Escalation And Intrawar Deterrence During Limited Wars In The Middle East

A central purpose of this monograph is to reexamine two earlier conflicts for insights that may be relevant for ongoing dangers during limited wars involving nations possessing chemical or biological weapons or emerging nuclear arsenals. These conflicts are the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the 1991 Gulf War. Both of these wars were fought at the conventional level, although the prospect of Israel using nuclear weapons (1973), Egypt using biological weapons (1973), or Iraq using chemical and biological weapons (1991) were of serious concern at various points during the fighting. This monograph will consider why efforts at escalation control and intrawar deterrence were successful in the two case studies and assess the points at which these efforts were under the most intensive stress that might have caused them to fail.

This monograph analyzes military escalation and intrawar deterrence by examining two key wars where these concepts became especially relevant - the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the 1991 Gulf War against Iraq. Intrawar deterrence is defined as the effort to control substantial military escalation during an ongoing war through the threat of large-scale and usually nuclear retaliation should the adversary escalate a conflict beyond a particularly important threshold. The deep contrasts between the 1973 and 1991 dangers of escalation underscore the range of problems that can occur in these types of circumstances.

This monograph analyzes military escalation and intrawar deterrence by examining two key wars where these concepts became especially relevant: the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the 1991 Gulf War against Iraq. A central conclusion of this monograph is that intrawar deterrence is an inherently fragile concept, and that the nonuse of weapons of mass destruction in both wars was the result of a number of positive factors that may not be repeated in future conflicts.

This timely study synthesizes past history with the major military events and dynamics of the 20th- and 21st-century Middle East, helping readers understand the region's present-and look into its future. The Middle East has been-and will continue to be-a major influence on policy around the globe. This work reviews the impact of past epochs on the modern Middle East and analyzes key military events that contributed to forming the region and its people. By helping readers recognize historical patterns of conflict, the book will stimulate a greater understanding of the Middle East as it exists today. The work probes cause and effect in major conflicts that include the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the World Wars, the Arab-Israeli wars, and the U.S. wars with Iraq, examining the manner in which military operations have been conducted by both internal and external actors. New regional groups-for example, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)-are addressed, and pertinent events in Afghanistan and Pakistan are scrutinized. Since military affairs are traditionally an extension of politics and economics, the three are considered together in historical context as they relate to war and peace. The book closes with a chapter on the Arab Awakening and its impact on the future balance of power.

This book examines the question of how to deter a non-state terrorist actor. Can terrorism be deterred? This book argues that current research is unable to find strong cases of deterrence success, because it uses a flawed research design which does not capture the longitudinal dynamics of the process. So far, the focus of inquiry has been on the tactical elements of a state’s counterterrorism strategy, instead of the non-state actor’s grand strategies. By studying the campaigns of Hezbollah, the Palestinians, the Irish Republican Army, Chechens, the Kurdistan Workers' Party, and Al-Qaeda/Taliban and ISIS over time, we can see that deterrence strategies that target the cost-benefit calculus of terrorist organizations lead to wars of attrition – which is the non-state organization’s strategy for victory. To escape the attrition trap, the state must undermine the attrition strategy of terrorist organizations by using offensive campaigns that become critical educational moments. The case studies presented here uncover an evolutionary process of learning, leading to strategic deterrence successes. Some terrorist organizations abandoned the use of force altogether, while others abandoned their aspirational goals or resorted to lower levels of violence. These findings should enable policymakers to transition from the failed policy that sought to defeat the Taliban and al-Qaeda in the unending war in Afghanistan to a policy that successfully applies deterrence. This book will be of much interest to students of deterrence theory, terrorism studies, war and conflict studies, and security studies.

Cold War-era strategic thinking was driven by the belief that individuals, organizations, and foreign states could be deterred from offensive action by the threat of reprisal. That assurance was shaken with the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001; suddenly, it seemed that no threat was powerful enough to deter individuals or organizations that valued political objectives over their own lives and the lives of their members. More than a decade later, new research and theory are bringing deterrence back into currency as a viable counterterrorism strategy. Alex S. Wilner updates deterrence theory for conflict in the twenty-first century, arguing for its value against challengers such as rogue states, cyber warriors, and transnational terrorist organizations. Deterring Rational Fanatics provides a full-scale discussion of deterrence theory concepts and controversies, assessing the utility of relying on the logic of deterrence and coercion to counter contemporary terrorism. In particular, targeted killings directed against the Taliban of Afghanistan provide a vivid illustration of the impact deterrence can have on militant behavior: precision strikes that eliminate militant leaders represent a significant cost to planning and participating in political violence, a cost that can coerce, manipulate, and alter behavior. Though deterrence theory is not a panacea for terrorism, insurgency, or militancy, it can serve as a strategic guide for state responses; as Wilner shows, terrorist violence can indeed be deterred.

This provocative challenge to US politics and strategy maintains that America endures endless wars because its leaders no longer know how to think about war.