Weapons Of Mass Destruction Terrorism Human Rights And The Future Of U S Libyan Relations

Witnesses: William Burns, Bur. of Near East. Aff., Dept. of State; Paul DeSutter, Bur. of Ver'n. & Compl., Dept. of State; Patrick Clawson, Wash. Inst. for Near East Policy; Ray Takeyh, Near East & S. Asia Center, Nat. Def. Univ.; & Krista Riddley, Advoc. Dir., Middle Eat & North Africa, Amnesty International. Appendix: Prepared Statements by: John Conyers, Jr., a Rep. in Congress from MI; Family members of victims of Pan Am Flight 103; Kara Weipz & Glenn Johnson, Jr., Victims of Pan Am Flight 103, Inc.; Responses from the Dept. of State to questions asked by Rep. Barbara Lee & Howard Berman from CA; & Barbara Lee: Article from The Washington PostÓ entitled My Secret Talks with Libya, & Why They Went Nowhere,Ó by Gary Hart, Jan. 18, 2004

Following the Libyan government's December 2003 decision to eliminate its weapons of mass destruction and long range missile programs, a number of bilateral diplomatic exchanges have taken place, and the termination of U.S. economic sanctions on Libya has paved the way for a renewal of investment by U.S. oil, gas, and energy service firms in Libya's under-capitalized energy sector. Several visits to Libya by Bush Administration officials and Members of Congress in 2004 and 2005 have raised expectations of a formal reestablishment of normal relations between the U.S. and Libya in the near future, including the removal of the last remaining sanctions associated with Libya's designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. Bilateral intelligence and counter-terrorism cooperation has contributed to a gradual U.S.-Libyan re-engagement on security matters since late 2001. Continuing U.S. concerns about Libya's relationship with some Palestinian terrorist groups and an alleged ...

Disarmament of Libya's weapons of mass destruction : hearing before the Subcommittee on International Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Human Rights of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, One Hundred Eighth Congress, second session, September 22, 2004.

With an increase of global security concerns over potential terrorist acts, the threat of WMDs, and increasing political issues with nations seeking nuclear capability, the need to track, detect, and safeguard nuclear material globally has never been greater. Nuclear Safeguards, Security and Nonproliferation is a comprehensive reference that covers cutting-edge technologies used to trace, track, and safeguard nuclear material. It is a contributed volume with sections contributed by scientists from leading institutions such as Los Alamos National Labs, Sandia National Labs, Pacific Northwest Nuclear Labs, and Texas A&M University, and the Monterey Institute of International Studies. The book is divided into 3 sections and includes 30 chapters on such topics as - the security of nuclear facilities and material, the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials, improvised nuclear devices, how to prevent nuclear terrorism. International case studies of security at nuclear facilities and illegal nuclear trade activities provide specific examples of the complex issues surrounding the technology and policy for nuclear material protection, control and accountability. Specific cases include analysis of the timely issues in the nuclear programs of countries such as North Korea, Iran, and Kazakstan among others. Nuclear Security is a must-have volume for the dozens of private and public organizations involved in driving Homeland Security, domestic, and international policy issues relating to nuclear material security, non-proliferation, and nuclear transparency. Written by some of the world's top scientists including members of the Nuclear Division of Los Alamos National Labs (U.S.) A timely discussion of current international nuclear security issues includes case studies on Iraq, Iran and North Korea Book takes a global perspective on nuclear security and non-proliferation detailing the little-known real-world technologies used to secure, detect and track nuclear material

Including many older documents not available electronically or otherwise accessible, this three-volume set provides the first comprehensive collection of key documents, statements, and testimony on U.S. government counterterrorism policies as they have evolved in the face of the changing terrorist threats. Selected executive and congressional materials highlight the government's diverse policy and program responses to terrorism. The testimony, statements, and documents provide the public articulation and face to the largely important intelligence, law enforcement, preventative security measures, and international cooperation used in the shadowy war against terrorism. Recent entries provide a handy compilation of important post-9/11 materials. For example, useful background information on U.S. actions against Osama bin Laden, the Taliban, and Saddam Hussein and terrorism fundraising. Also included are statements from the Reagan and other administrations that relate to disputes over the appropriate use of force. Introductory chapters by Alexander and Kraft provide the historical context and analysis of previous and current U.S. counterterrorism policy including U.S. legislation. For over two centuries, America has faced occasional outbreaks of terrorism, perpetrated by both indigenous and foreign groups. But the spectacular bombing in Oklahoma City in 1995 and the September 11, 2001, attacks seemed to signify a new age, frightening many Americans and destroying their sense of domestic security. In addition, U.S. citizens and interests have been increasingly affected by acts of terrorism abroad. The challenges of terrorism, therefore, have required the United States to develop comprehensive strategies and programs to counter both conventional and unconventional threats, nationally and globally.

This book offers a novel approach to understanding the puzzle of nuclear proliferation by examining how leaders’ beliefs and perceptions about the international system influence states' decisions to acquire nuclear weapons. Today, there is a persisting dilemma over the spread of nuclear weapons for both practitioners and scholars of international affairs. Uncertainty remains whether determined proliferators can be stopped, as shown by the cases of North Korea and Iran. These instances of proliferation raise questions about regional stability, the use of pre-emptive military action, and the potential for reactive-proliferation by neighbouring countries. Despite the serious implications surrounding the spread of these weapons, proliferation scholarship has thus far failed to solve what has been described as the "proliferation puzzle"- why do some countries choose nuclear weapons while others do not? The author argues that understanding basic psychological motivations, such as the role of power and perceptions of self and others, forms a strategic context which provides answers about a leader’s willingness to proliferate. Proliferation willingness is a critical, yet frequently overlooked, part of the proliferation equation. Ultimately, it is the combination of willingness and proliferation opportunity (i.e. technical and scientific capabilities) that determines whether a country 'goes nuclear'. By examining several historical instances of proliferation decision-making—in South Africa, India, Libya and Australia—the book's findings highlight the fundamental role of leaders’ beliefs in shaping proliferation outcomes. This book will be of much interest to students of nuclear proliferation, political psychology, security studies and IR in general.