Constitutionalizing The European Union

Enlargement and treaty reform have moved Europe's constitutional debate into the political spotlight. This important new text outlines the main themes of constitutional debate in the EU, analyzes formal and informal constitution-building since the early days of European integration, and introduces the actors and structures behind treaty change.

Previously published as a special issue of the Journal of European Public Policy, this volume presents a theory of constitutionalization as well as comparative analyses and case studies to underscore the claim that the European integration process itself engenders a democratic self-healing mechanism. There exists a consensus among academics, politicians, and the public that the European Union suffers from a ‘democratic deficit’. But how can it be resolved? This book deals with two core areas central for the development of the liberal-democratic constitutional state: the extension of the powers of representative assemblies and the institutionalization of human rights. The European Union has made remarkable progress in these two areas over the past half century. Whenever a planned step of European integration through transfers of sovereignty threatens to undermine domestic standards of parliamentary control and human rights standards, political elites in the member states regularly mobilize to counteract these developments. The proponents of the Union’s ‘constitutionalization’ regularly invoke democratic and human rights norms shared by all members of the European Union to successfully exercise moral pressure on the sceptics of further constitutionalization.

The European Union is in a state of transformation with its constitutional future the subject of much heated debate. This book provides a durable, authoritative and comprehensive account of constitutional development, examining the pivotal roles of law and judicial politics in establishing the EU constitutional edifice. Michael Longo demonstrates and substantiates the arguments for and against constitutionalization through the development of a theoretical framework drawing on theories and empirical research in both law and political science to understand this new process of European integration.

The negative results of referenda on the European Union (EU) Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands, and subsequent low-key adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon raise complex questions about the possible democratization of international organisations. This book provides a full analysis of the EU Constitutional Treaty process, grounded in broader political theoretical debates about democratic constitutionalisation and globalization. As international organizations become permanent systems of governance that directly interfere in individuals’ lives, it is not enough to have them legitimated by the consent of governments alone. This book presents an evaluation of the present EU Treaty of Lisbon in comparison with the original EU Constitutional Treaty, and analyses the importance of consent of the people, asking if saving the treaty came at the cost of democracy. Drawing first-hand on the European Convention and the referendum in the Netherlands, this book outlines an original political theory of democratic constitutionalisation beyond the nation-state, and argues that international organizations can be put on democratic foundations, but only by properly engaging national political structures. Learning from the EU Constitutional Treaty will be of interest to students and scholars of European Union politics, history and policy.

This authoritative study considers all aspects of the European Union's distinctive constitution since its inception. A unique political animal, the EU has given rise to important constitutional conundrums and paradoxes that the authors explore in detail. Their analysis illuminates the distinctive features of the Union's pluralist constitutional construct and provides the tools to understand the Union's development, especially during the Laeken (2001–2005) and Lisbon (2007–2009) processes of constitutional reform and spells out the parallels between the European and the Canadian constitutional experiences. Offering the first history of European constitutional law that is both theoretically informed and normatively grounded, the authors have developed an original theory of constitutional synthesis that will be essential reading for all readers interested in the process and theory of European integration.

These essays, written in honour of retired ECJ judge Pernilla Lindh, reflect on the development of courts and judging in the EU since the founding of the Union. In particular they focus on recent reforms and proposals aimed at further increasing public confidence and democratic accountability throughout the EU judicial system.

After the fall of Communism in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), the newly democratized countries of this region joined two main pan-European political and legal structures: the Council of Europe and the European Union. This book shows how the Eastward enlargement of these two structures fostered the 'constitutionalization' both of the Council of Europe and of the EU. Prompted by the enlargement of the Council of Europe and the admission of a number of countries which brought unique and often more substantial problems onto the Court's agenda, the main judicial body of the Council of Europe, the European Court of Human Rights, became a quasi 'constitutional court' of Europe. This book demonstrates that this was primarily as a result of the widening of its agenda and the resulting need to make activist decisions about the compatibility of national laws with the European Convention. In terms of the EU, the book shows that the enlargement (first prospective, and then, actual) has been an important agenda-setter for the constitutionalization of the EU; in particular, for openly placing the issue of fundamental rights on the EU agenda as a legitimate and indispensable matter of concern for the EU. But the 'constitutional synergies' were a two-way street: the accession to both pan-European structures has also affected the development of democratic constitutionalism in CEE states. It has raised difficult issues regarding the relationships between national sovereignty, democracy, and human rights that CEE policy makers have grappled with; these issues and responses by CEE member states have had implications for the 'old' EU member states as well. These dynamics are explored through various case studies, providing a new perspective on the development of legal norms and institutions within European supranational bodies.

Europe is in crisis. With rising unrest among citizens of EU member states exemplified by the UK's decision to leave the EU, and the growing popularity of anti-EU political parties, Dieter Grimm presents the argument that Europe has to change its method of further integration or risks failure. This book, containing essays many of which have not been published in the English language to date, explores how the EU has become over-constitutionalized. Grimm argues that this has left the EU with a democratic deficit leading to the alienation of citizens. This book highlights Europe's democracy problem. The most prominent argument running throughout is that the EU and its decision-making processes have become over-constitutionalized. This is due to the constitutionalization of European treaties, which has occurred by raising them to the eminence of a constitution as a result of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice. However, the treaties contain provisions that would be ordinary law in member states. The fact that they enjoy constitutional status in Europe detaches them from the democratic processes in the member states and the EU itself, and contributes to the growing independence of the EU's executive and judicial institutions. The book also asserts that currently the EU does not have enough sources of legitimation to uphold itself, surviving solely on the legitimation provided by member states. One popular remedy is the suggestion of 'parliamentarization' of the EU, giving the European Parliament the powers typically possessed by national parliaments as a means of heightening its legitimation. This is criticized by Grimm as expanding the Parliament's powers would not change the effects of over-constiutionalization as the Parliament is inferior to the constitution. In order to reduce the EU's legitimacy deficit, Grimm makes several recommendations. The repoliticization of the decision-making processes, which can be achieved by reducing treaties to the capacity necessary for their constitutional function; the reinvigoration of European Parliament elections, by having 'Europeanized' parties to increase engagement with European society and give voters the opportunity to more immediately influence European politics; and a new division of powers based on subject matter to restrain European expansionism, reserving particular areas of policy to the responsibility of member states even if this affects the common market.