Constitutional Democracy And Judicial Supremacy

In The Supreme Court and Constitutional Democracy John Agresto traces the development of American judicial power, paying close attention to what he views as the very real threat of judicial supremacy. Agresto examines the role of the judiciary in a democratic society and discusses the proper place of congressional power in constitutional issues. Agresto argues that while the separation of congressional and judicial functions is a fundamental tenet of American government, the present system is not effective in maintaining an appropriate balance of power. He shows that continued judicial expansion, especially into the realm of public policy, might have severe consequences for America's national life and direction, and offers practical recommendations for safeguarding against an increasingly powerful Supreme Court. John Agresto's controversial argument, set in the context of a historical and theoretical inquiry, will be of great interest to scholars and students in political science and law, especially American constitutional law and political theory.

"The best books on politics offer us fresh insight into the way things are, and powerful arguments about how things ought to be. Jerome Foss's superb book accomplishes both of these ends, rescuing John Rawls's work from the dusty corners of overly abstract theorizing by emphasizing Rawls's dedication to a very practical reinvention of the American political experiment. This approach has the virtue not only of according with Rawls's mature interpretation of his work, but also of setting up a lively contrast between the constitutional republicanism of the framers and Rawls's constitutional democracy. This book is a trustworthy guide to the American constitutional tradition as well as Rawls's innovative alternative, offering a respectful treatment of the latter while providing an engaging and persuasive defense of the former." -Micah J. Watson, William Spoelhof Teacher-Scholar Chair in Political Science, Calvin College "Foss's careful study of the transformative intention of Rawls's political theory brings extraordinary insights to our academic debates, and to the real causes of our polarized, dysfunctional politics. The analysis of Rawls's pragmatism reveals its breathtaking goal to elevate progressive-liberal judges as epitomes of public reason, seeking to construct a rationalist, egalitarian-minded democracy to replace the framers' complex republicanism. Rawls has partially succeeded; we increasingly are ruled by living judicialism rather than the rule of law, under novel power wielded by federal courts, law professors, and lawyers. Foss gives Rawls a fair hearing, but insists we confront the arbitrary and utopian bases of this radical project, and the costs of elevating equality and constructed theory at the expense of liberty, self-government, and natural rights. Those who care about the fate of constitutional self-government, and whether utopian theories produce sustainable polities or political-social disorder, must confront this book." -Paul Carrese, Professor of Political Science, U.S. Air Force Academy

Should the Supreme Court have the last word when it comes to interpreting the Constitution? The justices on the Supreme Court certainly seem to think so--and their critics say that this position threatens democracy. But Keith Whittington argues that the Court's justices have not simply seized power and circumvented politics. The justices have had power thrust upon them--by politicians, for the benefit of politicians. In this sweeping political history of judicial supremacy in America, Whittington shows that presidents and political leaders of all stripes have worked to put the Court on a pedestal and have encouraged its justices to accept the role of ultimate interpreters of the Constitution. Whittington examines why presidents have often found judicial supremacy to be in their best interest, why they have rarely assumed responsibility for interpreting the Constitution, and why constitutional leadership has often been passed to the courts. The unprecedented assertiveness of the Rehnquist Court in striking down acts of Congress is only the most recent example of a development that began with the founding generation itself. Presidential bids for constitutional leadership have been rare, but reflect the temporary political advantage in doing so. Far more often, presidents have cooperated in increasing the Court's power and encouraging its activism. Challenging the conventional wisdom that judges have usurped democracy, Whittington shows that judicial supremacy is the product of democratic politics.

This book makes the radical claim that rather than interpreting the Constitution from on high, the Court should be reflecting popular will--or the wishes of the people themselves.

Examines the distinct difference between how the people and the founding fathers viewed the new Constitution and how it is interpreted over two hundred years later and maintains that originally the people were the ones responsible for seeing that its concepts were properly implemented.

What does it mean to have a constitution? Scholars and students associated with Walter Murphy at Princeton University have long asked this question in their exploration of constitutional politics and judicial behavior. These scholars, concerned with the making, maintenance, and deliberate change of the Constitution, have made unique and significant contributions to our understanding of American constitutional law by going against the norm of court-centered and litigation-minded research. Beginning in the late 1970s, this new wave of academics explored questions ranging from the nature of creating the U.S. Constitution to the philosophy behind amending it. In this collection, Sotirios A. Barber and Robert P. George bring together fourteen essays by members of this Princeton group--some of the most distinguished scholars in the field. These works consider the meaning of having a constitution, the implications of particular choices in the design of constitutions, and the meaning of judicial supremacy in the interpretation of the Constitution. The overarching ambition of this collection is to awaken a constitutionalist consciousness in its readers--to view themselves as potential makers and changers of constitutions, as opposed to mere subjects of existing arrangements. In addition to the editors, the contributors are Walter F. Murphy, John E. Finn, Christopher L. Eisgruber, James E. Fleming, Jeffrey K. Tulis, Suzette Hemberger, Stephen Macedo, Sanford Levinson, H. N. Hirsch, Wayne D. Moore, Keith E. Whittington, and Mark E. Brandon.

With quiet eloquence, Lane Sunderland argues that we must reclaim the fundamental principles of the Constitution if we are to restore democratic government to its proper role in American life. For far too long, he contends, the popular will has been held in check by an overly powerful Supreme Court using non-constitutional principles to make policy and promote its own political agendas. His work shows why this has diminished American democracy and what we can do to revive it. Sunderland presents a strong, thoughtful challenge to the constitutional theories promoted by Ronald Dworkin, Archibald Cox, Richard Epstein, Michael Perry, John Hart Ely, Robert Bork, Philip Kurland, Laurence Tribe, Mark Tushnet, and Catharine MacKinnon—an enormously diverse group united by an apparent belief in judicial supremacy. Their theories, he demonstrates, undermine the democratic foundations of the Constitution and the power of the majority to resolve for itself important questions of justice. Central to this enterprise is Sunderland's reconsideration of The Federalist as the first, most reliable, and most profound commentary on the Constitution. "The Federalist," he states, "is crucial because it explains the underlying theory of the Constitution as a whole, a theory that gives meaning to its particular provisions." In addition, Sunderland reexamines the Declaration of Independence and the work of Hobbes, Locke, and Montesquieu, in order to better define the nature and limits of their influence on the Framers. His reading of these works in conjunction with The Federalist shows just how far afield contemporary commentators have strayed. Sunderland deliberately echoes and amplifies Madison's wisdom in Federalist No. 10 that the object of the Constitution is "to secure the public good and private rights . . . and at the same time to preserve the spirit and form of popular government." To attain that object, he persuasively argues, requires that the judiciary acknowledge and enforce the constitutional limitations upon its own powers. In an era loudly proclaiming the return of popular government, majority rule, and the "will of the people," that argument is especially relevant and appealing.