Disarmament Of Libya S Weapons Of Mass Destruction

Disarmament of Libya's weapons of mass destruction: hearing before the Subcommittee on International Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Human Rights of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, One Hundred Eighth Congress, second session, September 22, 2004.

Disarmament of Libya's weapons of mass destruction : hearing before the Subcommittee on International Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Human Rights of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, One Hundred Eighth Congress, second session, September 22, 2004.

Recent events in Libya have already had a significant effect on the region and beyond, and perhaps one of the most compelling results has been the potential impact on regional powers for the future course of nuclear proliferation. Libya's nuclear disarmament experience has provided lessons learned for those states who have themselves acquired nuclear weapons recently, may be in the process of developing that capability, or may be considering the possibility of doing so. This study argues that the lessons learned from the Libyan case of disarmament will confirm the decision of those countries that have already acquired nuclear weapons and add momentum to the efforts of those countries on their way to developing or considering the acquisition of nuclear weapons as a means of enhancing national and regime security. This dynamic, not surprisingly, will thereby complicate future efforts at nonproliferation and denuclearization. In light of the impact of the Libyan experience on other countries, the author offers several recommendations as the international community pursues nonproliferation and counterproliferation policies, including paying sufficient attention to both material and symbolic rewards to cooperative countries, placing less emphasis on public calls for regime change, and modifying the regional threat environment.

This report discusses the recent revolution in Libya, from its 2011 uprising to the end of the Qadhafi era. It specifically looks at Libya's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) disarmament, political reform and human rights, and energy as it relates to the Libyan economy.

This Adelphi Paper examines the motives behind Libya‘s pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, from Gadhafi‘s rise to power in 1969 through to the end of 2003. It also assesses the proliferation pathways that the regime followed during this period, including early dependence on Soviet technology and assistance, subsequently relying on technological infusions from the A.Q. Khan network. Wyn Q. Bowen clearly analyzes the decision to give up the quest for nuclear weapons, focusing on the main factors that influenced the Gadhafi regime‘s calculations, including the perceived need to re-engage, both politically and economically, with the international community, particularly the United States. It explores the process of dismantling the nuclear programme and the question of whether Libya constitutes amodel for addressing the challenges posed by other proliferators.