Double Cross Deception Techniques In War

How does deception factor into fighting wars, and is it effective? In an intriguing companion to The Dark Game, Paul B. Janeczko reveals the truth about the strategic lies of war. The biblical account of Gideon. The ancient story of the Trojan horse. Deceptive techniques have been used in war through the ages. But while the principles have changed very little, the technology behind fooling the enemy has evolved dramatically. Paul B. Janeczko’s fascinating chronology focuses on the American Civil War, World Wars I and II, and the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Gulf Wars to reveal evolving attitudes toward the use and effectiveness of deceptive operations. Find out the secret plan behind the invasion of Normandy and the details of General Schwarzkopf’s “Hail Mary play” during the Gulf War, among many other strategies and maneuvers designed to pull the wool over enemies' eyes. Back matter includes source notes and a bibliography.

In the war against Hitler, the Allies had to use every ounce of cunning and trickery that they possessed. Combining military deceptions with the double-agent network run by the intelligence services, they were able to send the enemy misleading information about Allied troops, plans and operations. From moving imaginary armies around the desert to putting a corpse with false papers floating in the Mediterranean, and from faking successful bombing campaigns to the convoluted deceptions which kept part of the German forces away from Normandy prior to D-Day, Terry Crowdy explores the deception war that combined the double-agent network with ingenious plans to confuse and hoodwink the Führer.

Turnabout and Deception combines two of spymaster Barton Whaley's most potent analyses of the craft: Turnabout: Crafting the Double-Cross and When Deception Fails: The Theory of Outs. Each examination delves into extensive case studies to establish not only foundational understandings of essential espionage principals, but also creates guidance for their practical application on both individual and governmental scales. Deception is a basic tactic used by allies and enemies alike, but when both protagonist and antagonist ply the same trade, it is the master of the double-cross who comes out the victor. Turnabout and Deception examines how to turn the tables on an opponent and use their own deception against them. Through thirty-eight case studies, this monograph dissects the double-cross to reveal the psychological battle of wits at its core. No matter how well crafted, however, there is always a chance that a deception will fail. But failure is not the end of a deception, and even failed deception operations can yield results. Turnabout and Deception pores over sixty more case studies to determine why a deception will fail, steps to prevent a failed operation, and how to turn that failure into a success.

From the bestselling author of The Spy and the Traitor, A Spy Among Friends, and Rogue Heroes, a fascinating work of popular history that vividly recreates the vast web of deception spun by spies in order to conceal D-Day. On June 6, 1944, 150,000 Allied troops landed on the beaches of Normandy and suffered an astonishingly low rate of casualties. A stunning military achievement, it was also a masterpiece of trickery. Operation Fortitude, which protected and enabled the invasion, and the Double Cross system, which specialized in turning German spies into double agents, tricked the Nazis into believing that the Allied attacks would come in Calais and Norway rather than Normandy. It was the most sophisticated and successful deception operation ever carried out, ensuring Allied victory at the most pivotal moment in the war. This epic event has never before been told from the perspective of the key individuals in the Double Cross system, who together made up one of the oddest and most brilliant military units ever assembled. Until now.

This book describes and analyzes the history of the Mediterranean "Double-Cross System" of the Second World War, an intelligence operation run primarily by British officers which turned captured German spies into double agents. Through a complex system of coordination, they were utilized from 1941 to the end of the war in 1945 to secure Allied territory through security and counter-intelligence operations, and also to deceive the German military by passing false information about Allied military planning and operations. The primary questions addressed by the book are: how did the double-cross-system come into existence; what effects did it have on the intelligence war and the broader military conflict; and why did it have those effects? The book contains chapters assessing how the system came into being and how it was organized, and also chapters which analyze its performance in security and counter-intelligence operations, and in deception.

First Published in 1987. New information obtained from the declassification of Ultra intercepts and other Second World War documents as well as from recent scholarly research has credited Allied deception operations with an even more important contribution to winning the war than was previously supposed. Yet deception is only one factor in the achievement of victory; it cannot guarantee success. It must be fully understood and exploited by the highest levels of command. Most histories of deception operations during the Second World War have focused on those that were successful. Instances in which deception operations failed to achieve their objectives are discussed by John Campbell, who describes an early attempt to convince the Germans that the Allies intended to invade at Pas de Calais in the summer of 1943, and by Katherine Herbig, who gives the first detailed description of US deception operations in the Pacific. Klaus-Jurgen Moiier questions the actual effectiveness of deception operations against the Germans. He argues that many successes attributed to the Allies' use of deception were in fact achieved by independent considerations on the German side. Professor Moiier builds a particularly strong case in challenging the success of Operation Fortitude North, in which the Allies tried to divert German troops to Norway before invading Normandy. Although very little is known of Soviet deception operations on the Eastern Front, it must be remembered that they were conducted on a much larger scale than those of either the British in Europe or the Americans in the Pacific. Colonel David Glantz's account of Soviet deception and covert activities offers a version of the historiography of the war between the USSR and Germany which may explain some of the monumental German failures. Tom Cubbage not only contributes a synthesis of the primary and secondary sources available on the deception operations preceding Overlord, but also reviews the so-called Hesketh Report - Fortitude: A History of Strategic Decep­tion in North Western Europe April 1943 to May 1945, Colonel Roger Hesketh's official report on Allied deception operations against the Germans in north-west Europe which was declassified in 1976, yet remains unpublished. It indicates that Professor Muller's suspicions that the Allies over-estimated the impact of Forti­tude are unfounded. Edited and with a comprehensive introduction by Michael Handel, these important and original studies put the entire deception effort during the Second World War into a more balanced and accurate perspective.

J.C. Masterman was chairman of the Double-Cross Committee at the height of World War Two. This is his account of the double agents, deception and counter-espionage which were key to the victory of D-Day. Written as an official report for MI5 in 1945, originally published with the permission of the British Government over twenty years later, The Double-Cross System details the Allied handling of enemy agents and the British infiltration of Nazi spy-rings. Telling the stories of the agents codenamed Zigzag, Tricycle, Garbo and Snow, Masterman also tells the story of a triumphant operation in the Second World War’s intelligence effort.

An examination of modern military deception techniques, which considers the tactics that were used by the Coalition forces in the Gulf, by the Soviets in Afghanistan and by the British in a series of post-imperial bush wars, with discussion of how such techniques were developed during World War II.