Essays On Pareto Optimality In Cooperative Games

The book focuses on Pareto optimality in cooperative games. Most of the existing works focus on the Pareto optimality of deterministic continuous-time systems or for the regular convex LQ case. To expand on the available literature, we explore the existence conditions of Pareto solutions in stochastic differential game for more general cases. In addition, the LQ Pareto game for stochastic singular systems, Pareto-based guaranteed cost control for uncertain mean-field stochastic systems, and the existence conditions of Pareto solutions in cooperative difference game are also studied in detail. Addressing Pareto optimality for more general cases and wider systems is one of the major features of the book, making it particularly suitable for readers who are interested in multi-objective optimal control. Accordingly, it offers a valuable asset for researchers, engineers, and graduate students in the fields of control theory and control engineering, economics, management science, mathematics, etc.

This comprehensive work examines important recent developments and modern applications in the fields of optimization, control, game theory and equilibrium programming. In particular, the concepts of equilibrium and optimality are of immense practical importance affecting decision-making problems regarding policy and strategies, and in understanding and predicting systems in different application domains, ranging from economics and engineering to military applications. The book consists of 29 survey chapters written by distinguished researchers in the above areas.

Essays on Cooperative Games collates selected contributions on Cooperative Games. The papers cover both theoretical aspects (Coalition Formation, Values, Simple Games and Dynamic Games) and applied aspects (in Finance, Production, Transportation and Market Games). A contribution on Minimax Theorem (by Ken Binmore) and a brief history of early Game Theory (by Gianfranco Gambarelli and Guillermo Owen) are also enclosed.

This book introduces new concepts for cooperative game theory, and particularly solutions that determine the distribution of a coalitional surplus among the members of the coalition. It also addresses several generalizations of cooperative game theory. Drawing on methods of welfare economics, new value solutions are derived for Non-Transferable Utility games with and without differences of bargaining power among the members of the coalition. Cooperation in intertemporal games is examined, and conditions that permit the reduction of these games to games in coalition function form are outlined. Biform games and games that combine non-cooperative search and matching of coalition members with cooperative solutions (i.e., efficient contracts) within the coalition are considered. Contents:Value Solutions for Superadditive Transferable Utility Games in Coalition Function FormZeuthen–Nash BargainingNontransferable Utility Games and Games in Partition Function FormA Shapley Value Algorithm for Games in Partition Function FormExtension of the Nucleolus to Nontransferable Utility Games in Partition Function FormA Core Imputation with Variable Bargaining PowerBargaining Power Biform GamesIntertemporal Cooperative Games: A Sketch of a TheoryA Theory of Enterprise Readership: Graduate students and researchers in the field of game theory. Keywords:Cooperative Games;Value;Imputation;Bargaining TheoryKey Features:Proposes a value solution for games of two or more players that: (i) is the Nash bargaining solution in a special case, (ii) allows for unsymmetrical bargaining power, (iii) allows for group-to-group bargaining, and (iv) is always a point in the core of the game if the game is not nullUses methods from mathematical welfare economics to bridge the gap from non-transferable utility to transferable utilityRelying on Biform Games (Brandenburger and Stuart), constructs a model of cooperative value creation in coalitions formed by non-cooperative search and matching

This volume presents a collection of papers on game theory dedicated to Michael Maschler. Through his dedication and contributions to game theory, Maschler has become an important figure particularly in the area of cooperative games. Game theory has since become an important subject in operations research, economics and management science. As befits such a volume, the main themes covered are cooperative games, coalitions, repeated games, and a cost allocation games. All the contributions are authoritative surveys of a particular topic, so together they will present an invaluable overview of the field to all those working on game theory problems.

Professor Morgenstern's deep interests in economic time series and problems of measurement are represented by path-breaking articles devoted to the application of modern statistical analysis to temporal economic data. Originally published in 1967. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

Optimal control and differential games continue to attract strong interest from researchers interested in dynamical problems and models in management science. This volume explores the application of these methodologies to new as well as to classical decision problems in management sciences and economics. In Part I, optimal control and dynamical systems approaches are used to analyze problems in areas such as monetary policy, pollution control, relationship marketing, drug control, debt financing, and ethical behavior. In Part II differential games are applied to problems such as oligopolistic competition, common resource management, spillovers in foreign direct investments, marketing channels, incentive strategies, and the computation of Markov perfect Nash equilibria. Optimal Control and Differential Games is an excellent reference for researchers and graduate students covering a wide range of emerging and revisited problems in management science.