Economic Crises And The Breakdown Of Authoritarian Regimes

Why do some authoritarian regimes topple during financial crises, while others steer through financial crises relatively unscathed? In this book, Thomas B. Pepinsky uses the experiences of Indonesia and Malaysia and the analytical tools of open economy macroeconomics to answer this question. Focusing on the economic interests of authoritarian regimes' supporters, Pepinsky shows that differences in cross-border asset specificity produce dramatically different outcomes in regimes facing financial crises. When asset specificity divides supporters, as in Indonesia, they desire mutually incompatible adjustment policies, yielding incoherent adjustment policy followed by regime collapse. When coalitions are not divided by asset specificity, as in Malaysia, regimes adopt radical adjustment measures that enable them to survive financial crises. Combining rich qualitative evidence from Southeast Asia with cross-national time-series data and comparative case studies of Latin American autocracies, Pepinsky reveals the power of coalitions and capital mobility to explain how financial crises produce regime change.

Why do some authoritarian regimes topple during financial crises, while others steer through financial crises relatively unscathed? In this book, Thomas B. Pepinsky uses the experiences of Indonesia and Malaysia and the analytical tools of open economy macroeconomics to answer this question. Focusing on the economic interests of authoritarian regimes' supporters, Pepinsky shows that differences in cross-border asset specificity produce dramatically different outcomes in regimes facing financial crises. When asset specificity divides supporters, as in Indonesia, they desire mutually incompatible adjustment policies, yielding incoherent adjustment policy followed by regime collapse. When coalitions are not divided by asset specificity, as in Malaysia, regimes adopt radical adjustment measures that enable them to survive financial crises. Combining rich qualitative evidence from Southeast Asia with cross-national time-series data and comparative case studies of Latin American autocracies, Pepinsky reveals the power of coalitions and capital mobility to explain how financial crises produce regime change.

Thomas B. Pepinsky examines how coalitions and capital mobility in Indonesia and Malaysia shape the links between financial crises and regime change.

"Economic Shocks and Authoritarian Stability hones in on the economic challenges facing authoritarian regimes through a set of comparative case studies, which include Iran, Iraq under Saddam Hussein, Malaysia, Indonesia, Russia, the Eastern bloc countries, China, and Taiwan, authored by the top experts in these countries. Through these comparative case studies, this volume provides readers with the analytical tools for assessing whether the current round of economic shocks will lead to political instability or even regime change among the world's autocracies. This volume identifies the duration of economic shocks, the regime's control over the financial system, and the strength of the ruling party as key variables to explain whether authoritarian regimes would maintain the status quo, adjust their support coalitions, or fall from power after economic shocks"--

Krisen offenbaren die Fragilität der Ordnung und fordern die Macht heraus. Wie gehen autoritäre Regime mit ihnen um? Welche Stärken und Schwächen zeigen sie in der Krisenbewältigung, verglichen mit demokratischen Ordnungen? Wie lässt sich ihre Anpassungsfähigkeit und Persistenz erklären? Die Beiträge dieses Bandes verbinden die Sichtweisen von Politikwissenschaft, Geschichte, Literaturwissenschaft, Soziologie und Regionalwissenschaften auf gegenwärtige und untergegangene Regime in Afrika, Ost- und Zentralasien, Ost- und Westeuropa und Lateinamerika. Die Fallstudien beleuchten die Verdichtung autoritärer Herrschaft in der Krise, die meist zwei konträre Ziele verfolgt: die Stabilität zu erhalten und die eigene Herrschaft zu erneuern.

Democracies and Authoritarian Regimes provides a broad, accessible overview of the key institutions and political dynamics in democracies and dictatorships, enabling students to assess the benefits and risks associated with democracy, and the growing challenges to it. Comprehensive coverage of the full spectrum of political systems enhances students' understanding of the relevance of contemporary global trends, including the nature of democratic backsliding and authoritarian resurgence, the rise of populism and identity politics, and the impact of cultural and socio-economic drivers of democracy. Each chapter features a broad range of case studies complemented by boxes that illustrate key terms, ensuring relevant research is translated in a clear, engaging format for students. This text is supported by a range of online resources, to encourage deeper engagement with the subject matter. For students: Regular updates to supplement the text, ensuring students are fully informed of real-time developments in the field For lecturers: In-class assignments to reinforce key concepts and facilitate deeper, critical engagement with key topics

Based on a detailed study of 35 cases in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and post-communist Eurasia, this book explores the fate of competitive authoritarian regimes between 1990 and 2008. It finds that where social, economic, and technocratic ties to the West were extensive, as in Eastern Europe and the Americas, the external cost of abuse led incumbents to cede power rather than crack down, which led to democratization. Where ties to the West were limited, external democratizing pressure was weaker and countries rarely democratized. In these cases, regime outcomes hinged on the character of state and ruling party organizations. Where incumbents possessed developed and cohesive coercive party structures, they could thwart opposition challenges, and competitive authoritarian regimes survived; where incumbents lacked such organizational tools, regimes were unstable but rarely democratized.

How autocracy flourished even as the economy failed in Venezuela An alarming number of countries that once were seemingly stable democracies have veered in recent years toward authoritarianism—a trend known as “democratic backsliding.” One of those countries in Venezuela, which enjoyed periods of democratically elected governments in the latter half of the twentieth century but in the past two decades has increasingly descended into autocratic rule, coupled with economic collapse. Autocracy Rising, written by a veteran scholar of Venezuela and Latin American politics generally explores how and why this happened. Corrales argues that Venezuela’s slide began with the policies of former president Hugo Chávez—policies that were based on government control of the economy and in turn generated a lingering economic crisis. After he succeeded Chávez in 2013, Nicolás Maduro not only entrenched the failed economic policies but also responded to various crises by establishing institutions that further undermined democracy. Each of Maduro’s responses may have solved a short-term problem but collectively they destroyed both any pretense of democracy in Venezuela and prospects for his own long-term success. Corrales analyzes the lingering crisis in Venezuela by comparing it to twenty cases in Latin America where presidents were forced out of office. Regardless of how the current situation ends in Venezuela, His book illuminates the depressing cycle in which semi-authoritarian regimes become increasingly autocratic in response to crises, only to cause new crises that led to even greater authoritarianism.