Conflict Crisis And War In Pakistan

Using an analysis of patterns of international crisis and war from 1948 to 1975, Patrick James suggests why some international crises result in war while others do not. Over one hundred cases are used to assess the three most prominent explanations for crisis escalation to war: (1) war is the result of rational choice by leaders who expect to gain from it; (2) war is the product of the outward projection of political unrest within states; and (3) war is the result of classical balance of power politics. James concludes that the best explanations for war include elements from all three categories.

India and Pakistan, nuclear neighbors and rivals, fought the last of three major wars in 1971. Far from peaceful, however, the period since then has been "one long crisis, punctuated by periods of peace." The long-disputed Kashmir issue continues to be both a cause and consequence of India-Pakistan hostility. Four Crises and a Peace Process focuses on four contained conflicts on the subcontinent: the Brasstacks Crisis of 1986–1987, the Compound Crisis of 1990, the Kargil Conflict of 1999, and the Border Confrontation of 2001–2002. Authors P.R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, and Brookings senior fellow Stephen P. Cohen explain the underlying causes of these crises, their consequences, the lessons that can be learned, and the American role in each. The four crises are notable because any one of them could have escalated to a large-scale conflict, or even all-out war, and three took place after India and Pakistan had gone nuclear. Looking for larger trends of peace and conflict in the region, the authors consider these incidents as cases of attempted conflict resolution, as instances of limited war by nuclear-armed nations, and as examples of intervention and engagement by the United States and China. They analyze the reactions of Indian, Pakistani, and international media and assess the two countries' decision-making processes. Fo ur Crises and a Peace Process explains how these crises have affected regional and international policy and evaluates the prospects for lasting peace in South Asia.

This book focuses on the 2001-2002 crisis that brought India and Pakistan to the brink of war. Authors focus on: the political history that led to the crisis; the conventional military environment, the nuclear environment and coercive diplomacy and de-escalation during the crisis; and how South Asia can avoid similar crises in the future.

In examining the forces that made the Indo-Pakistani relationship prone to conflict, Dr. Ganguly focusses first on the nature of the British colonial disengagement policy, a hasty and ill-conceived procedure that served to exacerbate the ideological differences between India's major political parties, the Congress and the Muslim League. Their competing views–the Congress espoused a secular polity while the League drew its inspiration from Islamic tenets–formed the basis of the two polities that emerged from the collapse of the British Indian empire. Disputes also arose over the uncertain status of Kashmir. With the lapse of the British doctrine of paramountcy (recognition of the British as the sovereign power in India), the so-called princely states had to join either India or Pakistan on the basis of geographic location and demographic composition. Kashmir posed a problem because of its location and because it had a Hindu monarch ruling a Muslim majority population. This peculiar status made it the center of a Pakistani irredentist claim. This claim was rejected by India, iintent upon demonstrating that all minorities could thrive under the aegis of secular government. Once set in motion by the interplay of domestic, regional, and systematic factors, these three forces--disengagement, ideological differences, and the conflict over Kashmir--brought the subcontinent to war in 1947-1948, 1965, and 1971. Dr. Ganguly provides a comprehensive and comparative analysis of these three Indo-Pakistani conflicts as well as an assessment of both the impact of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on the security of South Asia and the changes in the perceptions of that security.

This book explains why Kashmir has been such a hotly contested issue and why international coverage of this region is set to continue, for as long as the crisis remains unresolved.

This book is a major reinterpretation of politics in Pakistan. Its focus is conflict among groups, communities, classes, ideologies and institutions, which has shaped the country's political dynamics. Mohammad Waseem critically examines the theory surrounding the millennium-long conflict between Hindus and Muslims as separate nations who practiced mingled faiths, and the Hindu, Muslim and Sikh renaissances that created a twentieth-century clash of communities and led to partition. Political Conflict in Pakistan addresses multiple clashes: between the high culture as a mission to transform society, and the low culture of the land and the people; between those committed to the establishment's institutional constitutional framework and those seeking to dismantle the "colonial" state; between the corrupt and those seeking to hold them to account; between the political class and the middle class; and between civil and military power. The author exposes how the ruling elite centralised power through the militarisation and judicialization of politics, rendering the federalist arrangement an empty shell and thus grossly alienating the provinces. He sets all this within the contexts of education and media as breeders of conflict, the difficulties of establishing an anti-terrorist regime, and the state's pragmatic attempts at conflict resolution by seeking to keep the outsiders inside. This is a wide-ranging account of a country of contestations.