The Future Of Naval Aviation

Today, alongside its all-important operations in direct support of the Global War on Terrorism, naval aviation also continues its now 60-year commitment to shaping the maritime and littoral environment through persistent forward presence. In the longer term, naval aviation is also adapting to a series of geopolitical revolutions which will dramatically increase the future demand for a secure sea base capable of projecting dominant power ashore in wartime against the full spectrum of possible opponents. It is adapting to these demands by exploiting technologies and operational practices developed in the last decade that will greatly increase its ability to surge and concentrate forces rapidly; protect the sea base from new air, surface, and undersea threats; and find, identify, locate, track, and strike mobile as well as fixed targets ashore, under all weather conditions, and in timely enough fashion to produce the desired effects. This report discusses the following topics: (1) Formal Alliances Provide Predictable Access, Informal Coalitions Do Not; (2) Distributed Ground Forces Require Persistent, Distributed Air Support; (3) The Sea Shield Must Be Dominant If the Sea Base Is to Be Effective; (4) Adapting; (5) The Spectrum from Presence to Major Combat; (6) Technology and the Spectrum of Threat; (7) The Value of Robust Airborne Early Warning (AEW) Aircraft; (8) No Substitute for Range in Carrier Aviation; (9) The Need for Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA) is Not Going Away; (10) Land-Based Maritime Patrol Aircraft; (11) Multimission Helicopters; (12) New Capabilities and Challenges; (13) Eliminating the Weather Sanctuary for Mobile Targets; (14) Providing a Dominant Defense of the Sea Base; (15) Shoot Archers Not Arrows; (16) Make Opposing Submarines Pay for Their Inevitable Indiscretions; (17) Get Back in the Counter-Surveillance Business; and (18) The Force of the Future.

In a widely noted speech to the Navy League Sea-Air-Space Expo in May 2010, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates warned that “the Navy and Marine Corps must be willing to reexamine and question basic assumptions in light of evolving technologies, new threats, and budget realities.We simply cannot afford to perpetuate a status quo that heaps more and more expensive technologies onto fewer and fewer platforms—thereby risking a situation where some of our greatest capital expenditures go toward weapons and ships that could potentially become wasting assets.” Secretary Gates specifically questioned whether the Navy's commitment to a force of eleven carrier strike groups through 2040 makes sense, given the extent of the anticipated superiority of the United States over potential adversaries at sea as well as the growing threat of antiship missiles. Though later disclaiming any immediate intention to seek a reduction in the current carrier force, Gates nevertheless laid down a clear marker that all who are concerned over the future of the U.S. Navy would be well advised to take with the utmost seriousness. We may stand, then, at an important watershed in the evolution of carrier aviation, one reflecting not only the nation's current financial crisis but the changing nature of the threats to, or constraints on, American sea power, as well as—something the secretary did not mention—the advent of a new era of unmanned air and sea platforms of all types. Taken together, these developments argue for resolutely innovative thinking about the future of the nation's carrier fleet and our surface navy more generally. In Innovation in Carrier Aviation, number thirty-seven in our Newport Papers monograph series, Thomas C. Hone, Norman Friedman, and Mark D.Mandeles examine the watershed period in carrier development that occurred immediately following World War II, when design advances were made that would be crucial to the centrality in national-security policy making that carriers and naval aviation have today. In those years several major technological breakthroughs—notably the jet engine and nuclear weapons—raised large questions about the future and led to an array of innovations in the design and operational utilization of aircraft carriers. Central to this story is the collaboration between the aviation communities in the navies of the United States and Great Britain during these years, building on the intimate relationship they had developed during the war itself. Strikingly, the most important of these innovations, notably the angled flight deck and steam catapult, originated with the British, not the Americans. This study thereby also provides interesting lessons for the U.S. Navy today with respect to its commitment to maritime security cooperation in the context of its new “maritime strategy.” It is a welcome and important addition to the historiography of the Navy in the seminal years of the Cold War.

Carrier air wing and the future of naval aviation : hearing before the Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fourteenth Congress, second session, hearing held February 11, 2016.

The purpose of this review, which was prepared by officers on duty in the Operations Division, including Air Combat Intelligence officers with extensive service in the Pacific, is to analyze the relation between air and sea power. It is based upon the experience of naval aviation in the war against Japan as recorded in the files of the Navy Department. Reports of the United States Strategic Bombing: Survey have also been consulted and the chart of the progress of the war has been taken from one of them. The danger inherent in any report confined to one aspect of the war is that it may mislead the reader into forgetting that the conflict was won by a combination of ground, naval, and air forces, each of which carried its share of the common burden. All operated within the framework of strategic plans, and it is the aim of this analysis to show how naval aviation fulfilled its part of those plans. Since it is from the lessons of experience that plans for the future must be derived, the report is presented in the hope that it will prove of some value to those responsible for the future security of the United States.

The Department of Defense is developing the means to transform the nation's armed forces to meet future military challenges. For the Navy and Marine Corps, this vision is encompassed in Naval Power 21. Many new war-fighting concepts will be needed to implement this vision, and the ONR has requested the NRC to identify new science and technology opportunities for new naval aviation capabilities to support those concepts. This report presents an assessment of what they imply for naval aviation, an analysis of some capabilities that, if developed, would make a significant contribution to realizing those concepts, and an identification of key technologies in which ONR could invest to achieve those capabilities. In particular, the report focuses on seven key capabilities: multispectral defense, unmanned air operations, hypersonic weapons delivery, fast-kill weapons, heavy-lift air transport, intelligent combat information management, and omniscient intelligence.