Empiricism Explanation And Rationality

Originally published in 1986. All students of social science must confront a number of important philosophical issues. This introduction to the philosophy of the social sciences provides coherent answers to questions about empiricism, explanation and rationality. It evaluates contemporary writings on the subject which can be as difficult as they are important to understand. Each chapter has an annotated bibliography to enable students to pursue the issues raised and to assess for themselves the arguments of the authors.

"Understanding Empiricism" is an introduction to empiricism and the empiricist tradition in philosophy. The book presents empiricism as a philosophical outlook that unites several philosophers and discusses the most important philosophical issues bearing on the subject, while maintaining enough distance from, say, the intricacies of Locke, Berkeley, Hume scholarship to allow students to gain a clear overview of empiricism without being lost in the details of the exegetical disputes surrounding particular philosophers. Written for students the book can serve both as an introduction to current problems in the theory of knowledge as well as a comprehensive survey of the history of empiricist ideas. The book begins by distinguishing between the epistemological and psychological/causal versions of empiricism, showing that it is the former that is of primary interest to philosophers. The next three chapters, on Locke, Berkeley, Hume respectively, provide an introduction to the main protagonists in the British empiricist tradition from this perspective. The book then examines more contemporary material including the ideas of Sellars, foundations and coherence theories, the rejection of the a priori by Mill, Peirce and Quine, scepticism and, finally, the status of religious belief within empiricism. Particular attention is paid to criticisms of empiricism, such as Leibniz's criticisms of Locke on innatism and Frege's objections to Mill on mathematics. The discussions are kept at an introductory level throughout to help students to locate the principles of empiricism in relation to modern philosophy.

What is knowledge? How does it differ from mere belief? Do you need to be able to justify a claim in order to count as knowing it? How can we know that the outer world is real and not a dream? Questions like these are ancient ones, and the branch of philosophy dedicated to answering them - epistemology - has been active for thousands of years. In this thought-provoking Very Short Introduction, Jennifer Nagel considers these classic questions alongside new puzzles arising from recent discoveries about humanity, language, and the mind. Nagel explains the formation of major historical theories of knowledge, and shows how contemporary philosophers have developed new ways of understanding knowledge, using ideas from logic, linguistics, and psychology. Covering topics ranging from relativism and the problem of scepticism to the trustworthiness of internet sources, Nagel examines how progress has been made in understanding knowledge, using everyday examples to explain the key issues and debates ABOUT THE SERIES: The Very Short Introductions series from Oxford University Press contains hundreds of titles in almost every subject area. These pocket-sized books are the perfect way to get ahead in a new subject quickly. Our expert authors combine facts, analysis, perspective, new ideas, and enthusiasm to make interesting and challenging topics highly readable.

Carl G. Hempel exerted greater influence upon philosophers of science than any other figure during the 20th century. In this far-reaching collection, distinguished philosophers contribute valuable studies that illuminate and clarify the central problems to which Hempel was devoted. The essays enhance our understanding of the development of logical empiricism as the major intellectual influence for scientifically-oriented philosophers and philosophically-minded scientists of the 20th century.

This is a comprehensive examination of the ideas of the early modern philosophers on the nature of mind. Taking Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume in turn, Janice Thomas presents an authoritative and critical assessment of each of these canonical thinkers' views of the notion of mind. The book examines each philosopher's position on five key topics: the metaphysical character of minds and mental states; the nature and scope of introspection and self-knowledge; the nature of consciousness; the problem of mental causation and the nature of representation and intentionality. The exposition and examination of their positions is informed by present-day debates in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of psychology so that students get a clear sense of the importance of these philosophers' ideas, many of which continue to define our current notions of the mental.Again and again, philosophers and students alike come back to the great early modern rationalist and empiricist philosophers for instruction and inspiration. Their views on the philosophy of mind are no exception and as Janice Thomas shows they have much to offer contemporary debates. The book is suitable for undergraduate courses in the philosophy of mind and the many new courses in philosophy of psychology.

The present volume is a product of an international research program 'Foundations of Science and Ethics', launched in 1976 by the Inter University Centre of Post-Graduate Studies, Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia, with the financial support of the V olkswagen Foundation. According to the outline ofthe program, formulated in 1976 by a committee consisting of Professors Dagfinn F~llesdal, Rudolf Haller (coordinator), Lorenz Kruger, Karel Lambert, Keith Lehrer, Kuno Lorenz, Gunther Patzig, Ivan Supek and Paul Weingartner, its general purpose was to investigate the interplay of various internal and external factors in the development of science. Generous financial support from the Volkswagen Foundation made it possible to plan four annual conferences, the first of which was held in Dubrovnik on March 6-12, 1978. This volume contains the majority of the papers presented in the first Dubrovnik conference; the main theme of this conference was 'Rationality in Science and Ethics' (Some of the papers appear here in a thoroughly revised form. ) Further results of the research program will be discussed in three other conferences, to be held in Dubrovnik in 1979-1981; the papers presented in these conferences will be published separately. Professor Rudolf Haller of the University of Graz assumed the burden of the practical planning and organization of the first conference (as well as that of the other three conferences). I wish to thank Professor Haller on behalf of all participants for carrying out this demanding and time-consuming task.

Originally published in 1986. Wittgenstein, William James, Thomas Kuhn and John Wisdom share an attitude towards problems in the theory of knowledge which is fundamentally in conflict with the empiricist tradition. They encourage the idea that in understanding the central concepts of epistemology – objectivity, certainty and reasoning – people and their practices matter most. This clash between orthodox empiricism and a freshly inspired pragmatism forms the background to the strands of argument in this book. With these philosophers as a guide, it points to new directions by showing how the theory of knowledge can be shaped around our actions without sacrificing reason’s control over our beliefs.