Economic Development Competition Policy And The World Trade Organization

At the recent World Trade Organization (WTO) ministerial meeting in Doha, Qatar, WTO members called for the launch of negotiations on disciplines relating to competition based on explicit consensus on modalities to be agreed at the fifth WTO ministerial meeting in 2003. WTO discussions since 1997 have revealed little support for ambitious multilateral action. Proponents of the WTO antitrust disciplines currently propose an agreement that is limited to "core principles"-nondiscrimination, transparency, and provisions banning "hard core" cartels. The authors argue that an agreement along such lines will create compliance costs for developing countries without addressing the anticompetitive behavior of firms located in foreign jurisdictions. To be unambiguously beneficial to low-income countries, any WTO antitrust disciplines should recognize the capacity constraints that prevail in these economies, make illegal collusive business practices by firms with international operations that raise prices in developing country markets, and require competition authorities in high-income countries to take action against firms located in their jurisdictions to defend the interests of affected developing country consumers. More generally, a case is made that traditional liberalization commitments using existing WTO fora will be the most effective means of lowering prices and increasing access to an expanded variety of goods and services.

At the recent World Trade Organization (WTO) ministerial meeting in Doha, Qatar, WTO members called for the launch of negotiations on disciplines relating to competition based on explicit consensus on modalities to be agreed at the fifth WTO ministerial meeting in 2003. WTO discussions since 1997 have revealed little support for ambitious multilateral action. Proponents of the WTO antitrust disciplines currently propose an agreement that is limited to quot;core principlesquot; - nondiscrimination, transparency, and provisions banning quot;hard corequot; cartels. Hoekman and Mavroidis argue that an agreement along such lines will create compliance costs for developing countries without addressing the anticompetitive behavior of firms located in foreign jurisdictions. To be unambiguously beneficial to low-income countries, any WTO antitrust disciplines should recognize the capacity constraints that prevail in these economies, make illegal collusive business practices by firms with international operations that raise prices in developing country markets, and require competition authorities in high-income countries to take action against firms located in their jurisdictions to defend the interests of affected developing country consumers. More generally, a case is made that traditional liberalization commitments using existing WTO fora will be the most effective means of lowering prices and increasing access to an expanded variety of goods and services.This paper - a product of Trade, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to analyze quot;behind the borderquot; policies that affect international trade.

Developing countries have a great interest in pursuing active domestic competition policy but should do so independent of the World Trade Organization -- which they should use to improve market access through further reduction in direct barriers to trade in goods and services.

This publication brings together a series of working papers that Member countries' trade and competition authorities have considered during the past two years. They analyse issues at the interface of trade and competition.

The authors survey national competition policies and the issues they raise for international trade and investment. The book includes detailed recommendations for international agreement on minimum standards in those competition-policy measures that affect the ability of foreign firms to contest markets. These standards could be negotiated and implemented bilaterally, regionally, and globally at the World Trade Organisation.

In the run-up to the November 1999 WTO Ministerial in Seattle, this conference proceedings explored the various options towards better coherence between trade and competition policies.

The World Trade Organization (WTO) has a role to play in strengthening the global trading system for development, primarily by lowering barriers to trade in goods and services and ensuring that trade rules are useful to Developing countries. But greater international cooperation must complement WTO-based negotiations, in particular, concerted action outside the WTO to enhance the trade capacity of poor countries ("aid for trade").