Dominoes And Bandwagons

Fearing the loss of Korea and Vietnam would touch off a chain reaction of other countries turning communist, the United States fought two major wars in the hinterlands of Asia. What accounts for such exaggerated alarm, and what were its consequences? Is a fear of the domino effect permanently rooted in the American strategic psyche, or has the United States now adopted a less alarmist approach? The essays in this book address these questions by examining domino thinking in United States and Soviet Cold War strategy, and in earlier historic settings. Combining theory and history in analyzing issues relevant to current public policy, Dominoes and Bandwagons examines the extent to which domino fears were a rational response, a psychological reaction, or a tactic in domestic politics.

"This is a book about power in world politics in general and about the relationship between the Soviet Union and the balance of power during the Cold War in particular. Its empirical core is an investigation of how members of the Soviet political elite thought about the problem of power in world politics, mainly during the years between 1945 and 1989"--Page 1.

A collection of essays on military defence strategy, which considers historical applications of the "domino theory", the psychological dynamics of the US-Soviet relationship vis-a-vis Eurasian boundaries. It also examines whether the USSR actually infers a lack of resolve from American retreats.

Examining the shifts in Russian foreign policy and their potential impact on the status and influence of the United States in the international system, this outstanding volume examines why the Kremlin initially sought an alliance with the United States and the internal and external reasons why such a policy was unsustainable. In particular, it looks for an explanation for the post-Cold War vacillations in Russian foreign policy. Russia made several decisions which were perceived domestically as being unacceptable capitulations to American interests. Consequently, a pro-Western foreign policy became incompatible with Russian political culture. The rapprochement following 9/11 was destined to be temporary due to the decision by the Bush administration to invade Iraq. Contributing to the fields of international relations and comparative foreign policy, this study provides a fresh approach to the balance/bandwagon issue and takes into account the global repercussions of the recent war in Iraq. It will be of particular value to specialists in Russian foreign policy, international relations theory, and US foreign policy.

In exploring the special nature of alliances among democracies, Thomas Risse-Kappen argues that the West European and Canadian allies exerted greater influence on American foreign policy during the Cold War than most analysts assume. In so doing, he challenges traditional alliance theories that emphasize strategic interactions and power-based bargaining processes. For a better understanding of the transatlantic relationship, the author proposes that we instead turn to liberal theories of international affairs. Accordingly, liberal democracies are likely to form the "pacific federations" described by Immanuel Kant or "pluralistic security communities" as Karl W. Deutsch suggested. Through detailed case studies, Risse-Kappen shows that the Europeans affected security decisions concerning vital U.S. interest during the 1950-1953 Korean war, the 1958-1963 test ban negotiations, and the 1962 Cuban missile crisis--all during a span of time in which the U.S. enjoyed undisputed economic and military supremacy in the alliance. He situates these case studies within a theoretical framework demonstrating that the European influence on decision-making processes in Washington worked through three mechanisms: norms prescribing timely consultations among the allies, use of domestic pressures for leverage in transatlantic interactions, and transnational and transgovernmental coalitions among societal and bureaucratic actors. The book's findings have important repercussions for the post-Cold War era in that they suggest the transatlantic security community is likely to survive the end of the Soviet threat.

This iconoclastic and fundamental work, Eric Nordlinger's last, advocates a new variant of isolationism, a "national strategy" confining U.S. military actions largely to North America and to neighboring sea-and air- lanes but encouraging international activism and engagement in nonsecurity realms. In Nordlinger's view, disengaging from security commitments on distant shores would liberate the United States to use its resources and decision-making powers to act more effectively abroad in matters of economic policy and human rights. A national strategy would then become a powerful new method of encouraging international ideals of democracy, and isolationism would be freed of its previous associations with appeasement, weakness, economic protectionism, and self-serving nationalism. Nordlinger draws on the recent historical record to show that a national strategy would have lessened the perils of earlier decades, including those of the Cold War. While real dangers did exist during this period, engaged strategies, such as containment, too often exacerbated them. The United States could have effectively and far less expensively helped to deter Communist aggression in Europe and Asia by encouraging other nations to make larger investments in their own protection. Marshaling impressive empirical evidence in defense of a controversial position, this final work by a leading scholar of international affairs is essential reading for scholars, practitioners, and lay readers alike.

In a new interpretation of how and why the United States went to war in Vietnam, the author challenges conventional wisdom about the origins of the war, arguing that U.S. policy decisions were shaped by an imbalance of military power favoring the U.S. over the Soviet Union and China, a factor that is also relevant to the current U.S. intervention in Iraq.

At the end of the Cold War security concerns are more about regional and civil conflicts than nuclear or Eurasian global wars. Stephen Cimbala argues that deterrence characteristics of the pre-Cold War period will in the 21st century again become normative.