Nonmilitary Approaches To Countering Chinese Coercion

"In this third installment of CNAS' Maritime Strategy Series, Dr. John Lee of the University of Sydney discusses political and diplomatic tools to impose costs on bad behavior in maritime Asia as part of an overall strategy encompassing military and non-military tools. Dr. Lee argues that present legal and multilateral mechanisms are insufficient to constrain assertive behavior by rising powers, China in particular. As a first step toward a more robust architecture, Dr. Lee recommends that the United States and other regional powers -- Australia, Japan, the Philippines and Vietnam -- ought to explore the possibility of formalizing a Code of Practice (CoP) as declaratory policy regulating behavior guiding all disputes in both the East and South China Seas. Such a concept could then be promoted to other regional states such as Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia, while leaving the door open for China. Among other benefits, a Code of Practice instrument would help generate collective pressure, including by key great powers, to challenge coercive behavior and define sorely needed rules of the road"--Publisher's web site.

In recent years, China's rise has been accompanied by increasingly belligerent use of its economic leverage to coerce states into avoiding or reversing political or military policies with which Beijing disagrees. Chinese actions have included government-backed popular boycotts, import restrictions, export restrictions, tourism restrictions, and threats of punishment against specific companies. These measures have been threatened or instituted against several U.S. treaty allies and partners in response to a wide range of perceived slights. These campaigns have had mixed success to date for China, but the costs for U.S. allies and partners in some cases have been substantial, and China appears likely to continue to use this tactic going forward. Left unaddressed, such pressure campaigns may create a chilling effect on state decisionmaking and sovereignty, harming U.S. allies and partners and threatening the free and open international order. The authors propose that the United States help establish a multilateral mechanism consisting of willing partners to respond collectively to Chinese economic pressure campaigns. They assess options for how this mechanism might be established, what sorts of actions this body or its members might take to push back against Chinese coercion, and the potential benefits and costs of these different approaches.

Mounting costs, risks, and public misgivings of waging war are raising the importance of U.S. power to coerce (P2C). The best P2C options are financial sanctions, support for nonviolent political opposition to hostile regimes, and offensive cyber operations. The state against which coercion is most difficult and risky is China, which also happens to pose the strongest challenge to U.S. military options in a vital region.

In the past decade, tensions in Asia have risen as Beijing has become more assertive in maritime disputes with its neighbors and the United States. Although taking place below the threshold of direct military confrontation, China’s assertiveness frequently involves coercive elements that put at risk existing rules and norms; physical control of disputed waters and territory; and the credibility of U.S. security commitments. Regional leaders have expressed increasing alarm that such “gray zone” coercion threatens to destabilize the region by increasing the risk of conflict and undermining the rules-based order. Yet, the United States and its allies and partners have struggled to develop effective counters to China’s maritime coercion. This study reviews deterrence literature and nine case studies of coercion to develop recommendations for how the United States and its allies and partners could counter gray zone activity.

This compact, insightful book offers an up-to-the-minute guide to understanding the evolution of maritime territorial disputes in East Asia, exploring their legal, political-security and economic dimensions against the backdrop of a brewing Sino-American rivalry for hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region. It traces the decades-long evolution of Sino-American relations in Asia, and how this pivotal relationship has been central to prosperity and stability in one of the most dynamics regions of the world. It also looks at how middle powers – from Japan and Australia to India and South Korea – have joined the fray, trying to shape the trajectory of the territorial disputes in the Western Pacific, which can, in turn, alter the future of Asia – and ignite an international war that could re-configure the global order. The book examines how the maritime disputes have become a litmus test of China’s rise, whether it has and will be peaceful or not, and how smaller powers such as Vietnam and the Philippines have been resisting Beijing’s territorial ambitions. Drawing on extensive discussions and interviews with experts and policy-makers across the Asia-Pacific region, the book highlights the growing geopolitical significance of the East and South China Sea disputes to the future of Asia – providing insights into how the so-called Pacific century will shape up.

"Political Warfare provides a well-researched and wide-ranging overview of the nature of the People's Republic of China (PRC) threat and the political warfare strategies, doctrines, and operational practices used by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The author offers detailed and illuminating case studies of PRC political warfare operations designed to undermine Thailand, a U.S. treaty ally, and Taiwan, a close friend"--

The second half of the 20th century featured a strategic competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. That competition avoided World War III in part because during the 1950s, scholars like Henry Kissinger, Thomas Schelling, Herman Kahn, and Albert Wohlstetter analyzed the fundamental nature of nuclear deterrence. Decades of arms control negotiations reinforced these early notions of stability and created a mutual understanding that allowed U.S.-Soviet competition to proceed without armed conflict. The first half of the 21st century will be dominated by the relationship between the United States and China. That relationship is likely to contain elements of both cooperation and competition. Territorial disputes such as those over Taiwan and the South China Sea will be an important feature of this competition, but both are traditional disputes, and traditional solutions suggest themselves. A more difficult set of issues relates to U.S.-Chinese competition and cooperation in three domains in which real strategic harm can be inflicted in the current era: nuclear, space, and cyber. Just as a clearer understanding of the fundamental principles of nuclear deterrence maintained adequate stability during the Cold War, a clearer understanding of the characteristics of these three domains can provide the underpinnings of strategic stability between the United States and China in the decades ahead. That is what this book is about.

This edited collection examines the British ‘way’ in counter-insurgency. It brings together and consolidates new scholarship on the counter-insurgency associated with the end of empire, foregrounding a dark and violent history of British imperial rule, one that stretched back to the nineteenth century and continued until the final collapse of the British Empire in the 1960s. The essays gathered in the collection cover the period from the late nineteenth century to the 1960s; they are both empirical and conceptual in tone. This edited collection pivots on the theme of the nature of the force used by Britain against colonial insurgents. It argues that the violence employed by British security forces in counter-insurgency to maintain imperial rule is best seen from a maximal perspective, contra traditional arguments that the British used minimum force to defeat colonial rebellions. Case studies are drawn from across the British Empire, covering a period of some hundred years, but they concentrate on the savage wars of decolonisation after 1945. The collection includes a historiographical essay and one on the ‘lost’ Hanslope archive by the scholar chosen by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to manage the release of the papers held. This book was published as a special issue of Small Wars and Insurgencies.