Designing International Environmental Agreements

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This title was first published in 2000: Conflicts between developed and developing countries over global environmental problems, and the fact that the co-operation required to solve environmental collective action problems is typically elusive in the world of international relations, suggests a research agenda regarding how one might hop to bring about co-operation in an inherently non-co-operative international setting. In particular, what can economic theory tell us about the design of international environmental agreements (IEAs) that will protect the world's fragile environmental resources? This book collects work on IEAs which demonstrates the value of rigorous microeconomic and econometric modelling in comprehending the many and varied facets of the design and implementation in IEAs.

Built in to every multilateral environmental agreement is a dilemma: how to incorporate justice and fairness on the one hand and effectiveness on the other. Our immense difficulty in meeting this two-edged imperative highlights the fact that we are, at best, at an early stage in the development of international environmental ethics, and that no coherent and effective ethical system yet exists in this context. This remarkable book starts from a conviction that the principle of common but differentiated responsibility (CBDR) offers the best way forward toward the much-desired goal of sustainable development. Presenting a full-scale, multidisciplinary assessment of the feasibility of the principle of CBDR in multilateral environmental agreements, encompassing legal and policy status perspectives as well as historical developments and future prospects, this study identifies issues and aspects in the theoretical and practical application of the CBDR principle. The author responds with in-depth knowledge and awareness to such specific questions as the following: What does the principle of common but differentiated responsibility entail in international environmental law, with special reference to international environmental treaties? How is the principle reflected in the burden-sharing design of current agreements? What problems and challenges does the practical application of the CBDR principle present to the international community and individual countries as well as to the international environmental regimes themselves? What factors should be taken into account when assessing the success or failure of the principle? What is the status of the principle in international environmental law (currently and possibly in the future), and what are its implications in the broader international context? The author examines methods for differentiation from both theoretical and actual treaty-level viewpoints. She offers examples from the negotiation history of international environmental treaties to shed light on the importance of information-sharing and wide participation during the negotiations. Recognizing that, in the international environmental field, problems of economic development and the geopolitics of global wealth distribution soon come to the fore, and that each stateand’s right to development should not be too heavily restricted under international environmental regimes, she demonstrates that the CBDR principle has a strong potential to formally integrate the environment and development at the international level. The study will be of immeasurable value in promoting understanding of how CBDR actually works. It will help lawyers and policymakers perceive how different parties want to use the principle, and to discern clearly what options could be chosen by the parties, which aspects are crucial, and what factors influence the effectiveness of the arrangements.

Environmental problems like global climate change and stratospheric ozone depletion can only be remedied if states cooperate with one another. But sovereign states usually care only about their own interests. So states must somehow restructure the incentives to make cooperation pay. This is what treaties are meant to do. A few treaties, such as the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, succeed. Most, however, fail to alter the state behaviour appreciably. This book develops a theory that explains both the successes and the failures. In particular, the book explains when treaties are needed, why some work better than others, and how treaty design can be improved. The best treaties strategically manipulate the incentives states have to exploit the environment, and the theory developed in this book shows how treaties can do this. The theory integrates a number of disciplines, including economics, political science, international law, negotiation analysis, and game theory. It also offers a coherent and consistent approach. The essential assumption is that treaties be self-enforcing-that is, individually rational, collectively rational, and fair. The book applies the theory to a number of environmental problems. It provides information on more than three hundred treaties, and analyses a number of case studies in detail. These include depletion of the ozone layer, whaling, pollution of the Rhine, acid rain, over-fishing, pollution of the oceans, and global climate change. The essential lesson of the book is that treaties should not just tell countries what to do. Treaties must make it in the interests of countries to behave differently. That is, they must restructure the underlying game. Most importantly, they must create incentives for states to participate in a treaty and for parties to comply.

In this publication, a number of recognized practitioners and scholars undertake to explore the realities and the conceptual underpinnings of environmental compliance mechanisms. In a relatively short period of time, such mechanisms were introduced in a wide range of new and existing environmental regimes. Yet, little is known about their function in practice and their implications. This is puzzling when considering, that the new mechanisms considerably depart from traditional patterns of counteraction and dispute settlement. Instead they build on partnership and cooperation and include a wide range of possible reactions, which range from those having coercive power to supportive measures. Quite a number of those mechanisms and their functioning are explained in the publication in order to lay ground for some cross-cutting analysis, which covers inter alia reporting, inspection and monitoring, supportive financial incentives and the interrelationship between compliance mechanisms and the principle of state responsibility and dispute settlement. Finally the role of non-governmental organizations is addressed. Practitioners and scholars in international environmental affairs and international law more generally will benefit significantly from the inside views and thorough reflection as provided for in this book.

Here is a practical reference which provides common methodologies, implementation rules and evalutation criteria for researchers, policy makers and business operators in the use of environmental voluntary agreements between regulators and polluters The book takes into account the variety of forms and application situations characterizing this environmental policy instrument, illustrating methodologies, implementation rules and evaluation criteria for researchers, policy makers and business operators.

International environmental agreements provide a practical basis for countries to address environmental issues on a global scale. This book explores the workings and outcomes of these agreements, and analyses key questions of why some problems are dealt with successfully and others ignored. By examining fundamental policies and issues in environmental protection this text gives an easily comprehensible introduction to international environmental agreements, and discusses problems in three areas: air, water and on land. It traces the history of agreements in broad thematic areas related to long-distance air pollution, ozone-depleting and greenhouse gases, ocean management, biological diversity, agricultural plant diversity and forest stewardship. Drawing on experts in their respective fields, this book provides an insightful evaluation of the successes and failures, and analysis of the reasons for this. Concluding with an insightful examination of research to show how performance of agreements can be improved in the future, this volume is a vital contribution to our understanding of the politics associated with establishing international environmental consensus. International Environmental Agreements will be of interest to scholars, students and researchers in global environmental politics, international relations and political science. Steinar Andresen is Senior Research Fellow at the Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Norway, and formerly professor at the Dept. of Political Science, University of Oslo. Elin Lerum Boasson is Research Fellow at the Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Norway. Geir Hønneland is Research Director at the Fridtjof Nansen Institute and adjunct professor at the University of Tromsø.

International environmental agreements provide a basis for countries to address ecological problems on a global scale. However, countries are heterogeneous with respect to their economic structures and to the problems relating to the environment that they encounter. Therefore, economic externalities and global environmental conflicts are common and can cause problems in implementation and compliance with international agreements. Economics of International Environmental Agreements illuminates those issues and factors that might cause some countries or firms to take different positions on common problems. This book explores why international environmental agreements deal with some problems successfully but fail with others. The chapters address issues that are global in nature, such as: transboundary pollution, provision of global public goods, individual preferences of inequality- aversion, global cooperation, self-enforcing international environmental agreements, emission standards, abatement costs, environmental quota, technology agreement and adoption and international institutions. They examine the necessary conditions for the improved performance of international environmental agreements, how cooperation among countries can be improved and the incentives that can be created for voluntary compliance with international environmental agreements. This text is of great importance to academics, students and policy makers who are interested in environmental economics, policy and politics, as well as environmental law.