Defeat Into Victory

Burma-felttogene, 1942-1945 - den engelske general William Joseph Slim, "Bill" Slim, "Uncle Bill", 1891-1970, skrev i 1956 disse krigserindringer om de berømte felttog og kampe i Burma, hvor det efterhånden lykkedes at få vendt krigslykken og få nederlagene vendt til sejre, og få overtaget fra de ellers så mægtige og uovervindelige japanske styrker i Sydøstasien, speciel Burma og Nordindien. "It is a personal narrative, written from the standpoint of a corps or army commander in the field, whose outlook was often limited by his own surrondings. It is based on a short account I wrote at the time, a skeleton diary, some contemporary papers, and my recollection."

In war, do mass and materiel matter most? Will states with the largest, best equipped, information-technology-rich militaries invariably win? The prevailing answer today among both scholars and policymakers is yes. But this is to overlook force employment, or the doctrine and tactics by which materiel is actually used. In a landmark reconception of battle and war, this book provides a systematic account of how force employment interacts with materiel to produce real combat outcomes. Stephen Biddle argues that force employment is central to modern war, becoming increasingly important since 1900 as the key to surviving ever more lethal weaponry. Technological change produces opposite effects depending on how forces are employed; to focus only on materiel is thus to risk major error--with serious consequences for both policy and scholarship. In clear, fluent prose, Biddle provides a systematic account of force employment's role and shows how this account holds up under rigorous, multimethod testing. The results challenge a wide variety of standard views, from current expectations for a revolution in military affairs to mainstream scholarship in international relations and orthodox interpretations of modern military history. Military Power will have a resounding impact on both scholarship in the field and on policy debates over the future of warfare, the size of the military, and the makeup of the defense budget.

Told here for the first time in vivid detail is the story of the defenders of Wake Island following their surrender to the Japanese on December 23, 1941. The highly regarded military historian Gregory Urwin spent decades researching what happened and now offers a revealing look at the U.S. Marines, sailors, soldiers, and civilian volunteers in captivity. In addition to exhaustive archival research, he interviewed dozens of POWs and even some of their Japanese captors. He also had access to diaries secretly kept by the prisoners. This information has allowed Urwin to provide a nuanced look at the Japanese guards and how the Americans survived three-and-a-half years in captivity and emerged with a much lower death rate than most other Allies captured in the Pacific. In part, Urwin says, the answer lies in the Wake Islanders’ establishment of life-saving communities that kept their dignity intact. Their mutual-help networks encouraged those who faltered under the physical and psychological torture, including what is today called water boarding. The book notes that the Japanese camp official responsible for that war crime was sentenced to life imprisonment by an American military tribunal. Most spent the war at a camp just outside Shanghai, one of the few places where Japanese authorities permitted the Red Cross to aid prisoners of war. The author also calls attention to the generosity of civilians in Shanghai, including Swiss diplomats and the American and British residents of the fabled International Settlement, who provided food and clothing to the prisoners. In addition, some of the guards proved to be less vicious than those stationed at other POW camps and occasionally went out of their way to aid the men. As the first historical work to fully explore the captivity of Wake Island’s defenders, the book offers information not found in other World War II historie

Bringing together leading contributors in the field, this new volume analyzes how victory and defeat in modern war can be understood and explained. It does so by confronting two inter-related research problems: the nature of victory and defeat in modern war and the explanations of victory and defeat. By first questioning the extent to which the concepts of victory and defeat are meaningful to describe the outcomes of modern wars, and whether the contents of these concepts are changing, it then evaluates different theories purporting to explain the outcomes of war and the impact of variables, ranging from technology to culture. The book tackles several key questions: What is the definition of victory in the ‘War on Terror’? What is the meaning of victory and defeat in contemporary insurgencies, such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan? Are the counterstrategies that were developed in the mid-twentieth century valid in order to deal with present and future conflicts? With case studies ranging from the Malayan Emergency to the current conflict in Iraq, Understanding Victory and Defeat in Contemporary War will be of great interest to students of war and conflict studies, security studies, military history and international relations.

How do people decide which country came out ahead in a war or a crisis? Why, for instance, was the Mayaguez Incident in May 1975--where 41 U.S. soldiers were killed and dozens more wounded in a botched hostage rescue mission--perceived as a triumph and the 1992-94 U.S. humanitarian intervention in Somalia, which saved thousands of lives, viewed as a disaster? In Failing to Win, Dominic Johnson and Dominic Tierney dissect the psychological factors that predispose leaders, media, and the public to perceive outcomes as victories or defeats--often creating wide gaps between perceptions and reality. To make their case, Johnson and Tierney employ two frameworks: "Scorekeeping," which focuses on actual material gains and losses; and "Match-fixing," where evaluations become skewed by mindsets, symbolic events, and media and elite spin. In case studies ranging from the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and the current War on Terror, the authors show that much of what we accept about international politics and world history is not what it seems--and why, in a time when citizens offer or withdraw support based on an imagined view of the outcome rather than the result on the ground, perceptions of success or failure can shape the results of wars, the fate of leaders, and the "lessons" we draw from history.

"Before Alamein we never won a battle, after Alamein we never lost one." Winston Churchill Although this is an exaggeration, it is perhaps a pardonable one. The second battle of El Alamein in November 1942 was followed in April 1943 by the complete withdrawal of German troops from North Africa. Meanwhile, on the Eastern Front, the Red Army had entered the hell of Stalingrad and emerged victorious. In the Pacific, American troops had captured and held the strategically vital island of Guadalcanal, in the teeth of frantic Japanese counter-attacks. In Burma, the Chindits were continuing to harass the enemy while British forces regrouped in preparation for the recapture of the country. The tide of the war had begun inexorably to turn in favour of the Allies. Victory covers all fronts in detail as it charts the progress of the final years of World War II.

Field Marshal William Slim stands alongside Montgomery as the outstanding British field commander of World War II. Defeat Into Victory is his classic account of the Burma campaign: a story of retreat, attrition and final hard-fought victory over the Japanese. Told by a commander always at the centre of events, this is a narrative which captures both the high drama and the harsh reality of war.