Crisis And Contagion

A sweeping critical account of the financial crises that rocked East Asia and other parts of the world beginning with the collapse of the Thai baht in 1997. Padma Desai retraces the story of Asia's "Crisis Five"--Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, the Philippines and Thailand.

No sooner had the Asian crisis broken out in 1997 than the witch-hunt started. With great indignation every Asian economy pointed fingers. They were innocent bystanders. The fundamental reason for the crisis was this or that - most prominently contagion - but also the decline in exports of the new commodities (high-tech goods), the steep rise of the dollar, speculators, etc. The prominent question, of course, is whether contagion could really have been the key factor and, if so, what are the channels and mechanisms through which it operated in such a powerful manner. The question is obvious because until 1997, Asia's economies were generally believed to be immensely successful, stable and well managed. This question is of great importance not only in understanding just what happened, but also in shaping policies. In a world of pure contagion, i.e. when innocent bystanders are caught up and trampled by events not of their making and when consequences go far beyond ordinary international shocks, countries will need to look for better protective policies in the future. In such a world, the international financial system will need to change in order to offer better preventive and reactive policy measures to help avoid, or at least contain, financial crises.

This book is an authoritative account of the economic and political roots of the 2008 financial crisis. It examines why it was triggered in the United States, why it morphed into the Great Recession, and why the contagion spread with such ferocity around the globe. It also examines how and why economies - including the Eurozone, Russia, China, India, East Asia, and the Middle East - have been impacted and explores their response to the unprecedented challenges of the crisis and the effectiveness of their policy measures. Global Financial Contagion specifically looks at how the Obama administration's policy missteps have contributed to America's huge debt and slow recovery, why the Eurozone's response to its existential crisis has become a never-ending saga, and why the G-20's efforts to create a new international financial architecture may fall short. This book will long be regarded as the standard account of the crisis and its aftermath.

This book provides a sweeping, up-to-date, and boldly critical account of the financial crises that rocked East Asia and other parts of the world beginning with the collapse of the Thai baht in 1997. Retracing the story of Asia's "Crisis Five"--Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand--Padma Desai argues that the region's imprudently fast-paced opening to the free flow of capital was pushed by determined advocates, official and private, in the global economy's U.S.-led developed center. Turmoil ensued in these peripheral economies, the Russian ruble faltered, and Brazil was eventually hit. The inequitable center-periphery relationship also extended to the policy measures that the crisis-swept economies implemented under International Monetary Fund bailouts, which intensified the downturns induced by the panic-driven outflows of short-term capital. Financial Crisis, Contagion, and Containment examines crisis origin and resolution in a comparative perspective by combing empirical evidence from the most robust economies to the least. Why is the U.S. relatively successful at weathering economic ups and downs? Why is Japan stuck in policy paralysis? Why is the European Central Bank unable to achieve both inflation control and stable growth? How can emerging markets avoid turbulence amid free-flowing speculative capital from private lenders of the developed center? Engaging and nontechnical yet deeply insightful, this book appears at a time when the continuing turmoil in Argentina has revived policy debates for avoiding and addressing financial crises in emerging market economies.

What can the international community do to prevent financial contagion?

Financial crises often transmit across geographical borders and different asset classes. Modeling these interactions is empirically challenging, and many of the proposed methods give different results when applied to the same data sets. In this book the authors set out their work on a general framework for modeling the transmission of financial crises using latent factor models. They show how their framework encompasses a number of other empirical contagion models and why the results between the models differ. The book builds a framework which begins from considering contagion in the bond markets during 1997-1998 across a number of countries, and culminates in a model which encompasses multiple assets across multiple countries through over a decade of crisis events from East Asia in 1997-1998 to the sub prime crisis during 2008. Program code to support implementation of similar models is available.

The 2007 subprime crisis in the U.S. triggered a succession of financial crises around the globe, reigniting interest in the contagion phenomenon. Not all crises, however, are contagious. This paper models a new channel of contagion where the degree of anticipation of crises, through its impact on investor uncertainty, determines the occurrence of contagion. Incidences of surprise crises lead investors to doubt the accuracy of their informationgathering technology, which endogenously increases the probability of crises elsewhere. Anticipated crisis, instead, have the opposite effect. Importantly, this channel is empirically shown to have an independent effect beyond other contagion channels.

From the financial contagion of the 2007 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) to viral contagion in the recent COVID-19 pandemic, Singapore has been severely impacted by ripples and shockwaves that have emanated from global financial and healthcare crises. At the same time, it has proven to be highly resilient amidst such instability. This book provides an in-depth account of Singapore's policy responses to the COVID-19 pandemic and GFC. It focuses on the policy capacity-building efforts that have taken place in the aftermath of earlier crises such as the 2003 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak and the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis.Linked across time and space, these four crises — SARS, COVID-19, the AFC and GFC — reflect a consistent pattern in Singapore's approach to crisis management. This is a pattern that involves policy learning and capacity-building after each crisis, and the application of these lessons and capacities to subsequent crises. In focusing on the role of policy capacity in Singapore's crisis response measures, this book will provide policymakers and practitioners with a useful framework that can be used to plan for future crises and pandemics.