European Competition Law Annual 2006

This is the eleventh in the series on EU Competition Law and Policy produced by the Robert Schuman Centre of the European University Institute in Florence. The volume reproduces the materials of the roundtable debate which examined the enforcement of the prohibition on cartels. The workshop participants - senior representatives of the Commission and the national competition authorities of some EC Member States, renowned international academics and legal practitioners - discussed the economic and legal issues that arise in this particular area, including: 1) unearthing cartels: the evidence; 2) the institutional framework and 3) tools of enforcement.

This is the twelfth in a series on EU Competition Law and Policy produced by the Robert Schuman Centre of the European University Institute in Florence. The volume reproduces the written contributions and transcripts in connection with a roundtable debate which examined the EU's enforcement policy as regards the abuse of a dominant position under Article 82 EC. The workshop participants included: senior enforcement officials and policy makers from the European Commission, from the national competition authorities of certain EU Member States and from the US Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission; and renowned international academics, legal practitioners and professional economists. In an intense, intimate environment, this group of experts debated a number of legal and economic issues structured according to three broad lines of discussion: 1) comparisons of the concept of monopolization under Section 2 of the Sherman Act with that of abuse of dominance under Article 82 EC; 2) a reformed approach to exclusionary unilateral conduct; and 3) exploitative unilateral conduct and related remedies.

This volume contains papers presented at the 18th Annual EU Competition Law and Policy Workshop. The papers examine means of balancing effective (public) competition law enforcement and the requirements of legitimate and accountable exercise of public authority. The authors address the design and performance of various enforcement tools at European and national levels, including sanctions and remedies but also distinctive instruments under Regulation 1/2003 (eg commitment procedures) and under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Article 106(3) when used as a basis for infringement procedures). From the perspective of legitimacy, reflections focus on the implications of fundamental rights standards and general principles of law for the EU's complex and quasi-federal enforcement architecture. Issues that may sometimes escape judicial scrutiny are also discussed, such as how agencies prioritise their activities, and how investigation responsibilities are distributed within the European Competition Network. Effectiveness and legitimacy are then considered in the context of public enforcement cooperation beyond the EU, where international organisations, regional cooperation and a range of formal and informal modes of governance prevail.

The European Competition Law Annual 2003 is the eighth in a series of volumes following the annual workshops on EU Competition Law and Policy held at the Robert Schuman Centre of the European University in Florence. The volume reproduces the materials of the roundtable debate that took place at the eighth Workshop and is dedicated to the question What is an Abuse of a Dominant Position?. It contains the usual mix of expert discussion and expert papers presented by the participants at this annual gathering of leading EU and international experts on competition law.

The European Union (EU) leniency programme is a key weapon in the Commission’s fight against hard-core cartels. Much of the success of EU cartel enforcement depends on the continued effectiveness of the leniency policy and is especially critical in response to the growth of private enforcement. This book offers a comprehensive description of the development of the policy, along with a normative framework that promises to ensure the full legitimacy of the leniency programme: the Commission’s policy should pursue not only effectiveness but also fairness. It is the first work to extensively analyse the effectiveness and fairness in the EU leniency policy. Proceeding systematically from clarifying the concepts of ‘effectiveness’ and ‘fairness’ to addressing the tension between leniency and private actions for damages, the author discusses the nature of, and interrelations among, such aspects as the following: – the theoretical model of the EU fining policy; – the compatibility of the EU enforcement system with fundamental rights protection; – the gathering and evaluation of evidence at the preliminary investigation stage; – the severity and foreseeability of the EU cartel fines; – judicial review by the EU Courts in competition matters; – to what extent the current policy is effective and fair; and – reforms brought about by the 2002 and 2006 Leniency Notices and the leniency-related amendments by the 2014 Antitrust Damages Directive. A key feature is the author’s presentation of a normative framework to test the effectiveness (deterrence) and substantive fairness (retribution) of the EU leniency policy. As a clear demonstration of how to forestall the danger of focusing on effectiveness of leniency at the expense of fairness, both in a substantive and in a procedural sense, this book is a major contribution to the literature of competition law. It will prove to be of great value to competition authorities, antitrust practitioners and interested academics not only in Europe but also throughout the world.

The aim of this book is to explore the economic fundamentals of European competition law.

This is the thirteenth in a series on EU Competition Law and Policy produced under the auspices of the Robert Schuman Centre of the European University Institute in Florence. The volume contains the written contributions of numerous competition policy experts, together with the transcripts of a roundtable debate which examined the subject of "settlements" between enforcers of competition law and defendant companies in cartel cases and in other types of antitrust cases. The Workshop participants included: -- senior judges from major jurisdictions (the European Union, Germany and the United States); -- senior enforcement officials and policy makers from the European Commission, from the national competition authorities of certain EU Member States and from the US Department of Justice and the US Federal Trade Commission; and -- renowned international international academics, legal practitioners and professional economists. In an intense, intimate environment, this group of experts debated a number of legal and economic issues pertaining to two broad lines of discussion: 1) settlements and plea agreements in cartel cases, including their links with leniency programs and with private enforcement; and 2) settlements in "commitment" cases decided under Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 and under comparable procedures of national law.