Concept Formation In Social Science Routledge Revivals

First published in 1983, this book examines the problems of concept formation in the social sciences, and in particular sociology, from the standpoint of a realistic philosophy of science. Beginning with a discussion of positivistic, hermeneutic, rationalist and realistic philosophies of science, Dr Outhwaite argues that realism is best able to furnish rational criteria for the choice and specification of social scientific concepts. A realistic philosophy of science therefore acts as his reference point for the dialectical presentation of alternative accounts.

The book proposes a new epistemological and methodological approach to concept formation across human and natural sciences, beyond Eurocentrism and specism. It elaborates a method enabling global epistemics to cope with multiplex challenges coming from geohistorical as well as epistemological standpoints whose methodological potential remains unexplored. It assumes monstrosity as the generative grammar of a new holistic approach to human knowledge, and draws from postcolonial, decolonial or post-western perspectives to place new methodological cornerstones, as well as from arts, astrology and magic from the Islamic and European Renaissance, indigenous knowledge, genetics, theoretical physics or Afrofuturism. The book aims at provoking a shift in critical perspectives, which do not acknowledge their own inability to steam an appropriate methodology of terminological and conceptual elaboration for the lexicon of contemporary human knowledge, out of a pressing demand: once agreed upon the world as a single yet multilayered spacetime of analysis, how should research about large-scale/long-term processes of social change advance, in order to cope with the asymmetrical power relations that materialize colonial history through heterarchies of class, gender, race, ethnicity, culture, knowledge, cosmology and ecology? This book struggles against the prejudice that the instances heterogeneous yet non canonical epistemics are in fact exclusively confined to provincial, exotic or solipsistic particularisms; therefore never as universalistic as the dominant ones. To address this problem, the book proposes: a different way to think of the relation between the abstract and the concrete; a new relation between data or histories, and concepts; an alternative pathway to cross-cultural translation in conceptual and terminological analysis; a new posture to inhabit the spacetimes at the border between translation and untranslatability.

Papaioannou offers a radical new reading of Hayek in the 21st century, arguing that the moral dimension of his political theory is based on the methodological implications of an epistemologically founded morality, a morality that must respect the natural limits of human knowledge.

Anthony Smith's important work on the concept of social change, first published in 1973, puts forward the paradigm of historical change as an alternative to the functionalist theory of evolutionary change. He shows that, in attempting to provide a theory of social change, functionalism reveals itself as a species of 'frozen' evolutionism. Functionalism, he argues, is unable to cope with the mechanisms of historical transitions or account for novelty and emergence; it confuses classification of variations with explanation of processes; and its endogenous view of change prevents it from coming to grips with the real events and transformations of the historical record. In his assessment of functionalism, Dr Smith traces its explanatory failures in its accounts of the developments of civilisation, modernisation and revolution. He concludes that the study of 'evolution' is largely irrelevant to the investigation of social change. He proposes instead an exogenous paradigm of social change, which places the study of contingent historical events at its centre.

This book, written by a philosopher interested in the problems of social science and scientific method, and a sociologist interested in the philosophy of science, presents a novel conception of how we should think about and carry out the scientific study of social life. This book combines an evaluation of different conceptions of the nature of science with an examination of important sociological theorists and frameworks. This second edition of the work was originally published in 1982.

The demise of empiricist philosophies of science has contributed to the current disarray of philosophy in the social sciences. This book argues that a realist analysis of the structures and processes which make up the social world can provide a way out of its present impasse. These processes, ranging from the interpersonal negotiation of meaning to the constraining influence of administrative or market structures, cannot be understood as mere constructs either in the minds of the theorist or of the social factors themselves, since they actually generate the social world as we know it. The author develops some implications of this approach and presents a realist view of some of the principal theoretical traditions and controversies within sociology and other social sciences.

This book, first published in 1976, discusses four classical paradigms for sociology – the positivism of Saint-Simon and Comte, Durkheim, Marx and Weber – and four contemporary developments or revisions of them – the sociologie active of Dumazedier and his colleagues in France, sociology in Socialist Poland, the work of Dahrendorf and the ‘new sociology’ of Mills and his successors. Christopher Bryant suggests that no neutral language exists in which to compare the characteristics of these different paradigms, yet highlights those features which are common to all of them. Unique in its approach and analysis of the relationship between sociology and action, this book is of value and interest to students of sociology and theory and professional sociologists.