Collateral Frameworks

The first book-length study of the importance of collateral frameworks in monetary policy, focusing on the Eurozone and euro crisis.

Central bank collateral policies came under pressure with the 2007-08 financial market crisis. This paper addresses the rationale for and constraints in taking collateral, and recent practices in different collateral frameworks. It then considers the risks of adverse selection. The paper concludes that (i) the collateral framework needs to include market incentives; (ii) central banks face trade-offs between risk and counterparty access; (iii) emerging markets may see pressure on collateral policies in coming years; and (iv) further work is required to develop pricing incentives and the structure of central bank facilities, both during normal times and in periods of market stress.

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The fourth book in the ‘European Public Investment Outlook’ series focuses on the urgent issue of how to finance needed investment in critical tangible and intangible infrastructure given high levels of public debt, a thorny problem facing many governments across Europe. Drawing on expertise from academics, researchers at public policy institutes and international governance bodies, the contributors analyse the current situation and prospects and propose feasible solutions. Financing Investment in Times of High Public Debt offers a powerful combination of high-level analysis of cross-continental policies and trends, with close examination of specific contexts in France, Italy, Germany and Spain. The chapters in Part II explore challenges including how to finance climate investments, the extent to which national promotional banks can offer solutions, EU budget reform and recent trends in tax progressivity. This book is essential reading for economists, policymakers, and anyone interested in implementing and financing public policy in Europe and wanting to better understand the intricacies of EU governance and institutions.

This book investigates to what extent the quality of eligible collateral is able to explain inflation. Addressing this question, hypotheses derived from the Theory of Property Economics by Heinsohn & Steiger are tested. Data are collected using a questionnaire, answered by central banks. An index of the quality of eligible collateral is constructed. Regression analyses are performed based on a sample of 62 countries for the period 1990 to 2003. A negative, robust and statistically significant correlation between inflation and the quality of eligible collateral is found. Central bank independence cannot contribute to the explanation of inflation. The result supports the theory of Heinsohn & Steiger: Securitisation of central bank lending is crucial for price stability.

Central banks normally accept debt of their own governments as collateral in liquidity operations without reservations. This gives rise to a valuable liquidity premium that reduces the cost of government finance. The ECB is an interesting exception in this respect. It relies on external assessments of the creditworthiness of its member states, such as credit ratings, to determine eligibility and the haircut it imposes on such debt. We show how such features in a central bank's collateral framework can give rise to cliff effects and multiple equilibria in bond yields and increase the vulnerability of governments to external shocks. This can potentially induce sovereign debt crises and defaults that would not otherwise arise.