Countering Chinese Coercion

"In this third installment of CNAS' Maritime Strategy Series, Dr. John Lee of the University of Sydney discusses political and diplomatic tools to impose costs on bad behavior in maritime Asia as part of an overall strategy encompassing military and non-military tools. Dr. Lee argues that present legal and multilateral mechanisms are insufficient to constrain assertive behavior by rising powers, China in particular. As a first step toward a more robust architecture, Dr. Lee recommends that the United States and other regional powers -- Australia, Japan, the Philippines and Vietnam -- ought to explore the possibility of formalizing a Code of Practice (CoP) as declaratory policy regulating behavior guiding all disputes in both the East and South China Seas. Such a concept could then be promoted to other regional states such as Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia, while leaving the door open for China. Among other benefits, a Code of Practice instrument would help generate collective pressure, including by key great powers, to challenge coercive behavior and define sorely needed rules of the road"--Publisher's web site.

Few studies have systematically tracked how China is using gray zone tactics-coercive activities beyond normal diplomacy and trade but below the use of kinetic military force-against multiple U.S. allies and partners. Lacking a foundational empirical baseline, it is difficult to determine patterns and trends in Chinese activities to develop effective counters to them. The authors developed a framework to categorize China's use of gray zone tactics against five U.S. allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific and to identify the most problematic People's Republic of China (PRC) tactics that the United States could prioritize countering. Based on open-source material, this report provides a more in-depth understanding of Chinese operations in the gray zone. Among other conclusions, the authors observe that China views gray zone activities as natural extensions of how countries exercise power. China employs such tactics to balance maintaining a stable, favorable external environment with efforts to alter the status quo in China's favor without triggering major pushback or conflict. It has used nearly 80 such tactics on its neighbors, often in relation to territorial disputes.

Mounting costs, risks, and public misgivings of waging war are raising the importance of U.S. power to coerce (P2C). The best P2C options are financial sanctions, support for nonviolent political opposition to hostile regimes, and offensive cyber operations. The state against which coercion is most difficult and risky is China, which also happens to pose the strongest challenge to U.S. military options in a vital region.

In the past decade, tensions in Asia have risen as Beijing has become more assertive in maritime disputes with its neighbors and the United States. Although taking place below the threshold of direct military confrontation, China’s assertiveness frequently involves coercive elements that put at risk existing rules and norms; physical control of disputed waters and territory; and the credibility of U.S. security commitments. Regional leaders have expressed increasing alarm that such “gray zone” coercion threatens to destabilize the region by increasing the risk of conflict and undermining the rules-based order. Yet, the United States and its allies and partners have struggled to develop effective counters to China’s maritime coercion. This study reviews deterrence literature and nine case studies of coercion to develop recommendations for how the United States and its allies and partners could counter gray zone activity.

This book analyzes when, how, why, and to what effect China has used its armed forces in recent decades to coerce other actors in the international system. Over the past 20 years, China’s international status as a “great power” has become undeniable. China’s “peaceful rise” has included substantial investments in military modernization and an increasingly assertive regional posture. While China has not waged war since 1979, it has frequently resorted to what the U.S. State Department has referred to as “gangster tactics” – threats, intimidation, and armed confrontation – to advance its strategic aims. This volume illuminates the ways in which China has employed its military and paramilitary tools to coerce other states, and examines the motivations and specific foreign policy objectives that China has pursued using force short of war. The study presents new analysis of an original dataset on coercive actions undertaken by China’s armed forces, taking into account the political objectives pursued and the environmental contexts in which these operations occurred. It also presents a series of expert case studies addressing the most consequential examples of China using force to coerce in recent decades. The volume contributes to a more historically informed, empirically based understanding of great power competition. This book will be of much interest to students of Chinese security and foreign policy, strategic studies, Asian politics and International Relations.

The United States is in the midst of a new cold war with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and America is losing. That claim, at the core of Michael Sobolik’s new book Countering China’s Great Game: A Strategy for American Dominance, challenges the Washington, D.C. conventional wisdom about U.S.-China relations. Officials in Washington are reacting to the CCP and playing defense. Like America’s efforts to contain the Soviet Union in the twentieth-century Cold War, the United States needs a strategic vision to overcome the CCP. Sobolik offers a plan for American victory over the CCP and presents a roadmap to sabotage the crux of the CCP’s foreign policy: the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). At its core, the BRI is not an economic venture. It is a geopolitical gambit. Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s “project of the century” has entered its second phase: leveraging yesterday’s investments for today’s political and military ends. Xi will never do away with the BRI because it is strengthening Beijing’s strategic position from Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands to Africa and Latin America. The BRI is the apotheosis of the CCP’s grand strategy. America needs a blueprint to take it down. Sobolik provides this blueprint by identifying the BRI’s core weakness: imperial overstretch. After identifying China’s penchant for empire-building, he identifies the BRI’s key weaknesses globally and traces them back to the CCP’s vulnerabilities at home. Sobolik’s work offers policymakers a plan to go on the offense and win America’s new cold war.

This book examines the South China Sea territorial disputes from the perspective of international order. The authors argue that both China and the US are attempting to impose their respective preferred orders to the region and that the observed disputes are due to the clash of two competing order-building projects. Ordering the maritime space is essential for these two countries to validate their national identities and to achieve ontological security. Because both are ontological security-seeking states, this imperative gives them little room for striking a grand bargain between them. The book focuses on how China and the US engage in practices and discourses that build, contest, and legitimise the two major ordering projects they promote in the region. It concludes that China must act in its legitimation strategy in accordance with contemporary publicly accepted norms and rules to create a legitimate maritime order, while the US should support ASEAN in devising a multilateral resolution of the disputes.

This book focuses on China’s future under Xi Jinping’s authoritarian leadership by examining various facets of the political, economic, social and foreign policy trajectories of contemporary China. It assesses Xi Jinping’s power dynamic as the ‘core’ leader of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and analyses the impact of Xi’s signature domestic policies which demonstrate his political authority within the domestic sphere. Moreover, the book presents Xi’s pro-active, assertive and action-oriented outlook as a foundation for China’s diplomacy in the ‘new era’. Bringing together an international set of experts in the field who explore critical facets of China under Xi Jinping that deeply influence the regional as well as the global order, the book investigates the impact of Chinese initiatives such as the grand Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB). Importantly, the book illustrates US-China relations and outlines how this relationship will intensify in the post-COVID-19 era, which is poised to be one of the biggest challenges and turning points of the ‘Asian Century’. Offering a timely insight into China’s future and the trajectory of Xi Jinping’s consolidation of power, this book will be of interest to academics in the fields of China Studies, Asian and International Politics and International Relations.