Cvn 78 Gerald R Ford U S Navy Aircraft Carrier

A unique keepsake with beautiful images and interesting information about the U.S. Navy's newest aircraft carrier, CVN-78 Gerald R. Ford. A perfect gift for anyone interested in aircraft carriers, the Navy, or President Ford.

CVN-78, CVN-79, CVN-80, and CVN-81 are the first four ships in the Navy's new Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) class of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers (CVNs). CVN-78 (named for Gerald R. Ford) was procured in FY2008. The Navy's proposed FY2019 budget estimates the ship's procurement cost at $12,964.0 million (i.e., about $13.0 billion) in then-year dollars. The ship received advance procurement (AP) funding in FY2001-FY2007 and was fully funded in FY2008-FY2011 using congressionally authorized four-year incremental funding. To help cover cost growth on the ship, the ship received an additional $1,394.9 million in FY2014-FY2016 and FY2018 cost-to-complete procurement funding. The ship was delivered to the Navy on May 31, 2017, and was commissioned into service on July 22, 2017. CVN-79 (named for John F. Kennedy) was procured in FY2013. The Navy's proposed FY2019 budget estimates the ship's procurement cost at $11,341.4 million (i.e., about $11.3 billion) in then-year dollars. The ship received AP funding in FY2007-FY2012, and was fully funded in FY2013-FY2018 using congressionally authorized six-year incremental funding. The ship is scheduled for delivery to the Navy in September 2024. CVN-80 (named Enterprise) was procured in FY2018. The Navy's proposed FY2019 budget estimates the ship's procurement cost at $12,601.7 million (i.e., about $12.6 billion) in then-year dollars. The ship received AP funding in FY2016 and FY2017, and the Navy plans to fully fund the ship in FY2018-FY2023 using congressionally authorized six-year incremental funding. The Navy's proposed FY2019 budget requests $1,598.2 million in procurement funding for the ship. The ship is scheduled for delivery to the Navy in September 2027. CVN-81 (not yet named) is scheduled to be procured in FY2023. The Navy's proposed FY2019 budget estimates the ship's procurement cost at $15,088.0 million (i.e., about $15.1 billion) in then-year dollars. The Navy plans to request AP funding for the ship in FY2021 and FY2022, and then fully fund the ship in FY2023-FY2028 using congressionally authorized six-year incremental funding. The Navy's FY2019 budget submission programs the initial increment of AP funding for the ship in FY2021. The ship is scheduled for delivery to the Navy in September 2032. Oversight issues for Congress for the CVN-78 program for FY2019 include the following: whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy's FY2019 procurement funding requests for the CVN-78 program; whether to accelerate the procurement of CVN-81 from FY2023 to an earlier year, or use a block buy contract to procure multiple aircraft carriers, or pursue a combined material buy for multiple aircraft carriers, or do some combination of these things; cost growth in the CVN-78 program, Navy efforts to stem that growth, and Navy efforts to manage costs so as to stay within the program's cost caps; whether to conduct the shock trial for the CVN-78 class in the near term, on the lead ship in the class, or years later, on the second ship in the class; CVN-78 program issues that were raised in a January 2018 report from the Department of Defense's (DOD's) Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E); and whether the Navy should shift at some point from procuring large-deck, nuclear-powered carriers like the CVN-78 class to procuring smaller aircraft carriers.

CVN-78, CVN-79, CVN-80, and CVN-81 are the first four ships in the Navy's new Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) class of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers (CVNs). This in-depth illustrated volume discusses technical issues, fleet planning, budgeting, and delays in the Ford Class program.

CVN-78, CVN-79, and CVN-80 are the first three ships in the Navy's new Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) class of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers (CVNs).CVN-78 was procured in FY2008. The Navy's proposed FY2015 budget estimates the ship's procurement cost at $12,887.2 million (i.e., about $12.9 billion) in then-year dollars. The ship received advance procurement funding in FY2001-FY2007 and was fully funded in FY2008- FY2011 using congressionally authorized four-year incremental funding. The Navy did not request any procurement funding for the ship in FY2012 and FY2013. To help cover cost growth on the ship, the ship received an additional $588.1 million in procurement funding in FY2014, and the Navy is requesting another $663.0 million in procurement funding for FY2015.CVN-79 was procured in FY2013. The ship received advance procurement funding in FY2007- FY2012, and the Navy plans to fully fund the ship in FY2013-FY2018 using congressionally authorized six-year incremental funding. The Navy's proposed FY2015 budget estimates CVN- 79's procurement cost at $11,498.0 million (i.e., about $11.5 billion) in then-year dollars, and requests $1,300 million in procurement funding for the ship.CVN-80 is scheduled to be procured in FY2018. The Navy's proposed FY2015 budget estimates the ship's procurement cost at $13,874.2 million (i.e., about $13.9 billion) in then-year dollars. Under the Navy's proposed FY2015 budget, the ship is to receive advance procurement funding in FY2016-FY2017 and be fully funded in FY2018-FY2023 using congressionally authorized six-year incremental funding.

This is a print on demand edition of a hard to find publication. Contents: (1) Introduction; (2) Background: Proposed 313-Ship Fleet; FY 2010 Shipbuilding Request; (3) Oversight Issues for Congress: Adequacy of Proposed 313-Ship Fleet: Adequacy of Shipbuilding Plan for Maintaining 313 Ships; Shortfalls Relative to 313-Ship Goals; Affordability of Shipbuilding Plan; (4) Legislative Activity for FY 2010: FY 2010 Defense Authorization Act; FY 2010 DoD Appropriations Act; Resolution Directing Submission of FY 2010 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan; Legislation on Individual Shipbuilding Programs. Appendixes: (A) December 2009 Press Reports About Draft FY 2011 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan; (B) Adequacy of Planned 313-Ship Fleet; (C) Size of the Navy and Navy Shipbuilding Rate. Charts and tables.

During the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union both deployed thousands of 'nonstrategic' nuclear weapons that were intended to be used in support of troops in the field during a conflict. These included nuclear mines; artillery; short, medium, and long-range ballistic missiles; cruise missiles; and gravity bombs. In contrast with the longer-range 'strategic' nuclear weapons, these weapons had a lower profile in policy debates and arms control negotiations. At the end of the 1980s, before the demise of the Soviet Union, each nation still had thousands of these weapons deployed with their troops in the field, aboard naval vessels, and on aircraft. In 1991, both the United States and Soviet Union announced that they would withdraw most and eliminate many of their nonstrategic nuclear weapons. The United States now retains approximately 1,100 nonstrategic nuclear weapons, with a few hundred deployed with aircraft in Europe and the remaining stored in the United States. Estimates vary, but experts believe Russia still has between 2,000 and 6,000 warheads for nonstrategic nuclear weapons in its arsenal. The Bush Administration indicated that nuclear weapons remained essential to U.S. national security interests, but it did quietly redeploy and remove some of the nuclear weapons deployed in Europe. In addition, Russia has increased its reliance on nuclear weapons in its national security concept. Some analysts argue that Russia has backed away from its commitments from 1991 and may develop and deploy new types of nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Analysts have identified a number of issues with the continued deployment of U.S. and Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons. These include questions about the safety and security of Russia's weapons and the possibility that some might be lost, stolen, or sold to another nation or group; questions about the role of these weapons in U.S. and Russian security policy, and the likelihood that either nation might use these weapons in a regional contingency with a non-nuclear nation; questions about the role that these weapons play in NATO policy and whether there is a continuing need for the United States to deploy these weapons at bases overseas; and questions about the relationship between nonstrategic nuclear weapons and U.S. nonproliferation policy, particularly whether a U.S. policy that views these weapons as a militarily useful tool might encourage other nations to acquire their own nuclear weapons, or at least complicate U.S. policy to discourage such acquisition. Some argue that these weapons do not create any problems and the United States should not alter its policy. Others, however, argue that the United States should reduce its reliance on these weapons and encourage Russia to do the same. Many have suggested that the United States and Russia expand efforts to cooperate on ensuring the safe and secure storage and elimination of these weapons, possibly by negotiating an arms control treaty that would limit these weapons and allow for increased transparency in monitoring their deployment and elimination. Others have suggested that any potential new U.S.-Russian arms control treaty count both strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons. This might encourage reductions or the elimination of these weapons. The 111th Congress may review some of these proposals.

Today, alongside its all-important operations in direct support of the Global War on Terrorism, naval aviation also continues its now 60-year commitment to shaping the maritime and littoral environment through persistent forward presence. In the longer term, naval aviation is also adapting to a series of geopolitical revolutions which will dramatically increase the future demand for a secure sea base capable of projecting dominant power ashore in wartime against the full spectrum of possible opponents. It is adapting to these demands by exploiting technologies and operational practices developed in the last decade that will greatly increase its ability to surge and concentrate forces rapidly; protect the sea base from new air, surface, and undersea threats; and find, identify, locate, track, and strike mobile as well as fixed targets ashore, under all weather conditions, and in timely enough fashion to produce the desired effects. This report discusses the following topics: (1) Formal Alliances Provide Predictable Access, Informal Coalitions Do Not; (2) Distributed Ground Forces Require Persistent, Distributed Air Support; (3) The Sea Shield Must Be Dominant If the Sea Base Is to Be Effective; (4) Adapting; (5) The Spectrum from Presence to Major Combat; (6) Technology and the Spectrum of Threat; (7) The Value of Robust Airborne Early Warning (AEW) Aircraft; (8) No Substitute for Range in Carrier Aviation; (9) The Need for Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA) is Not Going Away; (10) Land-Based Maritime Patrol Aircraft; (11) Multimission Helicopters; (12) New Capabilities and Challenges; (13) Eliminating the Weather Sanctuary for Mobile Targets; (14) Providing a Dominant Defense of the Sea Base; (15) Shoot Archers Not Arrows; (16) Make Opposing Submarines Pay for Their Inevitable Indiscretions; (17) Get Back in the Counter-Surveillance Business; and (18) The Force of the Future.