Credit Crises

Before 2007, economists thought that financial crises would never happen again in the United States, that such upheavals were a thing of the past. Gary B. Gorton, a prominent expert on financial crises, argues that economists fundamentally misunderstand what they are, why they occur, and why there were none in the U.S. from 1934 to 2007. Misunderstanding Financial Crises offers a back-to-basics overview of financial crises, and shows that they are not rare, idiosyncratic events caused by a perfect storm of unconnected factors. Instead, Gorton shows how financial crises are, indeed, inherent to our financial system. Economists, Gorton writes, looked from a certain point of view and missed everything that was important: the evolution of capital markets and the banking system, the existence of new financial instruments, and the size of certain money markets like the sale and repurchase market. Comparing the so-called "Quiet Period" of 1934 to 2007, when there were no systemic crises, to the "Panic of 2007-2008," Gorton ties together key issues like bank debt and liquidity, credit booms and manias, moral hazard, and too-big-too-fail--all to illustrate the true causes of financial collapse. He argues that the successful regulation that prevented crises since 1934 did not adequately keep pace with innovation in the financial sector, due in part to the misunderstandings of economists, who assured regulators that all was well. Gorton also looks forward to offer both a better way for economists to think about markets and a description of the regulation necessary to address the future threat of financial disaster.

In a series of disarmingly simple arguments financial market analyst George Cooper challenges the core principles of today's economic orthodoxy and explains how we have created an economy that is inherently unstable and crisis prone. With great skill, he examines the very foundations of today's economic philosophy and adds a compelling analysis of the forces behind economic crisis. His goal is nothing less than preventing the seemingly endless procession of damaging boom-bust cycles, unsustainable economic bubbles, crippling credit crunches, and debilitating inflation. His direct, conscientious, and honest approach will captivate any reader and is an invaluable aid in understanding today's economy.

The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, published by the U.S. Government and the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission in early 2011, is the official government report on the United States financial collapse and the review of major financial institutions that bankrupted and failed, or would have without help from the government. The commission and the report were implemented after Congress passed an act in 2009 to review and prevent fraudulent activity. The report details, among other things, the periods before, during, and after the crisis, what led up to it, and analyses of subprime mortgage lending, credit expansion and banking policies, the collapse of companies like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and the federal bailouts of Lehman and AIG. It also discusses the aftermath of the fallout and our current state. This report should be of interest to anyone concerned about the financial situation in the U.S. and around the world.THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION is an independent, bi-partisan, government-appointed panel of 10 people that was created to "examine the causes, domestic and global, of the current financial and economic crisis in the United States." It was established as part of the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009. The commission consisted of private citizens with expertise in economics and finance, banking, housing, market regulation, and consumer protection. They examined and reported on "the collapse of major financial institutions that failed or would have failed if not for exceptional assistance from the government."News Dissector DANNY SCHECHTER is a journalist, blogger and filmmaker. He has been reporting on economic crises since the 1980's when he was with ABC News. His film In Debt We Trust warned of the economic meltdown in 2006. He has since written three books on the subject including Plunder: Investigating Our Economic Calamity (Cosimo Books, 2008), and The Crime Of Our Time: Why Wall Street Is Not Too Big to Jail (Disinfo Books, 2011), a companion to his latest film Plunder The Crime Of Our Time. He can be reached online at www.newsdissector.com.

While paramount to the modern economy, understanding how the banking system works has been usually cast aside from overall economic education. Even in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, which has underlined the vital importance of banking in the economy, the workings of the sector remain a black box. To this end, this book provides a comprehensive and easy to read review of the banking sector, covering all issues related to commercial and investment banking and providing experienced as well as non-expert readers the opportunity to expand their knowledge on these topics. After going through the book, readers have the opportunity to gain a deeper knowledge regarding the commercial and investment functions of the banking sector and the ability to evaluate the potential outcome of policy actions.

Based on the recent subprime crisis, the authors analyze the mechanisms of a financial market crisis. In order to highlight the basic transmission mechanisms and drivers of a financial market crisis they discuss the relevant players & strategies, explain the principles of the financial instruments that were involved in the crisis and analyze how bubbles emerge, how they burst and what the economic impact might be. The authors address the following key questions: * Why do financial markets run into crises over and over again? * Where do risks for financial crises come from? * Who are the players in the game? * Which instruments and strategies can drive a crisis? * What are the transmission mechanisms onto other markets and the real economy? * When is it all finally over? * How to best weather the storm? Hence, in the prologue the authors highlight the basic framework for a financial crisis based on the subprime crisis. Here, they will also introduce the important topics and drivers of the crisis, i.e. the relevant players (banks, investment banks, hedge funds, real money investors, regulators and rating agencies), the involved instruments (ABS/RMBS, CDOs, SIV, leveraged loans, Leveraged Super Senior tranches, etc.), the strategies which caused the crisis or were affected by the meltdown (leveraged exposure to highly correlated risks), and risks that were underestimated (investors ignored the market risk that was involved with the leveraged bets). In the subsequent chapter -- which is split into three parts -- they will explain these important topics in more detail and highlight the infection and transmission mechanisms. As an example, they introduce the business and investment concepts of investment banks and hedge funds and how they were involved in the crisis. Moreover, they explain how structured credit products (such as ABS, CDOs and SIVs) work and how they were used in order to implement leveraged bets in the markets. Finally, they highlight how a financial crisis evolves and why certain financial institutions failed. In the epilogue, they conclude how markets manage a crisis and why the crisis may also be healthy for the stability of financial markets.

The most recent credit crisis brought to light many problems with our financial system. This book offers plain-spoken explanations of what went wrong during the past crises and explains how to prevent future problems.

Why stable banking systems are so rare Why are banking systems unstable in so many countries—but not in others? The United States has had twelve systemic banking crises since 1840, while Canada has had none. The banking systems of Mexico and Brazil have not only been crisis prone but have provided miniscule amounts of credit to business enterprises and households. Analyzing the political and banking history of the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Mexico, and Brazil through several centuries, Fragile by Design demonstrates that chronic banking crises and scarce credit are not accidents. Calomiris and Haber combine political history and economics to examine how coalitions of politicians, bankers, and other interest groups form, why they endure, and how they generate policies that determine who gets to be a banker, who has access to credit, and who pays for bank bailouts and rescues. Fragile by Design is a revealing exploration of the ways that politics inevitably intrudes into bank regulation.

What causes a financial crisis? Can financial crises be anticipated or even avoided? What can be done to lessen their impact? Should governments and international institutions intervene? Or should financial crises be left to run their course? In the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, many blamed international institutions, corruption, governments, and flawed macro and microeconomic policies not only for causing the crisis but also unnecessarily lengthening and deepening it. Based on ten years of research, the authors develop a theoretical approach to analyzing financial crises. Beginning with a review of the history of financial crises and providing readers with the basic economic tools needed to understand the literature, the authors construct a series of increasingly sophisticated models. Throughout, the authors guide the reader through the existing theoretical and empirical literature while also building on their own theoretical approach. The text presents the modern theory of intermediation, introduces asset markets and the causes of asset price volatility, and discusses the interaction of banks and markets. The book also deals with more specialized topics, including optimal financial regulation, bubbles, and financial contagion.