Emotionally Dumb

Alexithymia is an inability to identify and describe both one's own, and other people's emotions. Although individuals with alexithymia display the typical physical responses associated with emotions - such as tears, butterflies in the stomach or an increased heart rate - they are unable to recognize these responses in terms of the emotions they might be signifying. Emotionally Dumb describes the nature of alexithymia and includes therapeutic and self-help suggestions for overcoming some of the difficulties that alexithymia presents. The author discusses the possible causes and associated conditions, including Asperger Syndrome and posttraumatic stress disorder. The book provides details of the diagnostic tests available and includes an informal questionnaire, developed by the author, for people who believe they may have alexithymia. Written in accessible language, this book is ideal both for professionals and for anyone with an interest in the subject.

This book argues that there is a complex logical and epistemological interplay between the concepts of metaphor, narrative, and emotions. They share a number of important similarities and connections. In the first place, all three are constituted by aspect-seeing, the seeing-as or perception of Gestalts. Secondly, all three are meaning-endowing devices, helping us to furnish our world with meaning. Thirdly, the threesome constitutes a trinity. Emotions have both a narrative and metaphoric structure, and we can analyse the concepts of metaphors and narratives partly in each other's terms. Further, the concept of narratives can partly be analysed in the terms of emotions. And if emotions have both a narrative structure and a metaphoric one, then the concept of emotions must to some extent be analysable through the concepts of narratives and metaphors. But there is more. Metaphors (especially poetic ones) are important tools for the understanding of the tacit sides of emotions, perhaps because of the metaphoric structure of emotions. The notion that narrations can be tools for understanding emotions follows from two facts: narrations are devices for explanation and emotions have a narrative structure. Fourthly, the threesome has an impact on our rationality. It has become commonplace to say that emotions have a cognitive content, that narratives have an explanatory function, and that metaphors can perform cognitive functions. This book is the first attempt to articulate the implications that these new ways of seeing the three concepts entail for our concept of reason. The cognitive roles of the threesome suggest a richer notion of rationality than has traditionally been held, a rationality enlivened with metaphoric, narrative, and emotive qualities. Stefan Snaevarr (Reykjavik, 1953) studied philosophy and related subjects in Norway and Germany. Professor at Lillehammer University College in Norway, he is the author of several books of various kind in English, Norwegian and Icelandic.

As an educator, the level of curiosity I have about the world around me is boundless. I am usually invigorated by the events that happen around the world be it bad or good. I have, for long believed that there’s nothing ordinary about the events that happen to man, but also a fact is that the issues that face the world today aren’t technical problems that require sophisticated means of resolution. Society is built by values and attitudes. I am convinced that a change in attitude and beliefs can fundamentally tilt the arc of history toward a better end. When I came close to completing my doctoral studies—during the Coronavirus pandemic that brought all of the world to its knees the lockdown let me have an opportunity to pause and reflect on a lot of things. Most importantly, how do we fit in the large scheme as mankind. I asked, ‘What’s the purpose of life?” I believe I might have found the answer: We are here to witness. To partake in the co-creation of the Universe. We are here to make the world better, more unified, and more ordered for the benefit of everything and everyone that exists and ever will. That is the purpose of life.

Why do conservative politicians and scholars in Britain, Australia and the United States continue to view rising rates of out-of-wedlock births and teenage pregnancies as a threat to civilised society? This book examines the process by which social science transforms a biological event - a birth - into a social and moral problem. Drawing on Foucault's 'archaeology of knowledge', Reekie stresses the role of statistics and other social-scientific discourses in the emergence of the illegitimacy 'problem' in the early nineteenth century and its continuing cultural significance. The book illustrates the continuity in concerns about illegitimacy, including pressure on the welfare system, fears of racial and intellectual denigration, the detrimental nature of fatherless families, and the association of rising illegitimacy with the supposed selfishness of excessively independent women.

Sorting out the scientific facts from the unsupported hype about emotional intelligence. Emotional intelligence (or EI)—the ability to perceive, regulate, and communicate emotions, to understand emotions in ourselves and others—has been the subject of best-selling books, magazine cover stories, and countless media mentions. It has been touted as a solution for problems ranging from relationship issues to the inadequacies of local schools. But the media hype has far outpaced the scientific research on emotional intelligence. In What We Know about Emotional Intelligence, three experts who are actively involved in research into EI offer a state-of-the-art account of EI in theory and practice. They tell us what we know about EI based not on anecdote or wishful thinking but on science. What We Know about Emotional Intelligence looks at current knowledge about EI with the goal of translating it into practical recommendations in work, school, social, and psychological contexts.

This book investigates how bodily information contributes to categorization processes for at least some conceptual classes and thus to the individual mastery of meanings for at least some word classes. The bodily information considered is mainly that provided by the so-called proprioceptive and interoceptive systems introduced by Sherrington. The authors reconsider this in a new Gibsonian fashion calling it more generally “proprioception”, which indicates the complex of all the bodily signals we are aware of and the qualitative experiences these give rise to. The book shows that proprioceptive information understood in this sense is essential for explaining (among others) how we develop broad categories such as animate vs. inanimate, concepts denoting bodily experiences such as hunger or pain as well as emotions and abstract concepts such as friendship and freedom and in accounting for how we master the meanings of the corresponding words in our language.

This book theorizes digital logics and applications for the rhetorical canon of delivery. Digital writing technologies invite a re-evaluation about what delivery can offer to rhetorical studies and writing practices. Sean Morey argues that what delivery provides is access to the unspeakable, unconscious elements of rhetoric, not primarily through emotion or feeling as is usually offered by previous studies, but affect, a domain of sensation implicit in the (overlooked) original Greek term for delivery, hypokrisis. Moreover, the primary means for delivering affect is both the logic and technology of a network, construed as modern, digital networks, but also networks of associations between humans and nonhuman objects. Casting delivery in this light offers new rhetorical trajectories that promote its incorporation into digital networked-bodies. Given its provocative and broad reframing of delivery, this book provides original, robust ways to understand rhetorical delivery not only through a lens of digital writing technologies, but all historical means of enacting delivery, offering implications that will ultimately affect how scholars of rhetoric will come to view not only the other canons of rhetoric, but rhetoric as a whole.