Constitutional Coup

Americans hate bureaucracy—though they love the services it provides—and demand that government run like a business. Hence today’s privatization revolution. Jon Michaels shows how the fusion of politics and profits commercializes government and consolidates state power in ways the Constitution’s framers endeavored to disaggregate.

Americans revere their Constitution. However, most of us are unaware how tumultuous and improbable the drafting and ratification processes were. As Benjamin Franklin keenly observed, any assembly of men bring with them "all their prejudices, their passions, their errors of opinion, their local interests and their selfish views." One need not deny that the Framers had good intentions in order to believe that they also had interests. Based on prodigious research and told largely through the voices of the participants, Michael Klarman's The Framers' Coup narrates how the Framers' clashing interests shaped the Constitution--and American history itself. The Philadelphia convention could easily have been a failure, and the risk of collapse was always present. Had the convention dissolved, any number of adverse outcomes could have resulted, including civil war or a reversion to monarchy. Not only does Klarman capture the knife's-edge atmosphere of the convention, he populates his narrative with riveting and colorful stories: the rebellion of debtor farmers in Massachusetts; George Washington's uncertainty about whether to attend; Gunning Bedford's threat to turn to a European prince if the small states were denied equal representation in the Senate; slave staters' threats to take their marbles and go home if denied representation for their slaves; Hamilton's quasi-monarchist speech to the convention; and Patrick Henry's herculean efforts to defeat the Constitution in Virginia through demagoguery and conspiracy theories. The Framers' Coup is more than a compendium of great stories, however, and the powerful arguments that feature throughout will reshape our understanding of the nation's founding. Simply put, the Constitutional Convention almost didn't happen, and once it happened, it almost failed. And, even after the convention succeeded, the Constitution it produced almost failed to be ratified. Just as importantly, the Constitution was hardly the product of philosophical reflections by brilliant, disinterested statesmen, but rather ordinary interest group politics. Multiple conflicting interests had a say, from creditors and debtors to city dwellers and backwoodsmen. The upper class overwhelmingly supported the Constitution; many working class colonists were more dubious. Slave states and nonslave states had different perspectives on how well the Constitution served their interests. Ultimately, both the Constitution's content and its ratification process raise troubling questions about democratic legitimacy. The Federalists were eager to avoid full-fledged democratic deliberation over the Constitution, and the document that was ratified was stacked in favor of their preferences. And in terms of substance, the Constitution was a significant departure from the more democratic state constitutions of the 1770s. Definitive and authoritative, The Framers' Coup explains why the Framers preferred such a constitution and how they managed to persuade the country to adopt it. We have lived with the consequences, both positive and negative, ever since.

Americans hate bureaucracy—though they love the services it provides—and demand that government run like a business. Hence today’s privatization revolution. Jon Michaels shows how the fusion of politics and profits commercializes government and consolidates state power in ways the Constitution’s framers endeavored to disaggregate.

A stunning exploration of the subtle erosion of freedom in an age of concocted fear and de facto military authority. When we think of a military coup, the first image that comes to mind is a general, standing at a podium with a flag behind him, declaring the deposing of elected leaders and the institution of martial law. Think again. In AMERICAN COUP, William Arkin reveals the desk-bound takeover of the highest reaches of government by a coterie of "grey men" of the national security establishment. Operating between the lines of the Constitution this powerful and unelected group fights to save the nation from "terror" and weapons of mass destruction while at the same time modifying and undermining the very essence of the country. Many books are written about secrecy, surveillance, and government law-breaking; none so powerfully expose the truth of everyday life in this state of war.

The subject of revolutionary overthrow of constitutional orders in Africa is at the intersection of three disciplines: jurisprudence and legal philosophy, constitutional law and power politics, and civil-military relations, that is, military security policy which is one aspect of national security policy. The subject is of interest in at least four ways. It problematizes the inescapable question of governance in the African continent. It challenges the democratization agenda in Africa how does one democratize not only political governance but also the instruments of violence in the state? It also challenges African constitutional lawyers and policy makers to seek a constitutional model that addresses the enduring menace of the power of the gun in African affairs and the changing role of the military in African politics. Finally, it underscores concerns about sovereignty and national security. This book contributes to a fuller understanding of the coup syndrome in African. To this end, it vigorously interrogates the place of coups in the governance of Africa, and explores the relevance of Kelsens theory of revolutionary legality in the context of coup dtats in Africa. It is a major contribution by a leading thinker in the field.

Americans have a love-hate relationship with government. Rejecting bureaucracy--but not the goods and services the welfare state provides--Americans have demanded that government be made to run like a business. Hence today's privatization revolution. But as Jon D. Michaels shows, separating the state from its public servants, practices, and institutions does violence to our Constitution, and threatens the health and stability of the Republic. Constitutional Coup puts forward a legal theory that explains the modern welfare state as a worthy successor to the framers' three-branch government. What legitimates the welfare state is its recommitment to a rivalrous system of separation of powers, in which political agency heads, career civil servants, and the public writ large reprise and restage the same battles long fought among Congress, the president, and the courts. Privatization now proclaims itself as another worthy successor, this time to an administrative state that Americans have grown weary of. Yet it is a constitutional usurper. Privatization dismantles those commitments to separating and checking state power by sidelining rivalrous civil servants and public participants. Constitutional Coup cements the constitutionality of the administrative state, recognizing civil servants and public participants as necessary--rather than disposable--components. Casting privatization as an existential constitutional threat, it underscores how the fusion of politics and profits commercializes government--and consolidates state power in ways both the framers and administrative lawyers endeavored to disaggregate. It urges--and sketches the outlines of--a twenty-first-century bureaucratic renaissance.--

U.S. policymakers tend to believe that elections occupy a higher realm of moral authority and hope that, with democracy assistance programs, Latin America and other developing areas will 'move beyond' revolutions, coup d'états, general strikes, and other nonelectoral routes to power. But, military coups remain a regular and recurrent feature of Latin American politics, and nonelectoral paths may still be pursued there, especially in crisis circumstances, Furthermore, some of these extra-electoral means may enjoy both legitimacy and constitutional mandate. In this report, the authors test these propositions as they apply to various countries in Latin America.

Not only will breakdowns like the one that occurred in November 2000 grow more frequent, they will grow more serious as well."--Jacket.