroy the transportation facilities of their enemy, firing on river boats and dismantling rails to disrupt opposing supply lines while defending their own means of transport. According to Hess, Union logistical efforts proved far more successful than Confederate attempts to move and supply its fighting forces, due mainly to the North’s superior administrative management and willingness to seize transportation resources when needed. As the war went on, the Union’s protean system grew in complexity, size, and efficiency, while that of the Confederates steadily declined in size and effectiveness until it hardly met the needs of its army. Indeed, Hess concludes that in its use of all types of military transportation, the Federal government far surpassed its opponent and thus laid the foundation for Union victory in the Civil War.

Much of Civil War history emphasizes generalship (or the lack of it) as the key factor in analyzing why battles were won or lost. Taking an innovative approach, this book focuses on six elements of victory in nine important Western Theater engagements during 1862--a year when the North had not yet fully mobilized for war. With increasing complexity on the battlefield and the enormous growth of American armies, winning or losing depended upon achieving as many of these six critical goals as possible: a clear objective; mobilization of effective lieutenants; a competent staff; seizing and holding initiative; deploying all available resources; and realizing a successful strategic outcome. The more goals achieved, the greater the victory.

The germ of this document began with two questions: how much does it take to supply aCivil War army(the Army of the Potomac has the best records so it is used as the exemplar) and since we are dealing with the 19th century man, the numbers for other armies; Northern Virginia, Cumberland, Tennessee, should be pretty much the same; and how does it work? The results of the study are more or less complete, but there is a host of unanswered questions. Are wagons designated by regiment, brigade, division, corps?(photographic evidence suggests that some wagons had some sort of designation painted on their white tops) Does the same wagon always carry the same supply? Forage( the single most common supply unit) rations, administrative furniture (desks, cooking equipment, files)ammunition (are wagons specifically designated by battery, are there general artillery ammunition wagons? Are wagons carrying mixed loads; 3” rifles 12 pound Napoleons, Parrot guns) I did no find the answers, and these questions are left for other writers to research and answer.

Winner of the Army Historical Foundation Distinguished Writing Award Civil War Supply and Strategy stands as a sweeping examination of the decisive link between the distribution of provisions to soldiers and the strategic movement of armies during the Civil War. Award-winning historian Earl J. Hess reveals how that dynamic served as the key to success, especially for the Union army as it undertook bold offensives striking far behind Confederate lines. How generals and their subordinates organized military resources to provide food for both men and animals under their command, he argues, proved essential to Union victory. The Union army developed a powerful logistical capability that enabled it to penetrate deep into Confederate territory and exert control over select regions of the South. Logistics and supply empowered Union offensive strategy but limited it as well; heavily dependent on supply lines, road systems, preexisting railroad lines, and natural waterways, Union strategy worked far better in the more developed Upper South. Union commanders encountered unique problems in the Deep South, where needed infrastructure was more scarce. While the Mississippi River allowed Northern armies to access the region along a narrow corridor and capture key cities and towns along its banks, the dearth of rail lines nearly stymied William T. Sherman’s advance to Atlanta. In other parts of the Deep South, the Union army relied on massive strategic raids to destroy resources and propel its military might into the heart of the Confederacy. As Hess’s study shows, from the perspective of maintaining food supply and moving armies, there existed two main theaters of operation, north and south, that proved just as important as the three conventional eastern, western, and Trans-Mississippi theaters. Indeed, the conflict in the Upper South proved so different from that in the Deep South that the ability of Federal officials to negotiate the logistical complications associated with army mobility played a crucial role in determining the outcome of the war.

Why did Napoleon succeed in 1805 but fail in 1812? Were the railways vital to Prussia's victory over France in 1870? Was the famous Schlieffen Plan militarily sound? Could the European half of World War II have been ended in 1944? These are only a few of the questions that form the subject-matter of this meticulously researched, lively book. Drawing on a very wide range of unpublished and previously unexploited sources, Martin van Creveld examines the 'nuts and bolts' of war: namely, those formidable problems of movement and supply, transportation and administration, so often mentioned - but rarely explored - by the vast majority of books on military history. In doing so he casts his net far and wide, from Gustavus Adolphus to Rommel, from Marlborough to Patton, subjecting the operations of each to a thorough analysis from a fresh and unusual point of view. The result is a fascinating book that has something new to say about virtually every one of the most important campaigns waged in Europe during the last two centuries.

This study examines the logistical system that supported the Federal Army of the Southwest in the American Civil War during the Pea Ridge Campaign of January-March, 1862, under the command of Brigadier General Samuel R. Curtis. The Pea Ridge Campaign was carried out along the U.S. frontier of southwestern Missouri and northwestern Arkansas, a sparsely populated region with little economic infrastructure. The forces operating in the region did not have the benefit of railroads or navigable bodies of water. This study concludes that the commander and his quartermasters overcame enormous problems posed by the environment and situation to win the most significant victory in the Trans-Mississippi Theater in the entire Civil War. Creating a logistical system that allowed the Army of the Southwest to extend its operational reach, improve freedom of action, and extend the endurance of the army. Logistics is a rarely explored, but very important, field of study. This study attempts to put the field of logistics in its proper place within the study of military history. Logistics is tied with strategy and tactics; without logistics, victory is not possible. The American Civil War began when the Confederates fired on Fort Sumter on April 12, 1861. Over the next four years, many great campaigns and battles were fought from First Bull Run all the way through to Appomattox. Men from both sides fought and died, heroes were made and legends were born. In the early part of 1862, across the great Mississippi River, in Missouri and Arkansas, a campaign began. This campaign required considerably smaller amounts of men compared to some of the greater battles that later took place. Yet, the men that took part in that campaign later wrote about how the hardships they endured and what they accomplished were far greater than any other battle they fought. The reason they were able to overcome such hardships was the considerations they made in keeping their force fed, armed, and supplied. This campaign is called the Pea Ridge Campaign. The Pea Ridge Campaign started in January 1862 and lasted until the Battle of Pea Ridge in March 1862. The battle was fought from 6-8 March 1862. This battle was a decisive victory for Union control of Missouri and northern Arkansas within the Trans-Mississippi Theater. After this victory, the Confederate Army of the West moved east of the Mississippi River, giving control of Missouri to the Federals. With the Federal victory at Pea Ridge, and the Confederate abandonment of Arkansas, the Trans-Mississippi became a military backwater, not nearly as important as the campaigns moving downstream to control the Mississippi River Valley.