Economics Game Theory And International Environmental Agreements The Ca Foscari Lectures

The science and management of environmental problems is a vast area, comprising both the natural and social sciences, and the multidisciplinary links often make these issues challenging to comprehend. Economics, Game Theory and International Environmental Agreements: The Ca' Foscari Lectures aims to introduce students to the multidimensional character of international environmental problems in general, and climate change in particular.Ecology, economics, game theory and diplomacy are called upon and brought together in the common framework of a basic mathematical model. Within that framework, and using tools from these four disciplines, the book develops a theory that aims to explain and promote cooperation in international environmental affairs.Other books on the topic tend to be research-oriented volumes of various papers. Instead, this is a book that offers a reasonably-sized synthesis of the multidimensional societal problems of transfrontier pollution, particularly of climate change. It uses mathematical modeling of economic and game theory concepts to examine these environmental issues and demonstrate many results in an accessible fashion. Readers interested in understanding the links between ecology and economics, as well as the connection between economics and institutional decision-making, will find in this text not only answers to many of their queries but also questions for further thinking.

Key environmental issues, such as biodiversity and climate change, have in recent years become more pressing than ever. Where the critical papers in the early 1990s explained the difficulties of cooperation in tackling transboundary environmental problems, later works have analyzed the various alternatives, and increased our understanding of various institutional designs and negotiation protocols' impact on the success of cooperation. This Research Review identifies the most important articles on the game theoretic analysis of international environmental cooperation to both confront the cooperative and non-cooperative approaches to this, and demonstrate the diversity of methods used to analyze international environmental agreements

Game theory has emerged as a powerful tool in environmental economics, especially in the study of such transboundary pollution problems as global warming and acid rain. This book addresses key issues in the application of game theory to environmental economics and environmental management.

This text investigates various strategies to provide countries with an incentive to accede, agree and comply to an international environmental agreement.

It is impossible to understand modern economics without knowledge of the basic tools of gametheory and mechanism design. This book provides a graduate-level introduction to the economic modeling of strategic behavior. The goal is to teach Economics doctoral students the tools of game theory and mechanism design that all economists should know.

Lecture Notes in International Trade Theory covers classical international trade models (including the Ricardian, Ricardo Viner, and Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson models). The course is designed for M.Sc. and first year PhD students. It relies on both graphical and analytic methods, requiring only intermediate microeconomics and a solid grounding in calculus. The material emphasizes 'second-best' settings, where markets are imperfect. The goal is to equip students with a good enough understanding of open-economy general equilibrium relations that they understand how distortions ripple across different markets, e.g. commodity and factor markets. The Author applies these ideas to environmental and natural resource problems, including pollution 'leakage' (where pollution reductions in one country are offset by trading partners' increased pollution) and imperfect property rights. Other applications include the general equilibrium effects of commodity and trade taxes, international transfers (the 'transfer problem'), minimum wage constraints, and immiserizing growth. The Author assumes that students have some experience in formulating and answering comparative statics questions in an optimization setting. Building on these skills, and developing the idea of stability in an equilibrium setting (the Marshall Lerner condition), students learn how to formulate and answer comparative static questions in trade models.

The most interesting issues in environmental and resource economics have an explicit temporal dimension, since variables of interest such as pollutants, greenhouse gases, biomass of biological resources, or the stocks of fossil fuels accumulate in the ambient environment or are depleted through human actions and natural processes.The purpose of these lectures is to present the mathematical tools for analyzing environmental and resource management issues in a dynamic set-up.The lectures include a brief description of differential equations and then move on to describe methods of optimal control, dynamic programing, and differential games. The final chapters cover two novel topics: (1) environmental issues characterized by deep uncertainty, and aversion to ambiguity using robust control methods and formulations of precautionary policies; and (2) the study of pollution/resource management in space and time when the environmental variables evolve in time and diffuse in space.The lectures are a valuable tool for advanced graduate students in environmental and resource economics who are studying dynamic problems.

This book provides a comprehensive discussion of the economics of International Trade.Key questions related to why countries trade, how they gain from trade, and how international trade can produce winners and losers are answered. The last of these questions is related to the connection of trade to inequality in the distribution of income.The book uses both theoretical models and empirical evidence to answer these questions. It also provides a discussion of the economics of labor migration and international capital mobility. The book also provides a detailed discussion of the welfare implications of various trade policy instruments such as tariffs, quotas, export subsidies etc. This is followed by a discussion of the process of actual policymaking in democratic societies which goes into the realm of political economy. The focus here is on the political economy of trade policy. It also provides a discussion of the economics of preferential trading agreements and a history of multilateral trading agreements under the aegis of GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) and its evolution into the World Trade Organization (WTO).