Countering Coercion In Maritime Asia

In the past decade, tensions in Asia have risen as Beijing has become more assertive in maritime disputes with its neighbors and the United States. Although taking place below the threshold of direct military confrontation, China’s assertiveness frequently involves coercive elements that put at risk existing rules and norms; physical control of disputed waters and territory; and the credibility of U.S. security commitments. Regional leaders have expressed increasing alarm that such “gray zone” coercion threatens to destabilize the region by increasing the risk of conflict and undermining the rules-based order. Yet, the United States and its allies and partners have struggled to develop effective counters to China’s maritime coercion. This study reviews deterrence literature and nine case studies of coercion to develop recommendations for how the United States and its allies and partners could counter gray zone activity.

In the past decade, tensions in Asia have risen as Beijing has become more assertive in maritime disputes with its neighbors and the United States. Although taking place below the threshold of direct military confrontation, China's assertiveness frequently involves coercive elements that put at risk existing rules and norms; physical control of disputed waters and territory; and the credibility of U.S. security commitments. Regional leaders have expressed increasing alarm that such "gray zone" coercion threatens to destabilize the region by increasing the risk of conflict and undermining the rules-based order. Yet, the United States and its allies and partners have struggled to develop effective counters to China's maritime coercion. This study reviews deterrence literature and nine case studies of coercion to develop recommendations for how the United States and its allies and partners could counter gray zone activity.

"In this third installment of CNAS' Maritime Strategy Series, Dr. John Lee of the University of Sydney discusses political and diplomatic tools to impose costs on bad behavior in maritime Asia as part of an overall strategy encompassing military and non-military tools. Dr. Lee argues that present legal and multilateral mechanisms are insufficient to constrain assertive behavior by rising powers, China in particular. As a first step toward a more robust architecture, Dr. Lee recommends that the United States and other regional powers -- Australia, Japan, the Philippines and Vietnam -- ought to explore the possibility of formalizing a Code of Practice (CoP) as declaratory policy regulating behavior guiding all disputes in both the East and South China Seas. Such a concept could then be promoted to other regional states such as Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia, while leaving the door open for China. Among other benefits, a Code of Practice instrument would help generate collective pressure, including by key great powers, to challenge coercive behavior and define sorely needed rules of the road"--Publisher's web site.

Bringing together experts from history, international relations and the social sciences, United States Relations with China and Iran examines the past, present and future of U.S. foreign relations toward the People's Republic of China and the Islamic Republic of Iran. It benefits from recently declassified documents and an interdisciplinary, transnational approach to explore different aspects of the relations between these three countries. While the 20th century has been referred to as the “American Century,” this book posits that the 21st century will be shaped by relations between the United States and key countries in Asia, in particular China and Iran. In assessing the United States' foreign policy towards China and Iran over the past six decades the chapters focus on several key themes: interaction, normalization, and confrontation. The book provides an insight into how and why Washington has developed and implemented its policies toward Beijing and Tehran, and examines how China and Iran have developed policies toward the United States and internationally. Finally, it draws on the insights of leading scholars discussing the future of relations between Beijing and Tehran. This interdisciplinary book brings a unique perspective to the international relations of the 20th century and beyond, and will benefit students and scholars of U.S. foreign relations as well as Middle Eastern and East Asian history and politics.

This book analyzes when, how, why, and to what effect China has used its armed forces in recent decades to coerce other actors in the international system. Over the past 20 years, China’s international status as a “great power” has become undeniable. China’s “peaceful rise” has included substantial investments in military modernization and an increasingly assertive regional posture. While China has not waged war since 1979, it has frequently resorted to what the U.S. State Department has referred to as “gangster tactics” – threats, intimidation, and armed confrontation – to advance its strategic aims. This volume illuminates the ways in which China has employed its military and paramilitary tools to coerce other states, and examines the motivations and specific foreign policy objectives that China has pursued using force short of war. The study presents new analysis of an original dataset on coercive actions undertaken by China’s armed forces, taking into account the political objectives pursued and the environmental contexts in which these operations occurred. It also presents a series of expert case studies addressing the most consequential examples of China using force to coerce in recent decades. The volume contributes to a more historically informed, empirically based understanding of great power competition. This book will be of much interest to students of Chinese security and foreign policy, strategic studies, Asian politics and International Relations.

A robust yet accessible history of US involvement in the world's most dangerous waterway, and a guide for what to do about it. Lamentations that the United States is "losing" the South China Sea to China are now common. China has rapidly militarized islands and reefs, projects power across the disputed waterway, and freely harasses US allies and partners. The US has been unable to halt these processes or convince Beijing to respect the rights of smaller neighbors. But what exactly would "losing" mean? In On Dangerous Ground, Gregory B. Poling evaluates US interests in the world's most complex and dangerous maritime disputes by examining more than a century of American involvement in the South China Sea. He focuses on how the disputes there intersected and eventually intertwined with the longstanding US commitment to freedom of the seas and its evolving alliance network in Asia. He shows that these abiding national interests--defense of maritime rights and commitment to allies, particularly the Philippines--have repeatedly pulled US attention to the South China Sea. Understanding how and why is critical if the US and its allies hope to chart a course through the increasingly fraught disputes, while facing a more assertive, more capable, and far less compromising China. With an emphasis on decisions made not just in Washington and Beijing, but also in Manila and other Southeast Asian capitals, On Dangerous Ground seeks to correct the record and balance the China-centric narrative that has come to dominate the issue. It not only provides the most comprehensive account yet of America's history in the South China Sea, but it also demonstrates how that history should inform US national security policy in one of the most important waterways in the world.

This edited volume examines the political and security issues influencing and shaping the developing maritime order in the Indo Pacific. If focuses specifically on the impact of China’s maritime expansion upon the policies and strategies of the regional states as well as the major players. The chapters examine the interaction of these players, paying particular attention to Japan, as the originator of the Indo Pacific idea and promoter of security cooperation and regionalism. It also covers the responses of the ASEAN claimants, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines as well as Indonesia, alongside the key players, India, the US and also the EU.